Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 19PSCV00868, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 19PSCV00868, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

(2) Defendant Hernan Escobar’s, As Trustee Of The Escobar Living Trust Dated July 11, 2005, Notice Of Motion And Motion For Attorneys’ Fees And Costs Pursuant To Code Of Civil Procedure Sections 1032 & 1033.5 is GRANTED; though the court seeks clarification as to the exact amount of attorney fees (unclear whether they seek $302,747.53 or $179,962.50).

(Proposed orders have been filed for both, although the Escobar Defendants’ motion does not provide the exact amount of attorney fees sought.)

This is a real property case wherein the plaintiffs sued the defendants based on their representations during escrow that the $5,000 note and deed of trust were paid off and were not valid or enforceable.

On September 30, 2019, Plaintiffs Daniel and Erika Sapien filed suit against Defendants ALFRED CORTEZ, an individual; KARI,A E. CQRTEZ, an individual; FRANCISCO ESCOBAR, an individual; CARMEN ESCQBAR, an individual; C&H TRUST DEED SERVICE, an unknown entity; and ALL PERSONS UNKNOWN CLAIMING ANY LEGAL OR EQUITABLE RIGHT, TITLE, ESTATE, LIEN QR INTEREST IN THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THE COMPLAINT ADVERSE TO PLAINTIFFS' INTEREST OR ANY CLOUD ON PLAINTIFFS' INTEREST THERETQ, NAMED AS DOES 1 THROUGH DOES 100, INCLUSIVE for:

On May 21, 2021, the court denied Plaintiffs’ Motion for summary adjudication.

On March 1, 2024, the court issued its statement of decision (SOD) after the court trial.

Plaintiffs bring forth the motion for attorneys' fees in the amount of $167,991.50 on the grounds that (i) they are prevailing party[1] and (ii) attorney fees are provided by contract (Civil Code section 1717).

Attorneys' fees are allowable as costs when authorized by statute, contract or law. (Code of Civ. Proc., §1033.5(a)(10).) In turn, Civil Code section 1717 allows for the recovery of attorneys' fees for breach of contract when allowed for in the parties’ agreement.

Here, Plaintiffs purchased the Subject Property from Defendants pursuant to a Residential Purchase Agreement (the “Contract”). Paragraph 25 of the Contract provides that "[i]n any action, proceeding, or arbitration between Buyer and Seller arising out of this Agreement, the prevailing Buyer or Seller shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs from the non-prevailing Buyer or Seller...." (Beall Decl., Ex. A, p. 13 of 180 of PDF, emphasis added

Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to recover their attorney's fees under California Civil Code § 1717.

The lodestar method for calculating attorney's fees applies to any statutory attorney's fee award, unless the statute authorizing the award provides for another method of calculation. (Glaviano v Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist. (2018) 22 CA5th 744, 750–751 [lodestar method is primary method for establishing amount of recoverable fees in statutory fee-shifting cases, in which prevailing party is statutorily authorized to recover attorney's fees from losing party]; K.I. v Wagner (2014) 225 CA4th 1412, 1425 [lodestar method is generally presumed to be starting point in analyzing appropriate amount of statutory attorney's fees].

Under the lodestar method, there are two steps. The first step is determining the lodestar figure—the reasonable hours spent multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate—based on a careful compilation of the time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney who was involved in presenting the case. (Glaviano, supra, 22 Cal.App.5th at p. 751.) The second step allows a trial court to adjust or enhance the lodestar by applying a multiplier to consider the contingent nature and risk associated with the action, as well as other factors, such as degree of skill required, ultimate success achieved, and “extraordinary legal skill.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1130, 1132, 1137; see also Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (Serrano III) [identifies seven factors that a trial court properly considers in its decision to augment the lodestar calculation].)

Here, Counsel KELLY ANDREW BEALL explains that Wolfe & Wyman spent a total of approximately 779.1 hours on this matter and incurred a total of $167,991.50 in attorney's fees and provides a breakdown of the hours and tasks by each attorney and paralegal. (Beall Decl., Ex. B.) Additionally, the billing rate ranged from about $110 to $265. After a review of the time entries and considering the size, difficulty, and level of complexity in this case, the court determines both the time expended and hourly rate(s) reasonable.

