Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 24STCV20865, Date: 2024-05-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV20865 Hearing Date: May 23, 2024 Dept: 14
Smith v. Baldwin Housing
Case Background
This is a habitability action
involving numerous plaintiffs that reside at the 4063 Nicolet Avenue, Los
Angeles, California 90008 or 4070 Ursula Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90008,
which are adjacent to one another and are owned, operated and managed by the
same entities. Defendants Solari Enterprises (“Solari”), FPI Management, Inc.
(“FPI”), and AMC-CA Incorporated (erroneously sued as “Apartment Management
Consultants, LLC”) (“AMC”) are alleged to have managed the subject properties
during a portion of the last four years. Defendants BH Preservation Associates LP (“BHPA”) and
Baldwin Housing Associates, L.P. (“BHA”) are alleged to have owned the subject
properties for a portion of the last four years. During their tenancy at the
subject properties, Plaintiffs have been exposed to various substandard
conditions that include ceiling collapse, water intrusions, pest infestations,
unsanitary conditions in the flooring and common areas, broken and inoperable
fixtures.
On August
30, 2023, Plaintiffs initiated this action. On October 2, 2023, Plaintiff filed
their operative First Amended Complaint against Defendants BHA, BHPA, Solari,
FPI, and AMC (collectively, “Defendants”), asserting the following causes of
action: (1) breach of implied warranty of habitability; (2) tortious breach of
implied warranty of habitability; (3) negligence; (4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress; (5) private nuisance; (6) violation of California Civil
Code § 1942.4; (7) violation of unlawful business practices (Business &
Professions Code § 17200); and (8) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code §
45.33.
On December 21, 2023, Defendant BHPA
filed its answer to the FAC.
On December 27, 2023, Defendants BHA
and Solari filed their joint answer to the FAC.
On December 27, 2023, Defendant FPI
filed its demurrer and motion to strike to the FAC.
On January 29, 2024, Defendant AMC
filed its demurrer and motion to strike to the FAC.
Trial has
not yet been set in this matter.
(1)
Demurrer with Strike filed by Defendant FPI
Defendant FPI demurrers to the first and fourth through eighth causes of
action on the ground that they have been insufficiently pleaded to state a
cause of action against it. Additionally, Defendant FPI moves to strike
Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages and attorney fees found in paragraphs
57, 72, 78, 82, 89, 95, 96, 106, 109, 111, 113, 115, 117, 1120.
(2) Demurrer with Strike filed by Defendant AMC
Defendant AMC demurrers to the first and fourth through eighth causes of
action on the ground that they have been insufficiently pleaded to state a
cause of action against it. Additionally, Defendant AMC moves to strike
Plaintiffs’ claims for punitive damages and attorney fees found in paragraphs
57, 72, 78, 82, 89, 95, 96, 106, 109, 111, 113, 115, 117, 1120.
Decision
Defendants FPI and AMC’s demurrers
as SUSTAINED in their entirety. Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave to amend only as
to the fourth, seventh, and eighth causes of action. Defendants FPI and AMC’s
motions to strike are GRANTED in part as to the claim for punitive damages
raised in FAC ¶ 57 with leave to amend, and the motions is DENIED in part as
moot as to the remainder.
Plaintiffs are ordered to file amended pleadings within 30 days of this
order.
Discussion
As a
preliminary matter, because Defendants FPI and AMC raise similar arguments in
their respective filings. This court shall address them together to avoid
duplicity of analysis.
First
Cause of Action – Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability
Defendants
FPI and AMC separately argue that the first cause of action has been
insufficiently pleaded against them because this cause of action is premised in
contract, and it has not been sufficiently alleged that there is a contractual
relationship between them and Plaintiffs. (FPI’s Demurrer at pp. 2-3; AMC’s
Demurrer at pp. 5-6.)
Notably,
Plaintiffs’ oppositions fail to rebut this argument, and therefore, Plaintiffs
have abandoned the issue. (Herzberg v. County of Plumas (2005) 133
Cal.App.4th 1, 20.)
