Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 21PSCV00015, Date: 2023-09-27 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 21PSCV00015, Date: 2023-09-27 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

PLAINTIFF AND CROSS-DEFENDANT KAYMI CHAN’S MOTION TO QUASH (OR MODIFY) AND/OR FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER RE: DEPOSITION SUBPOENA FOR PRODUCTION OF BUSINESS RECORDS is GRANTED; the subpoena is modified.

This is a real property dispute between siblings. Kaymi Chan (“K Chan”), Fred Lapwo Chan (“F Chan”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”), and On Chan (“Defendant O Chan”) are siblings. According to Plaintiffs, at the time of purchasing the Property (known as 2459 Recinto Avenue in the city of Rowland Heights (“Recinto Property”)), the Parties agreed that (1) F Chan and O Chan would contribute the down payment, (2) K Chan and F Chan would contribute part of the mortgage payments, and (3) Defendant O Chan would contribute the property tax and insurance. (Complaint ¶10.) The Property would be jointly owned by the Parties. (Complaint ¶10.) From 2005 until 2017, Plaintiffs made payments. But in about September 2017, F Chan lost his job, to which Defendant O Chan told F Chan he need not continue to make payments so long as he removes his name from the title and in return Defendant O Chan would pay back F Chan the contribution he made in a single payment. (Complaint ¶16.) After F Chan removed his name from the Title, Defendant O Chan added his wife, Binh Luu (Defendant Luu) (collectively, “Defendants”), into the Title. (Complaint ¶17.) In June 2020, due to COVID-19, K Chan paused making monthly payments. (Complaint ¶13.) The total contribution made by K Chan towards the Property was $304,600.00 ($228,600 for mortgagee and $76,000 for Improvements.) (Complaint ¶14.) F Chan made a total of $85,900.00 towards mortgage on the Property. (Complaint ¶18.) On or about December 14, 2020, Defendant O Chan sent a demand letter to K Chan that she vacates the Property because she is a tenant who has failed to pay rent, affirming K Chan’s belief that Defendant O Chan would not recognize her ownership interest in the Property. (Complaint ¶19.) At the same time, F Chan realized that Defendant O Chan will not pay him for the contribution he promised he would make. (Complaint ¶19.)

On January 7, 2021, Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant O. Chan, Binh Luu, JPMorgan Chase, N.A., and Does 1 through 25 for:

On January 15, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Pending Action (“Lis Pendens”) on the Property.

On February 18, 2021, the court granted Defendants’ Motion to Expunge Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens).

On March 29, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), asserting a total of fourteen (14) causes of action for:

On April 30, 2021, Defendants filed a Demurrer, which on June 25, 2021 was sustained in part.

On June 25, 2021, the court issued the following order: The Demurrer - without Motion to Strike filed by Binh Luu, On Chan on 04/30/2021 is Sustained in Part. Defendant On Chan’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED in part (i.e., as to the first, fourth through seventh and fourteenth causes of action) and OVERRULED in part (i.e., as to the second, third, and eighth through twelfth causes of action). Defendants On Chan’s and Binh Luu’s demurrer to the tenth cause of action is OVERRULED. Defendants On Chan’s and Binh Luu’s demurrer to the thirteenth cause of action is SUSTAINED as to Plaintiff K Chan and OVERRULED as to Plaintiff F Chan. Demurrer is sustained with 10 days leave to amend as to the 1st cause of action only.[1]

On December 16, 2021, the court issued the following Minute Order: The Demurrer - without Motion to Strike filed by Kaymi Chan, Fred Lapwo Chan on 08/23/2021 is Sustained in Part.

Specifically, the 1^st cause of action for recission was sustained with 30 days leave to amend; 2^nd cause of action for breach of contract/lease was overruled; and 4^th cause of action for Declaratory Relief was sustained with 30 days leave to amend. (The 3^rd cause of action for damages to real property was not subject to the demurrer.) Consequently, without the filing of an amended complaint, that would only leave the 2^nd cause of action in the cross-complaint for breach of contract/lease and 3^rd cause of action for intentional damage to real property at issue.

On February 16, 2022, the Parties attended Mediation. As a result of Mediation, the following resolution was reached: On April 1, 2022, all causes of action in the FAC by Plaintiff Fred Chan against Defendants O Chan and Binh Luu were dismissed with prejudice and on April 4, 2022, all causes of action in the cross-complaint filed by O Chan against F Chan was dismissed with prejudice.

On April 22, 2022, O Chan filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Summary Adjudication as to Plaintiff’s FAC (“Motion”).

