Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 22PSCV01918, Date: 2024-05-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV01918    Hearing Date: May 6, 2024    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

DEFENDANT DOE #1’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS is GRANTED. As for leave to amend, as the complaint fails as a matter of law (and not fact), leave to amend is NOT granted.

Background

This case arises from the alleged sexual assault of a minor that occurred in 1982.

On November 21, 2022, Plaintiff John Doe filed suit against Defendant.

On October 12, 2023, Defendant filed its answer.

On March 26, 2024, Defendant filed the instant MJOP.

On April 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition.

On April 26, 2024, Defendant filed its reply.

Discussion

In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 218 (“AB 218”), which took effect January 1, 2020, and made several significant changes to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 (“CCP § 340.1”)—the statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse.[1] Among other things, the law revives all claims of childhood sexual abuse not previously litigated to finality for a 3-year period; it extends the SOL for such claims to 22 years after the age of majority (or age 40); it authorizes treble damages for “cover ups”; and it retroactively eliminates the protection previously afforded to public school districts by Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), which provided a bright-line rule that public entities could not be held liable for abuse claims arising from conduct occurring prior to January 1, 2009.

The crux of the District’s argument is that AB 218’s imposition of liability on public entities for past conduct where no enforceable claim existed (for failure to comply with claims presentation requirements) is unconstitutional because it violates Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution (“Gift Clause”). The constitutional provision provides that “[t]he Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending … in any manner whatever, for the payment of liabilities of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money….” (Cal. Const. Art. XVI, sec. 6.)

The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 [quoting Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21-22].) Interpreting this constitutional provision, the California Supreme Court has stated that “the legislature has no power to create a liability against the state for any [ ] past act of negligence.” (Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 693.) Doing otherwise “would, in effect, be the making of a gift.” (Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.)

Here, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a timely claim presentation would otherwise create liability for a past act of negligence when none existed because the claims presentation requirement is a substantive element of the COA against the District. Government Code section 905 provides that, aside from some exceptions, an action for money or damages may not be maintained against a public entity unless a written claim has first been timely presented to the defendant and rejected in whole or in part. Government Code section 945.4 reinforces that such suits are prohibited absent compliance with a timely claim presentation, which is to be filed not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code § 911.2 (a).) And case law is clear that timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural hurdle akin to a statute of limitations but is considered a substantive element of the claim. (Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 [“Complaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that compliance with the claims statute is excused are subject to a general demurrer for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”]; see also Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 906 [“Compliance with the claim requirement is a condition precedent to suing the public entity.”], emphasis added.)

Accordingly, prior to AB 218, Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely claim presentation—again, a substantive element of the claim—would result in no valid claim against the District. (Hom v. Chico Unified Sch. Dist. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 335, 339 [court does not have jurisdiction over a matter wherein the plaintiff fails to make a timely claim presentation].)

In opposition, Plaintiff heavily relies upon Coats v. New Haven Unified School District (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415. But Coats is inapposite. While Coats involved a constitutional challenge to Code of Civil Procedure § 340.1, it did not involve, address, or make any finding whatsoever regarding Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution. As such, the decision has no bearing on the argument made by the District in this case. (Agnew v. State Bd. of Equalization [“[i]t is axiomatic … that a decision does not stand for a proposition not considered by the court.”].)

Therefore, based on the foregoing binding authority, it appears that the Legislature has indeed overstepped its constitutional authority when it attempted to impose liability on public entities for past conduct where no enforceable claim existed, which runs afoul of the Gift Clause.

To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the public funds are used for a public purpose such that they are not a gift within the meaning of the Gift Clause, that argument also fails. (Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 450; Opp. p. 7, citing Scott v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1597.)

“The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.2d 73, 746, citing County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276.) That said, an appropriation for an unenforceable claim serves no public purpose.” (Conlin, supra, 99 Cal.17 at pp. 21-22 [“all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim” are unconstitutional regardless of whether “a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation.”].) Put plainly, if the claim is unenforceable, there is no public purpose as a matter of law. (Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at 450 [appropriation beyond the public entity’s “maximum exposure” serves no public purpose and is a gift of public funds as a matter of law]; see also (Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195, 200 [“[W[hen state funds are expended pursuant to a settlement agreement in exchange for the relinquishment of such a claim, no ‘public purpose’ is achieved. Such an expenditure violates the gift clause.”].)

Accordingly, even if the public purpose of AB 218 is to ensure that the victims severely damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those responsible and to increase the availability of the courts for victims of child sexual abuse, that is inapposite.

In sum, the Legislature by enactment of AB 218 created a liability where one did not previously exist because the claim presentation requirement is a substantive element of a claim. And when the Legislature creates a liability where one did not previously exist, whether the enactment was for a public purpose is irrelevant because all appropriations of public money for which there is no statutory or enforceable claim are unconstitutional. (Conlin, supra, 99 Cal.17 at pp. 21-22.)

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, though the court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s trauma and the court is cognizant that the Legislature has the right to excuse claim presentation prospectively, doing so retroactively and consequently creating liability when none existed appears to be unconstitutional. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.