Accordingly,
Defendants FPI and AMC’s demurrers to the first cause of action is sustained
without leave to amend.
Fourth
Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The elements of an IIED claim are: (1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) intention to cause or
reckless disregard of the probability of causing emotional distress; (3) severe
emotional suffering; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional
distress. To satisfy the element of extreme and outrageous conduct, defendant’s
conduct “‘must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated
in a civilized society.’” (Moncada, supra, 221 Cal.App.4th at
780.) Also, “[s]evere emotional distress means emotional distress of such
substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable person in
civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Potter v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co.¿(1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1004.)¿¿ “[T]he plaintiff
must allege with great specificity the acts which he or she believes are so
extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in civilized
community.” (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.)
Defendants FPI and AMC separately
demur to the fourth cause of action on the ground that it fails to sufficiently
allege with the requisite specificity outrageous conduct. (FPI’s Demurrer at
pp. 4-5; AMC’s Demurrer at pg. 7.) Additionally, Defendant FPI argues that the
FAC relies merely on conclusory allegations to support the element of severe
emotional distress.
In
opposition, Plaintiffs contend that the fourth cause of action has been
sufficiently pleaded against both defendants because it is alleged that they
failed to take remedial actions to correct the substandard conditions found in
the subject properties and intentionally ignored Plaintiffs’ complaints of
these conditions. (Opposition re: FPI at pg. 4; Opposition re: AMC at pg. 4.)
Upon review
of the allegations, this court is not persuaded by Plaintiffs’ arguments. As
alleged in the complaint, Plaintiffs were exposed to various substandard
conditions, which Defendants were made aware of, and Defendants failed to make
necessary repairs despite having knowledge of the substandard conditions. (FAC
¶¶ 48-54.) Also, the FAC makes the generalized allegation that Plaintiffs have
suffered severe emotional distress. (FAC ¶ 81.) These allegations are
insufficient for the following reasons. First, because the purported conduct is alleged collectively amongst the
varying Defendants, it is unclear what Defendants FPI and AMC specifically did
that amounted to egregious conduct. Second, Plaintiffs’ allegation for
severe emotional distress lack “facts
indicating the nature or extent of any mental suffering.” because the complaint only generally references the
various physical and emotion injuries that Plaintiffs allegedly suffer
from. (Pittman v. City of Oakland
(1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047.) Therefore, this cause of action has not been
sufficiently alleged.
Accordingly,
the demurrers are sustained to the fourth cause of action with leave to amend.
Fifth
Cause of Action – Private Nuisance
Defendants FPI and AMC separately
argue that the fifth cause of action for public nuisance is subject to demurer
because it is duplicative of the Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. (FPI’s Demurrer
at pp. 5-6; AMC’s Demurrer at pg. 7-8.)
Notably, Plaintiffs’ oppositions
fail to rebut this argument, and therefore, Plaintiffs have abandoned the
issue. (Herzberg, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at 20.)
Accordingly, the demurrers to the
fifth cause of action are sustained without leave to amend.
Sixth Cause of Action –
Violation of Civil Code § 1942.2
Next, Defendants FPI and AMC
separately argue that the sixth cause of action for violation of 1942.2 is
subject to demurer because it only applies to landlords and lessees of
residential rental properties, not property managers. (FPI’s Demurrer at pg. 8;
AMC’s Demurrer at pg. 9.) It is noted that Plaintiffs’ oppositions fail to
rebut this argument, and therefore, Plaintiffs have abandoned the issue. (Herzberg,
supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at 20.)
Accordingly, the demurrers to the
sixth cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.