On Wednesday, July 6, 2022, the court heard oral argument on the MSJ and allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs because the court’s tentative explained that both parties incorrectly argued breach of contract when the complaint (with certain COAs dismissed), only asserted a breach of joint venture agreement, which neither party addressed.

On July 21, 2022, the court issued its final ruling granting the MSJ as to the 2^nd cause of action (breach of oral joint venture agreement), the 3^rd cause of action (breach of implied joint venture agreement), the 10^th cause of action (Unjust Enrichment), and 13^th cause of action for Declaratory Relief because Plaintiff K. Chan (i) failed to make allegations that the purported joint venture was formed for profit but (ii) failed to provide evidence that the purchase of the home was profit. The court does not grant the MSJ as to the 12^th Cause of Action for Promissory Estoppel.

"If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court's own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders." (Motion p. ii, citing Code Civ. Proc. § 1987.1(a).)

K. Chan moves to quash the subpoena for business records served by Defendants to LENNAR Mortgage, LLC (“Lennar”) on the grounds that the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant, unnecessary, intrusive, and violates considerations of privacy. Specifically, the requests are as follows:

Request 1 This request seeks “[a]ll loan applications submitted by Kaymi Chan and Terri So in connection with loan #20363819 made by Eagle Home Mortgage, LLC secured by the real property located at 16032 Osprey Ave, Chino, CA on or about May 19, 2020”.

Request 2 This request seeks “[a]ll correspondence submitted by Kaymi Chan and Terri So in connection with their loan application for loan #20363819 made by Egal Home Mortgage, LLC secured by the real property located at 16032 Osprey Ave, Chino, CA on or about May 19, 2020”.

Request 3 This request seeks “[a]ll documents submitted by Kaymi Chan and Terri So supporting their existing mortgage and/or monthly rental obligations in connection with their loan application for loan #20363819 made by Eagle Home Mortgage, LLC secured by the real property located at 16032 Osprey Ave, Chino, CA on or about May 19, 2020”.

(See Ma Decl., Ex. A [true and correct copy of the Subpoena], p. 8 of 13 of PDF.)

In Opposition, Defendants explain the records are relevant because in applying for the mortgage on the Chino property, Plaintiff and her husband submitted a “Uniform Residential Loan Application” (hereinafter, “Application”). The Application asks specific questions about the borrowers’ current residence and whether they own or rent such residence and if rented, the amount of monthly rent, and if owned, the monthly mortgage payment. The issue of whether Plaintiff represented that she was a “renter” or “owned” the Recinto Property is relevant to Defendants’ defense as to the sole remaining COA for promissory estoppel (which is based on the allegation that the Recinto “Property would be owed by equally by Plaintiff....” (FAC ¶ 98)) because if Plaintiff “told the truth and stated that she was a 'renter”, then it would tend to prove that her promissory estoppel claim has no basis. In addition, it would undermine her credibility as a witness if she were to testify at trial that she was an owner.” (Opp. p. 4:19-26.)

While relevant discovery is one that assists a party in preparing for trial or facilitating settlement thereof, the discovery is not limitless such that it must be appropriately tailored. And here, despite Defendants’ contention that “there is simply no other way to obtain the loan application” (Opp. p. 5), there are other less intrusive means to obtain the information. For example, Defendants could simply propound an RFA as to whether Plaintiff indicated on the loan application that she was a renter of the Recinto property or an RFP as to the specific section on the loan application that provides that information. Or, as suggested by Plaintiff, Defendants could depose Plaintiff. (Motion p. 4.) But a subpoena that encompasses a broad panoply of financial records exceeds the scope of permissible discovery.[2]

All in all, as Plaintiff appears to agree that some of the information is discoverable and on the other hand, Defendants are amenable to a protective order, the court fashions an order that satisfies both parties’ request: the subpoena is modified to only allow for production of the specific section of the Form that states whether Plaintiff rented or owned the subject Rencito property.

[1] While leave to amend was granted, Plaintiffs did not file a Second Amended Complaint.

[2] And as to Mr. So’s (Plaintiff’s husband, who is a non-party) personal information such as social security numbers, wage and salary, etc. that could be obtained from this subpoena, that information is inarguably irrelevant, a point tacitly conceded by Defendants in opposition. (See Opp. p. 5:3-5 [“Plaintiff contends that the information sought includes sensitive personal information, such as social security numbers, wage, and salary etc of her and her husband, who is not a party to the lawsuit. Although these things may be true ….”], emphasis added.) To the extent Defendants aver Mr. So’s personal information is discoverable, the analysis Defendants provide only pertains to Plaintiff, which but further evidences Mr. So’s information is immaterial to the promissory estoppel defense and thus not discoverable.