Therefore, the motion is GRANTED, and Defendants ALFRED CORTEZ and KARLA E. CORTEZ are ordered to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiffs DANIEL A. SAPIEN and ERIKA SAPIEN in the amount of $167,991.50.

The Escobar Defendants move for an order awarding their attorneys’ fees in the amount of $179,962.50 (as the prevailing party on Plaintiffs’ complaint and pursuant to the attorneys’ fee provision in both the $5,000 promissory note and the Deed of Trust) and costs in the amount of $151,715.92 pursuant to CCP sections 1032 and 1033.5. The court will only address whether they are the prevailing party.

Here, Plaintiffs failed to recover any relief from the Escobar Defendants, satisfying the fourth category in CCP section 1032(a)(4) supra fn. 1.

Accordingly, the Escobar Defendants were the prevailing party pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1032 and are therefore entitled to Attorneys’ Fees.

The Escobar Defendants’ attorneys billed 1,357.10 hours on this file for a total of $302,747.53. (This amount includes 7.5 hours spent on the preparation of the instant motion.)

Escobar Defendants submit detailed time records for the legal work performed. (Pallares Decl. at ¶ 3, Exhibit A.) “[T]he verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.” (Motion p. 15, quoting Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Here, the defense law firm for the Escobar Defendants, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, charges on this file $280 per hour for partner level attorneys, $225 per hour for associate attorneys, and $95 per hour for paralegals. Rates need only be “within the range of reasonable rates charged by and judicially awarded comparable attorneys for comparable work.” (Motion p. 15, citing Children's Hospital & Medical Center v. Bontá (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 740, 783.) The court agrees with the firm that the rates charged on this file are below the reasonable rates charged by similarly experienced attorneys on similar cases, at least from awards this court has awarded. “Nonetheless, the Escobar Defendants will not seek a lodestar amount, and request a judgment for fees equal to the amount actually billed.” (Motion p. 16:17-18.)

Notwithstanding, the motion interchanges between seeking reduced attorney fees and billed attorney fees. For example, lines 19-20 on page 16 then seek “full fees amount of $302,747.53” as does paragraph 5 of Counsel Pallares’ declaration. (See also Motion p. 16:21-22 [“Thus, the Escobar Defendants are entitled to the total sum of fees and cost in the amount of $454,463.45” which is $151,715.92 in costs $302,747.53 in attorney fees]; see also Pallares Decl., ¶5 [“However, on October 3, 2024, the Escobar Defendants and Plaintiffs reached a settlement with regard to the payment of the judgment, costs, interest, and attorneys’ fees for a total of $800,000.Defendants request the full fees amount of $302,747.53.”].) But then in other portions, Escobar Defendants seek “a reduced amount of the attorney fees the amount of $179,962.50” (Motion pp. 16-17), which is also the amount stated in the memorandum of costs.

Thus, the court seeks clarification as to the EXACT amount of ATTORNEY FEES sought.

As to the recovery of costs in the amount of $151,715.92, absent an opposition, those costs are awardable. However, as this is a motion for attorney fees, Escobar Defendants are to follow the cost recovery procedures.

[1] Here, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiffs and against the Defendants on April 10, 2024, for the sum of $468,321.58. The court found that the Defendants breached their Residential Purchase Agreement with Plaintiffs. However, it is unclear whether Plaintiffs’ contention that they the prevailing party because they received a “net monetary recovery” is accurate. (See Motion p. 5:9, emphasis original.) According to Section 1032, a prevailing party “includes the party with a net monetary recovery, a defendant in whose favor a dismissal is entered, a defendant where neither plaintiff nor defendant obtains any relief, and a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant. If any party recovers other than monetary relief and in situations other than as specified, the "prevailing party" shall be as determined by the court, and under those circumstances, the court, in its discretion, may allow costs or not and, if allowed, may apportion costs between the parties on the same or adverse sides pursuant to rules adopted under Section 1034.” Here, while Plaintiffs technically won $468,321.58 through their action against the Cortez Defendants, their net recovery is $0 as the full amount owed to them goes toward the Escobar Defendants’ judgment. (See also Escobar Defendants’ Motion p. 12:1-2.)