Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 24STCV18304, Date: 2024-11-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV18304 Hearing Date: November 13, 2024 Dept: 14
#18
Case Background
This is an action for invasion of the right to privacy,
violation of Civ. Code, section 3344, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, negligence, and violation of Penal Code, section 632.7. Plaintiff
alleges that Defendant Ridge illegally recorded a phone conversation about her
deceased son without her knowledge. Ridge thereafter videotaped portions of
Plaintiff’s son’s funeral without her consent. Thereafter, Ridge posted these
recordings on social media.
On July 24, 2024, Plaintiff Judi Paul filed her
Complaint against Defendants Patrick Ridge, Danielle Nepus, Madison Mastera,
Graceland Ranch, Inc., and Ridge Productions, Inc.
On September 30, 2024, Defendants Patrick Ridge,
Danielle Nepus, Madison Mastera, and Graceland Ranch, Inc. (Moving Defendants)
filed this motion to strike.
On October 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition.
On November 5, 2024, Moving Defendants filed a reply.
Instant Pleading
Moving Defendants move to strike portions of
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
Decision
Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.
Discussion
Moving Defendants move to strike many sections of
Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that (1) the language is irrelevant,
improper, and inflammatory, and (2) the Complaint contains conclusions of law.
Moving Defendants seek to strike many items from the Complaint which generally
fall in the following categories:
-
Allegations that Ridge’s conduct was despicable or
disgusting
-
Adjectives describing Ridge's conduct as shameless,
shocking, disgusting, vile, and other similar words
-
Assertions that the video Ridge took was unauthorized
or illegal
-
Quotations taken from the videos Ridge posted on social
media
Code Civ. Proc., section 436(a) provides that a court
may strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any
pleading.
Whether the language was irrelevant, improper, or
inflammatory
Moving Defendants first allege that the allegations of
the Complaint contain inflammatory language which is highly prejudicial to
Moving Defendants. However, there is no authority which states a Court may
strike portions of a pleading for inflammatory or prejudicial content. Moving
Defendants’ use of the word “prejudicial” appears to invoke the prejudice
standard described in Evid. Code, section 352. However, there is no requirement
that a pleading must avoid prejudicing a defendant. A complaint typically describes
a defendant’s wrongful conduct which allegedly resulted in some injury to a
plaintiff. If a complaint had to avoid prejudicing a defendant, no complaint
could survive a motion to strike. Moving Defendants’ argument is thus without
merit.
Moving Defendants also argue that the language is
irrelevant. Plaintiff’s Complaint includes a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
The elements for a cause of action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress are (1) extreme and outrageous
conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard
of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s
suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) an actual and proximate
causal link between the tortious conduct and the emotional distress.¿ (Hughes
v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050.)¿
Here, the disputed language describes Ridge’s conduct
and characterizes it as shameless, disgusting, and vile, among other
descriptors. Because a cause of action for IIED requires that Plaintiff prove
Ridge’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, it was not unreasonable to describe
Ridge’s conduct using these adjectives. It was also reasonable for Plaintiff to
directly quote Ridge’s comments from the content he posted on social media to specifically
identify what conduct Plaintiff found extreme and outrageous. Therefore, the
disputed language is relevant to Plaintiff’s cause of action for IIED.
Additionally, the alleged inflammatory language is
relevant to Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages.
In
order to state a
prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint
must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute,
Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations
that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, section
3294, subd. (a).) “Malice is defined in the statute as
conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or
despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and
conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College Hospital,
Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code, section 3294,
subd. (c)(1)].) “As amended to include
[despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure the
plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious’ disregard of
the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of ‘despicable conduct’
must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 725.)
Here,
allegations that Ridge’s conduct was vile, shameless, or disgusting are
relevant to whether his conduct was malicious as required under Civ. Code,
section 3294 because those descriptors would show Ridge’s conduct rose to the
level of despicable conduct required to support a demand for punitive damages.
Therefore, the allegations are not irrelevant or improper.
The
motion to strike is DENIED on this ground.
Whether the language should be stricken because it
includes conclusions of law
Moving Defendants next allege that the language
describing Ridge’s conduct as illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, malicious, and
outrageous should be stricken because they are legal conclusions. Moving
Defendants cite Krug v. Meehan (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 274, 276 and argue
that conclusions of law must be stricken because they are deemed to be
surplusage that must be disregarded in considering the sufficiency of a
pleading.
Here, as Plaintiff points out, Moving Defendants do not
challenge the sufficiency of the Complaint, but move to strike the allegations
that constitute legal conclusions. There is no authority to support the
assertion that legal conclusions are irrelevant or improper. Rather, as the Krug
court held, legal conclusions alone are insufficient to support a cause of
action without supporting ultimate facts. The Krug court even notes that
“if substantial facts which constitute a cause of action are averred in the
complaint or can be inferred by reasonable intendment from the matters which
are pleaded, although the allegations of these facts are intermingled with
conclusions of law, the complaint is not subject to demurrer for insufficiency.”
(Krug, supra, 109 Cal.App.2d at p.277.) In other words, a complaint may
survive demurrer even if it contains conclusions of law if the ultimate facts
may be inferred from the matters pleaded. Thus, there is no prohibition on
legal conclusions in a complaint. Therefore, here, the legal conclusions in
Plaintiff’s Complaint are not irrelevant or improper.
Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED on this
ground.
Conclusion
Moving Defendants’ motion to strike is DENIED.