Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 24STCV21735, Date: 2025-02-18 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV21735 Hearing Date: February 18, 2025 Dept: 14
Case Background
This is an action for violation of the California
Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA).
On August 26, 2024, Plaintiff Dana Hughes filed her
Complaint against Defendant, Newegg, Inc.
On January 17, 2025, Defendant filed a motion to
strike.
On February 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.
On February 7, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.
Instant Pleading
Defendant moves to strike the demands for punitive
damages and attorney’s fees from the Complaint.
Decision
Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to
amend. Plaintiff must file a First Amended Complaint by March 20, 2025.
Legal Standard
In
order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the
elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section
3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704,
721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has
been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)
“Malice
is defined in the statute as conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury
to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant
with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (College
Hospital, Inc., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725 [examining Civ. Code,
section 3294, subd. (c)(1)].) “A conscious disregard
of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section
3294 of the Civil Code. In order to justify an award of punitive damages
on this basis, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant was aware of the
probable dangerous consequences of his conduct, and that he willfully and
deliberately failed to avoid those consequences.” (Taylor v. Superior
Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896.)
“As
amended to include [despicable], the statute plainly indicates that absent an
intent to injure the plaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and
conscious’ disregard of the plaintiffs’ interests. The additional component of
‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital, Inc.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 725.) The statute’s reference to despicable
conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage
awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conduct is “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible,
miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised
by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the
character of outrage frequently associated with crime.’” (Tomaselli v.
Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.)
“[T]he imposition of punitive damages upon a
corporation is based upon its own fault. It is not imposed vicariously by
virtue of the fault of others.” (City Products Corp. v. Globe Indemnity
Co. (1979) 88 Cal.App.3d 31, 36.) “Corporations are legal entities
which do not have minds capable of recklessness, wickedness, or intent to
injure or deceive. An award of punitive damages against a corporation
therefore must rest on the malice of the corporation’s employees. But the
law does not impute every employee’s malice to the corporation. Instead,
the punitive damages statute requires proof of malice among corporate
leaders: the ‘officer[s], director[s], or managing agent[s].’” (Cruz
v. Home Base (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 160, 167 [citation omitted].) As to
ratification, “[a] corporation cannot confirm and accept that which it does not
actually know about.’” (Ibid. [citing College Hospital, Inc.,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 726 [for ratification sufficient to justify
punitive damages against corporation, there must be proof that officers,
directors, or managing agents had actual knowledge of the malicious conduct and
its outrageous character]].)
Discussion
Defendant moves to strike the demands for punitive
damages and attorneys’ fees from the prayer for relief in Plaintiff’s
Complaint.
The Complaint alleges that Defendant installed a program
on its website (the TikTok Software) which collects data from visitors, matches
it with existing data, transmits users’ identifying information, and transmits
the data to TikTok. (Compl., ¶¶12-17.) Defendant did not obtain Plaintiff’s
consent before using the TikTok Software to collect her data. (Id.,
¶23.)
Punitive Damages
The allegations in the Complaint do not state that
Defendant engaged in despicable behavior. Although the allegations that
Defendant took Plaintiff’s data without her consent demonstrate that Defendant
acted with a conscious disregard for Plaintiff’s rights, the facts do not show
that this conduct amounted to despicable conduct sufficient to support a demand
for punitive damages.
Additionally, the Complaint does not state that
Defendant’s alleged malicious conduct was committed or ratified by an officer,
director, or managing agent. Thus, the Complaint fails to meet the pleading
standard to demand punitive damages from a corporate entity.
The Court declines to reach Defendant’s remaining
arguments.
Attorney Fees
Plaintiff argues in opposition to this motion that
attorney fees are permitted under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021.5, which
states in pertinent part, “Upon motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a
successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest
if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been
conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity
and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public
entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award
appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid
out of the recovery, if any.” (Code Civ. Proc., section 1021.5.)
Here, there are no facts in the Complaint alleging this
lawsuit concerns an important right affecting the public interest. Although the
Complaint states the TikTok Software would collect data from visitors to
Defendant’s website, there are no allegations that the software affected anyone
other than Plaintiff. Additionally, the facts merely state that Defendant has
been taking and transmitting visitor data through the TikTok Software. There
are no facts alleging that Plaintiff prevailing in this action and stopping
Defendant’s use of the TikTok Software would confer a significant public
benefit. Thus, the Complaint fails to plead a basis for the recovery of
attorney fees.
The motion to strike is GRANTED.
Plaintiff requests leave to amend. Although Plaintiff
fails to explain how the Complaint may be amended to cure the defects described
above, as the law requires that leave to amend be granted liberally, the Court
will grant leave to amend.
Conclusion
Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED with leave to
amend. Plaintiff must file a First Amended Complaint by March 20, 2025.