Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 22PSCV01736, Date: 2024-09-17 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22PSCV01736 Hearing Date: September 17, 2024 Dept: O
Tentative Ruling
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
COSTS is CONTINUED; Plaintiff provided the correct audited billing
records in reply.
Background
This is a lemon law case.
On November 8, 2022, Plaintiffs JOHNNY LABARTA and
JENNIFER ROSE LABARTA filed suit against Defendant General Motors, LLC for
various defects in their leased 2021 Cadillac Escalade.
On December 14, 2022, Defendant filed its answer.
On June 20, 2024, the parties filed a notice of
settlement.
On August 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion.
On September 4, 2024, Defendant filed its opposition.
On September 10, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their reply.
Legal Standard
Plaintiff brings forth the
motion pursuant to Civil Code section 1794 subdivision (d). (Motion p. 7.) In
turn, the statute provides the following:
If the buyer prevails in an
action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover
as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and
expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined
by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection
with the commencement and prosecution of such action. (Civ. Code §1794(d)
(emphasis added).)
As for
determining the “reasonableness” of attorney costs incurred in fee shifting
cases, the inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method
which embraces a two-step method. (See also Motion p. 7.)
The first
step requires a trial court to multiply the time reasonably spent by Plaintiff
counsel on the case by a reasonable hourly rate. A computation of time spent on
a case and the reasonable value of that time is fundamental to a determination
of an appropriate attorneys’ fee award.
The second step allows a trial court
to adjust or enhance the lodestar by applying a multiplier to consider the
contingent nature and risk associated with the action, as well as other
factors, such as degree of skill required, ultimate success achieved, and
“extraordinary legal skill.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1130, 1132, 1137; see also Serrano v. Priest
(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (Serrano III) [identifies seven factors that a
trial court properly considers in its decision to augment the lodestar
calculation].) The factors considered in
determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty
of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill
required and employed to handle the case, the attention given,
the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm,
LLC v. Teitler Family Trust (2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774, emphasis
added and underline added).) A negative modifier was appropriate when
duplicative work had been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.) The amount of the
multiplier lies within the court’s sound discretion. (Ketchum, supra, 24
Cal.4th 1122, 1138 [“To the extent a
trial court is concerned that a particular award is excessive, it has broad
discretion to adjust the fee downward or deny an unreasonable fee
altogether.”], see also Motion p. 8:11-12.)
After the
trial court has performed the lodestar calculations, it shall consider whether
the total award so calculated under all
of the circumstances of the case is more than a reasonable amount and, if
so, shall reduce the award so that it is a reasonable figure. (PLCM
Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095-96.)
Discussion
Plaintiff moves the court to issue an
Order awarding Plaintiff attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of (1) $41,098.32. Such amount consists of a) $32,350.00
in attorney fees and $3,748.32 in recoverable costs and expenses for Consumer
Law Experts, P.C.; and reservation for an additional $5,000.00 10 for
Plaintiffs counsel to review Defendant's Opposition, draft the Reply brief, and
attend the hearing on this issue. (Motion p. 2.) Defendant
takes issue with the number of hours Plaintiff’s Counsel devoted to the
litigation and the reasonableness of the hourly fee. More specifically,
Defendant argues that “[t]he absence of adequate time records and
billing statements in this case deprives the Court of the evidence required to
support Counsel’s demand. Counsel has failed to provide the Court with a
sufficient basis to determine whether their time spent on this matter was both
reasonable and reasonably valued at $32,350.00” (Opp. p. 1:14-15.)
However, it appears that Plaintiff
inadvertently included only the audited billing records. (Reply p. 1:1-6 [“In
the first instance, I would like to offer my sincerest apologies to the Court.
Unfortunately, Plaintiffs’ Motion inadvertently include only the audited
billing records for Plaintiffs’ counsel, Julian Moore. I have included the
correct audited billing records. (See generally Decl. of Arbre Kornely in
Support of Pls.’ Reply, Ex. 1.) Should Defendant or the Court need additional
time to review the corrected records, Plaintiffs will not oppose a continuance on
the hearing on their Motion for Attorney Fees.”].)
Therefore, the court continues the
hearing to allow Defendant to review the supplemental billing. The court will
set a briefing schedule at the hearing.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the hearing on
the motion is continued.