Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 20STCV20574, Date: 2023-06-26 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 20STCV20574, Date: 2023-06-26 Tentative Ruling

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MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT BY DEFENDANT KND DEVELOPMENT 52, LLC dba KINDRED HOSPITAL BALDWIN PARK is GRANTED.

This is a medical malpractice case. Plaintiff XIAO CHEN alleges the following against Defendants KINDRED HOSPITAL BALDWIN PARK (“Hospital” or “Kindred”); DR. PA WAN VERMANI (“Dr. Vermani”); and CHEN LI (“Defendant Li”): Plaintiff Chen is the spouse of decedent Decheng Li. Plaintiff alleges that commencing on or about May 19, 2019, the Hospital’s and Dr. Vermani’s negligent and intentional conduct caused the decedent’s death on June 3, 2019.

On March 30, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against Defendants for: 1. WRONGFUL DEATH-MEDICAL MALPRACTICE; 2. SURVIVAL ACTION; 3. FRAUD/DECEIT/INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATIONS; 4. ELDER ABUSE - VIOLATION OF WEL. & INST. CODE.

On July 19, 2022, the Hospital filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (hearing on March 1, 2023), which it took off calendar.

On October 18, 2022, Dr. Vermani filed an MSJ/MSA, which the court granted on 1/26/23.

On March 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the court’s ruling on Dr. Vermani’s summary judgment motion.

Under section 877.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,[1] “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).) “The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).)

Section 877.6 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement). (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (Tech-Bilt).)

In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement was made in good faith. The Tech-Bilt factors are:

(1) A rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability;

(4) A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial;

(5) The financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and

(6) The existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants.

Here, the court determines that the offer was made in good faith for the following reasons:

i. The evidence reflects that Kindred provided utmost care to Decedent always complied with the applicable standard of care, as evidenced by daily and hourly care

ii. Decedent died from the expected natural progression of Decedent’s condition at the time of his admission. According to the death certificate, completed by Deputy Coroner Melissa Munoz, acute cardiac dysfunction and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease proved to be Decedent’s immediate cause of death with aortic valvular disease as a significant condition contributing to his death as well.

iii. Though liability is denied, the amount of the settlement is reasonable given the asserted causes of action, the anticipated cost for further written discovery, depositions, and anticipated motions.

iv. There is no evidence to suggest that the Settling Parties engaged in any wrongful conduct in the negotiation of the instant settlement as it was reached through arms-length negotiations and mediation to avoid a costly trial.

Lastly, as for the court’s initial concern that Dr. Vermani’s judgment is on appeal, a review of Kindred’s summary judgment motion indicates that Dr. Vermani was an independent contractor, not an employee of the Hospital. Meaning, should the appellate court reverse the ruling, there would not be grounds for vicarious liability. (See MSJ filed on 7/19/22 p. 14 [“Dr. Vermani worked as an independent contractor, and Kindred Baldwin Park would not be responsible for his actions. As such, no actual nor ostensible agency between Kindred Baldwin Park and Dr. Vermani exists. Therefore, as the independent contractor relationship prevents any liability of Dr. Vermani from reaching Kindred Baldwin Park.”].) Thus, as any Dr. Vermani’s standard of care cannot be held against Kindred Baldwin Park, the court determines that Kindred must be discharged from any claims, partial and/or comparative indemnity, as well as contribution.

Therefore, absent an opposition to explain that the settlement is so far out of the ballpark, the court determines that the settlement was made in good faith.

[1] All statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

[2] Certain factors such as financial solvency or insurance coverage are not relevant where no party is claiming a “discount” based on such limitations. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 968 [holding that financial condition and insurance information were “irrelevant” as no discount was applied based on financial limitations, but rather, the modest settlement was predicated on the settling defendant’s absence of liability]; see also Dole Food Co. v. Super. Ct. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 894, 909 [“The Tech–Bilt factors are nonexhaustive and ‘may not apply in all cases.’”].) Therefore, this factor is inapplicable to the instant facts.

[3] A proposed order has been filed.