Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 24STV31431, Date: 2025-06-12 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STV31431 Hearing Date: June 12, 2025 Dept: 14
#8
Case Background
This is a lemon law action.
On November 27, 2024, Plaintiff Jessica Villarreal
filed a Complaint against Defendants FCA US, LLC, Cerritos Dodge Chryslyer Jeep
Ram, and Does 1 through 10 for: (1) Violation of Subdivision (D) of Civil Code
Section 1793.2; (2) Violation of Subdivision (B) of Civil Code Section 1793.2;
(3) Violation of Subdivision (A)(3) of Civil Code Section 1793.2; (4) Breach of
the Implied Warranty of Merchantability; (5) Negligent Repair; and (6) Fraudulent
Inducement – Concealment.
On January 30, 2025, Defendant FCA US, LLC
(“Defendant”) filed this demurrer.
On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition.
On June 5, 2025, Defendant filed a reply.
Instant Pleading
Defendant demurs to the sixth cause of action for fraudulent
inducement – concealment.
Decision
Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.
Defendant must file an answer within 20 days of this
order.
Discussion
Defendant demurs to the sixth cause of action for
fraudulent inducement by concealment on the grounds that the Complaint does not
meet the heightened pleading standard for fraud because it lacks allegations of
the “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the fraud was tendered.”
(Demurrer p. 2:10-12.)
“[T]he elements of an action for fraud and deceit
based on a concealment are: (1) the defendant must have concealed or suppressed
a material fact; (2) the defendant must have been under a duty to disclose the
fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant must have intentionally concealed or
suppressed the fact with the intent to defraud the plaintiff; (4) the plaintiff
must have been unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he did if he had
known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) as a result of the
concealment or suppression of the fact, the plaintiff must have sustained
damage.” (Boschma v. Home Loan Center, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 230,
248.) Absent a
fiduciary relationship between the parties, a duty to disclose can arise in
only three circumstances: (1) the defendant had exclusive knowledge of the
material fact; (2) the defendant actively concealed the material fact; or (3)
the defendant made partial representations while also suppressing the material
fact. (Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (Bigler-Engler) (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 276, 311; LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326,
336.) Moreover, a direct transactional relationship is not required to
establish a duty to disclose. (OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v.
CIBC World Markets Corp. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 835, 859.) “A vendor has an
affirmative duty to disclose material facts not only to immediate purchasers,
but also to subsequent purchasers when the vendor has reason to expect
that the item will be resold.” (Id. at 859-60 [emphasis in original].)
“Fraud must be pled
specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice.” (Lazar v.
Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) “This particularity requirement
necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by
what means the representations were tendered” (Ibid.) However, the specificity standard is less stringent “when ‘it appears from the nature of
the allegations that the defendant must necessarily possess full information concerning the facts of
the controversy.’” (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General
Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217, superseded by statute on other
grounds as stated in Californians for Disability Rights v. Mervyn's, LLC
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 223, 227, quoting Bradley v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co. (1973) 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 825.)
The
Court finds that Plaintiff alleges the elements of fraudulent concealment with
the requisite specificity. The Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff entered a warranty contract with Defendant in November 2019. (Compl.,
¶10.) Plaintiff purchased the Subject Vehicle as manufactured with FCA’s
defective engine. (Id., ¶18.) Defendant had
exclusive knowledge that the vehicle was defective prior to the sale. (Id.,
¶19, 21-22, 25.) Defendant concealed the defect from Plaintiff at the
time of purchase, repair, and thereafter. (Id.,
¶¶21, 23, 28-29, 68.) Plaintiff was unaware of the defect before they purchased
the vehicle. (Id., ¶25.) If Plaintiff knew of the defect, she would not
have purchased the vehicle. (Id., ¶24, 27.) As a result of the
concealment, Plaintiff was harmed when she purchased a vehicle she would not
have purchased had she known of the subject defect. (Id., ¶71.) As to
duty to disclose, because the Complaint alleges a contractual relationship (the
warranty contract) between the parties, that Defendant had exclusive knowledge
of the alleged material defect, and that Defendant actively concealed the
material defect, the facts pled are sufficient to establish that
Defendant owed a duty to disclose the material defect. Moreover, a duty to
disclose applies to Defendant, as it expected its vehicles to be sold through
authorized dealerships.
The Complaint pleads each element of
fraud with sufficient specificity because it contains facts to support each
element of fraud and sufficient detail to give Defendant notice of the charges
against it. Any missing details would reasonably be in Defendant’s possession
because Defendant was a party to the transaction described in the Complaint.
Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED on this ground.
Conclusion
Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED.
Defendant must file an answer within 20 days of this
order.