Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 22PSCV01111, Date: 2023-12-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV01111    Hearing Date: March 14, 2024    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

Defendants’ MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 397(A) is GRANTED.

Background

On September 20, 2022, SHENZHEN QIANHAI BAOPING ASSET MANAGEMENT CO., Ltd Filed Suit Against Defendants JINGGANG YAN, XIUHONG LIANG for recognition and enforcement of foreign country money judgment under uniform foreign country money judgments recognition act.

On November 14, 2022, default was entered against Defendants.

On February 21, 2023, the court denied Plaintiff’s application for default judgment.

On April 6, 2023, the court granted default judgment in the total amount of $9,613,252.20.

On October 30, 2023, Defendants filed a motion to set aside default and default judgment and writs of execution, which the court granted on 12/14/23.

On January 29, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion.

On February 13, 2024, a Writ - Return was filed.

Legal Standard

Defendants bring forth the instant motion pursuant to CCP section 397. In turn, the general venue rule is that “the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (Code Civ. Pro., § 395(a).) As such, the court may, on motion, change the place of trial “when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.” (Code of Civ. Pro., § 397, subd. (a).) Where a defendant has made a proper showing of nonresidence, the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the case comes clearly within one of the statutory exceptions to the general rule that actions are triable in the place of the defendant’s residence. [Citation.]” (California State Parks Foundation v. Superior Court (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 826, 833.)

Discussion

Venue rules designate a particular county within California as the “proper” place for trial of the action. The purpose of the venue rules is to protect defendants from being forced to trial at some remote location. (See Motion p. 2, quoting Kaluzok v. Brisson (1946) 27 Cal.2d 760, 763 [“The right of a plaintiff to have an action tried in a county other than that of the defendant’s residence is exceptional.”].) For venue purposes, a person's residence is interpreted as domicile; i.e., the place where the person resides with the intent to remain indefinitely. (Enter v. Crutcher (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 841, 844-845.) “Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482.)

Here, though the complaint alleges that Defendants reside in Los Angeles County, Defendants set forth evidence that they reside in Orange County. (See Liang Decl. “I am a resident of Orange County, California and have been a resident of Orange County continuously since around August 2018.”]; See Yan Decl., ¶3 [“Angeles County, Defendants set forth evidence that they reside in Orange County. (See Liang Decl., ¶3 [“I am a resident of Orange County, California and have been a resident of Orange County continuously since around August 2018.”].)

To the extent that Plaintiff may argue that the convenience of witness and the ends of justice will be served by keeping this action in Los Angeles County, this case is about recognition of an alleged Chinese judgment; the Complaint is entirely devoid of any ties to Los Angeles. (Motion p. 3.)

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted; the action is transferred to Orange County.