Judge Cherol J. Nellon, Case Number: 24STCV06038, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 24STCV06038, Date: 2025-01-28 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV06038 Hearing Date: January 28, 2025 Dept: 14

Case Background

This is a lemon law case.

On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff Naya Muhit FKA Sanniya Ali filed her Complaint against Defendants Mercedes Benz USA, LLC (Mercedes) and Keyes European (Keyes).

On October 25, 2024, Defendant Mercedes filed this motion for judgment on the pleadings.

On December 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition.

Instant Pleading

Defendant Mercedes moves for a judgment on the pleadings.

Decision

The motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant Mercedes is GRANTED. The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. Plaintiff awards Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend.

Judicial Notice

Mercedes requests that the Court take judicial notice of (1) a Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Web Dealer Original Title and (2) a Buyer’s Tag Receipt – Dealer Copy. Both documents are records of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV).

Plaintiff objects to the request, arguing that the records are not judicially noticeable under Evid. Code, section 452(d) because they are not court records. However, the records are judicially noticeable under Evid. Code, section 452(c) because DMV records, such as a driving record, are judicially noticeable as official acts of a state agency. (LaChance v. Valverde (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 779, 783.) Thus, the DMV records are judicially noticeable. Mercedes’ request for judicial notice is GRANTED.

Discussion

Mercedes first moves for judgment on the pleadings as to Plaintiff’s causes of action under the Song-Beverly Act on the grounds that Civ. Code, section 1792 does not apply to Plaintiff’s vehicle, which was purchased outside of California.

In Cummins v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court expressly held that the entire Song-Beverly Act, with particular reference to section 1793.2(d) only applies to goods sold in the State of California. (Cummins, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 493-94.)

Here, the Court granted Mercedes’s request for judicial notice of Texas DMV records which show that Plaintiff purchased the subject vehicle under the name Shannia Ali from Mercedes-Benz of Sugarland in Houston, Texas. (RJN Exhs. A, B.) Plaintiff argues that the Complaint does not disclose that title passed to Plaintiff in Texas and that the DMV records may not be judicially noticed. However, the records are judicially noticeable, as discussed above. The judicially noticed records are sufficient to show that the subject vehicle was not sold in California. Therefore, the Song-Beverly Act does not apply to the subject vehicle.

Mercedes next argues that Plaintiff’s claims under the Magnuson-Moss Act fail because Plaintiff has no viable claim under the Song-Beverly Act.

The Magnuson-Moss Act “authorizes a civil suit by a consumer to enforce the terms of an implied or express warranty. Magnuson–Moss ‘calls for the application of state written and implied warranty law, not the creation of additional federal law,’ except in specific instances in which it expressly prescribes a regulating rule.” (Daugherty v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 824, 832–833.) The courts have held that even if relief is not available under the Song-Beverly Act, a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Act may be based on other state laws, such as the warranty provisions under California Commercial Code, sections 2313 and 2714. (See Orichian v. BMW of North America, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1332; see also Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, 928 (purchaser’s express warranty claims under the California Commercial Code were viable despite the lack of a viable cause of action under the Song-Beverly Act).)

Here, the motion will turn on whether Plaintiff’s claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act stems from some other state law. Plaintiff is correct that her Magnuson-Moss claims need not be dependent upon a viable claim under the Song-Beverly Act. However, a Magnuson-Moss claim must be supported by some other state law. Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act incorporates the earlier allegations by reference. (Compl., ¶61.) Plaintiff’s earlier allegations are based entirely on sections of the Song-Beverly Act. Plaintiff does not invoke any other state laws which may be used to support a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Act.

Plaintiff cites Dagher and Clemens v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2008) 534 F.3d 1017, 1021 in support of her opposition, arguing that Magnuson-Moss claims may stand independent of any Song-Beverly claims. However, in Dagher and Clemens, both plaintiffs invoked provisions of the California Commercial Code in connection with their Magnuson-Moss claims. Here, Plaintiff’s Complaint only references portions of the Song-Beverly Act. If Plaintiff’s claims under the Magnuson-Moss act are based on some other state law, Plaintiff must state which law she is invoking in the Complaint to give Defendants sufficient notice of the allegations against them. As pled, Plaintiff’s sixth cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act appears to invoke the Song-Beverly Act and no other state laws. Because the motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted as to the Song-Beverly Act claim, the motion is also granted as to the sixth cause of action for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Act.

Conclusion

The motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by Defendant Mercedes is GRANTED. The Court grants Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend. Plaintiff awards Plaintiff 20 days leave to amend.