Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 24STCV24388, Date: 2025-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV24388    Hearing Date: March 12, 2025    Dept: 14

#6

Case Background

This is an action for declaratory relief and rescission of settlement. Plaintiff was hit by a car driven by Defendant Quiroz. Quiroz never disclosed a visual impairment or that he was driving without a license. Plaintiff alleges Quiroz’s insurance policy is invalid because he lacks a driver’s license. Plaintiff requests rescission of a settlement agreement.

On September 20, 2024, Plaintiff Kristopher Hogan filed his Complaint against Defendants Victor Quiroz, Sr.  and Farmers Direct Property and Casualty Insurance (“FDPC” erroneously sued as Metropolitan Direct Property and Casualty Insurance (MetLife)).

On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC).

On February 19, 2025, Defendant FDPC filed this demurrer and motion to strike.

Instant Pleading

FDPC demurs to the FAC and moves to strike the demands for punitive damages, attorney’s fees, and costs.

Decision

FDPC’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend.

FDPC’s motion to strike is GRANTED with 15 days leave to amend.

Discussion

1.     Demurrer

FDPC’s demurs to the FAC on the grounds that it is uncertain and fails to state a cause of action against it.

Uncertainty

FDPC first demurs to the FAC on the grounds that it is uncertain. Specifically, FDPC argues that the FAC fails to specify which Defendant each cause of action is brought against.

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) “The objection of uncertainty does not go to the failure to allege sufficient facts.” (Brea v. McGlashan (1934) 3 Cal.App.2d 454, 459.) “It goes to the doubt as to what the pleader means by the facts alleged.” (Id.) “Such a demurrer should not be sustained where the allegations of the complaint are sufficiently clear to apprise the defendant of the issues which he is to meet.” (People v. Lim (1941) 18 Cal.2d 872, 882.)  

Here, the FAC Alleges that on May 29, 2018, Plaintiff was bicycling in a crosswalk when Defendant Quiroz struck him with his vehicle. (FAC ¶¶4.1-4.2.) Quiroz is legally blind and unlicensed. (FAC ¶4.1.) Quiroz failed to disclose his visual impairment, drove without a license, and failed to disclose his disability. (FAC ¶¶4.4-4.5.) Defendant FDPC issued an insurance policy which Plaintiff alleges is invalid due to Quiroz’s lack of a driver’s license. (FAC ¶4.6.) FDPC failed to disclose Quiroz’s qualifications and insurance coverage. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Quiroz’s failure to disclose his disability and licensure status constitutes fraudulent concealment and justifies rescission of the settlement agreement and invalidation of the insurance policy issued by FDPC. (FAC ¶¶5.1.1-5.1.2.)

The FAC does not state which causes of action are directed at FDPC and which are directed at Quiroz. Additionally, the only facts Plaintiff alleges against FDPC specifically are that FDPC failed to disclose Quiroz’s disability, his licensure status, and information about Quiroz’s insurance coverage. The remainder of the FAC alleges in a conclusory manner that Quiroz’s conduct amounts to fraudulent concealment, gross negligence, and a violation of elder law. There are no allegations that FDPC’s conduct also gives rise to these causes of action. FDPC thus cannot determine which issues it is to meet. Therefore, the FAC is uncertain as to FDPC. FDPC’s demurrer is SUSTAINED. The Court declines to consider FDPC’s arguments with respect to sufficiency at this time.

2.     Motion to Strike

FDPC moves to strike Plaintiff’s demands for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.

Punitive Damages

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) 

Here, as discussed above, the FAC alleges that FDPC failed to disclose information about Quiroz’s disability, licensure status, and insurance coverage. The Court finds that the conduct described in the FAC does not rise to a level of malicious conduct sufficient to support a demand for punitive damages. Additionally, the FAC is uncertain as to FDPC and thus does not state FDPC engaged in fraudulent conduct. Therefore, the motion to strike Plaintiff’s demand for punitive damages is GRANTED.

Attorney’s Fees

Generally, each party bears his or her own attorney fees. (Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society (1975) 421 U.S. 240, 247.) Moreover, "[i]t is well settled that a party is not entitled to attorney fees except where authorized by statute or by contract.” (Anger v. Borden (1951) 38 Cal. 2d 136, 145.) 

Here, the FAC fails to identify any statute or contract which would allow Plaintiff to recover attorney’s fees. Therefore, the motion to strike is GRANTED as to the demand for attorney’s fees.

Although Plaintiff failed to oppose FDPC’s motions, the Court will grant leave to amend in an abundance of caution.

Conclusion

FDPC’s demurrer is SUSTAINED with 15 days leave to amend.

FDPC’s motion to strike is GRANTED with 15 days leave to amend.