Judge: Cherol J. Nellon, Case: 25STCV01424, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25STCV01424    Hearing Date: April 17, 2025    Dept: 14

#8

Case Background

This is an action for motor vehicle negligence arising from a vehicle collision.

On January 21, 2025, Plaintiff Tho Phuoc Dang filed his Complaint against Defendants Hadji Harris, Nichelle Thomas, Uber Technologies, Inc., Raiser LLC, and Raiser-CA LLC.

On February 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Doe Amendment naming Blue Hill Specialty Insurance Company (Blue Hill) as a Defendant in this action.

On March 10, 2025, Plaintiff dismissed all Defendants except for Blue Hill.

On March 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed this motion to compel arbitration.

On March 20, 2025, Defendant filed an opposition.

Instant Pleading

Plaintiff moves to compel arbitration and appoint a neutral arbitrator.

Decision

Plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and appoint a neutral arbitrator is DENIED.

Legal Standard

Code Civ. Pro. section 1281.2 permits a party to file a petition to request that the Court order the parties to arbitrate a controversy.  Under section 1281.2, a party is permitted to file a motion to request an order directing the parties to arbitrate a controversy.  Section 1281.2 also states that the Court may grant the motion if the Court determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. Code Civ. Proc., section 1281.6 provides in relevant part that where an arbitration agreement does not provide a method for appointing an arbitrator, the parties to the agreement may agree on a method of appointing an arbitrator. If the parties cannot agree, the court shall appoint an arbitrator on petition of a party to the agreement. (Id.)

When a motion to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. (Rosenthal v. Great Western Financial Sec. Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)  The moving party bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition. (Ibid.) 

Under Insurance Code section 11580.2, subdivision (i)(2), any arbitration instituted pursuant to an uninsured motorist policy shall be concluded within five years from the institution of the arbitration proceeding. (Ins. Code, section 11580.2 subd. (i)(2)(A).) Further, the provisions of Insurance Code section 11580.2 are deemed to be a part of every uninsured motorist policy. (See Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1053; Harford Fire Insurance Co. v. Macri (1992) 4 Cal.4th 318, 324; Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Kowalski (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 607, 609.)

There are two “common themes” in case law interpreting the scope of arbitration under section 11580.2 subdivision (f): “(1) arbitration of issues other than liability and damages is appropriate if the parties have contractually agreed to arbitrate more than is required by section 11580.2, subdivision (f); and, (2) only issues of liability and damages may be decided in an arbitral forum if the parties did not agree to arbitrate more than is required by section 11580.2, subdivision (f).” (Bouton v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1190, 1197.)

“If the insured has or may have rights to benefits, other than nonoccupational disability benefits, under any workers’ compensation law, the arbitrator shall not proceed with the arbitration until the insured's physical condition is stationary and ratable. In those cases in which the insured claims a permanent disability, the claims shall, unless good cause be shown, be adjudicated by award or settled by compromise and release before the arbitration may proceed.” (Insurance Code section 11580.2, subd. (f).)

Discussion

Plaintiff moves to compel arbitration and appoint a neutral arbitrator under Code Civ. Proc., sections 1281.2 and 1281.6. The parties do not dispute that an arbitration agreement exists. California law provides that auto insurers must include the provisions of Ins. Code section 11580.2 in uninsured and underinsured motorist policies. (Ins. Code section 11580.2; Harford Fire Insurance Co. v. Macri (1992) 4 Cal.4th 318, 324.) The determination of whether the insured is legally entitled to recover damages and the amount of damages shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration. (Ins. Code section 11580.2, subd. (f)) Thus, an arbitration agreement exists.

Plaintiff’s counsel argues that Defendant responded to his demand to arbitrate with a settlement offer and did not address the arbitration demand. (Yazdanpanah Decl., ¶8.) Plaintiff suffered bodily injuries and requires additional surgery in the near future. (Id., ¶5.) Plaintiff will never return to her former condition of health. (Id., ¶4.)

In opposition, Defendant argues that the demand for arbitration is not ripe because Plaintiff has not concluded the claims process with another insurer, Intact Insurance. Defendant points out that Intact Insurance is covering injuries to Plaintiff caused by an app-based driver under Bus. & Professions Code, section 7455, which also provides that insurance benefits provided under that section constitutes amounts payable under a worker’s compensation law. Plaintiff claims she will never return to her former state of health, meaning she is permanently disabled. Thus, under Insurance Code section 11580.2(f), Plaintiff was required to state whether she had a workers’ compensation claim, whether the claim has proceeded to findings and award or settlement, and if not, what reasons amounting to good cause are grounds for the arbitration action to proceed immediately. Additionally, arbitration may not proceed until Plaintiff’s condition is stationary and ratable.

Here, Plaintiff’s arbitration demand does not touch on the workers’ compensation benefits available through Intact Insurance. Additionally, Plaintiff’s condition is not stationary and ratable because she requires more surgery in the near future. Arbitration cannot commence until Plaintiff’s condition is stationary and ratable. Therefore, the demand for arbitration is premature.

The Court notes that even if the demand for arbitration was ripe, Defendant represents that it proposed a list of arbitrators on March 19, 2025. Defendant is not refusing to agree to Plaintiff’s proposed list of arbitrators. Therefore, the motion to compel arbitration and appoint a neutral arbitrator is DENIED.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration and appoint a neutral arbitrator is DENIED.