Seventh Cause of Action – Unfair
Business Practices
Defendants
FPI and AMC also separately argue that the seventh cause of action for unfair
business practices is subject to demurrer because the cause of action has not
been pleaded with the requisite specificity. (FPI’s Demurrer at pg. 9; AMC’s
Demurrer at pg. 10.) This court agrees. “To state a cause of action based on an unlawful
business act or practice under the UCL, a plaintiff must allege facts
sufficient to show a violation of some underlying law.” (People v. McKal
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 626, 635.) Additionally, “statutory causes of action must be
pleaded with particularity.” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 771, 790.) Upon review of the allegations, purported
conduct is alleged collectively amongst the varying Defendants, it is unclear
what Defendants FPI and AMC specifically did that amounted to an unfair or
illegal business practice. Furthermore, the facts alleged do not sufficiently
establish that these defendants had power to maintain or repair the properties,
which are alleged to be owned by Defendants BHA and BHPA.
Accordingly,
the demurrers to the seventh cause of action is sustained with leave to amend.
Eighth
Cause of Action – Violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code § 45.33.
Pursuant to
Los Angeles Municipal Code § 45.33, tenant harassment by a landlord is
prohibited. A form of harassment includes “Failing to perform and timely
complete necessary repairs and maintenance required by State, County, or local
housing, health, or safety laws; or failure to follow applicable industry
standards to minimize exposure to noise, dust, lead paint, asbestos, or other
building materials with potentially harmful health impacts (LAMC § 45.33(2).) Under
this municipal code, “landlord” is defined as “any owner, lessor, sublessor,
manager, and/or person, including any firm, corporation, partnership, or other
entity, having any legal or
equitable right of ownership or possession or the right to
lease or receive rent for the
use and occupancy of a rental unit.” (LAMC § 45.32.)
Defendants
FPI and AMC separately argue that the allegations are insufficiently pleaded
because the conduct alleged refers to the Defendants collectively, and thus,
they have not been pleaded with the requisite particularity. (FPI’s Demurrer at
pg. 10; AMC’s Demurrer at pp. 11-12.) As with the seventh cause of action, this
argument is persuasive, and as a result, additional facts need to be alleged as
to each defendant in order to maintain a statutory claim.
Additionally, AMC argues that LAMC
§ 45.32 does not apply to managers of a property. This argument is only
partially persuasive because the FAC does not allege that Defendants FPI or AMC
had the right to lease or to receive rent from the Plaintiffs. Thus,
additionally facts would need to be alleged as to this defect as well.
Accordingly, the demurrers to the
eighth cause of action are sustained with leave to amend.
Motion to Strike
Defendants FPI and AMC move to
strike Plaintiffs’ claim for attorney fees and punitive damages. Because their
demurrers have been sustained in their entirety, their motions to strike are
largely moot except as to Paragraph 57 of the FAC. It is clear that Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages stems
from the substandard living conditions allegedly caused by Defendants. (FAC ¶¶ 45-54.)
However, as stated above, these allegations have not been pleaded with the
requisite particularity because they are applied collectively against Defendants.
Consequently, those allegations are
insufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Lehto v. Underground
Constr. Co. (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 933, 944 [reasoning that a claim for
punitive damages must be pleaded with particularity].) Moreover, defective
conditions of a premises and a failure to correct on their own are not
sufficient to sustain a claim for punitive damages. (McDonell v. American
Trust Company (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 296, 297-299.) Thus, Plaintiffs would need to allege
additional facts to show that Defendants FPI and AMC acted with oppression,
malice or fraud.
Accordingly, Defendants FPI and AMC’s motions to strike are granted in
part as to Paragraph 57 of the FAC with leave to amend and denied as moot as to
the remainder.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs’ FAC is deficient because the conduct
alleged applies collectively to the Defendants. Thus, further factual
allegations specifically directed at Defendants FPI and AMC are required in
order to maintain the claims asserted in the pleadings.
Consequently, Defendants FPI and AMC’s demurrers as SUSTAINED in their
entirety. Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave to amend only as to the fourth, seventh,
and eighth causes of action. Defendants FPI and AMC’s motions to strike are
GRANTED in part as to the claim for punitive damages raised in FAC ¶ 57 with
leave to amend, and the motions is DENIED in part as moot as to the remainder.
Plaintiffs are ordered to file amended pleadings within 30 days of this
order.