Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 22PSCV01959, Date: 2023-08-31 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV01959    Hearing Date: October 18, 2023    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

DEFENDANT HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’S

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS (MJOP) is GRANTED. The court will hear from Plaintiff as to whether leave to amend should be granted.[1]

Background

This case arises from a minor’s alleged injuries incurred in school. Plaintiff MASEN MEDINA, a minor, y and through his Guardian ad Litem Wendy Olivas (“Plaintiff”) alleges the following against Defendants HACIENDA LA PUENTE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (“School District”) and LUIS FRANCO (“Franco”): One day in elementary school, Plaintiff asked for permission to “take a few moments to himself.” (Complaint ¶8.) The classroom assistant agreed, and Plaintiff “walked to the classroom exit to sit near the door.” (¶9.) But the teacher[2] mistakenly though Plaintiff was attempting to leave, so called a second classroom assistant, Mr. Franco, who then grabbed Plaintiff by both arms, pulled Plaintiff, became angry, twisted both of Plaintiff’s hands and arms, and broke Plaintiff’s left radius. (¶10-14.) Plaintiff sustained bodily injuries.

On November 22, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit for:

On March 20, 2023, the School District filed the instant MJOP.

On August 31, 2023, during the hearing on the MJOP, Defense Counsel informed the Court that the parties are working towards a Settlement Agreement. Thus, the parties stipulated to continue the hearing to 10/18/23.

Legal Standard

It is well established in California that either prior to trial or at the trial the plaintiff or the defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings and that the appropriate ground for such a motion is the same as that arguable by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause of action or defense.  (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791; see also Sofias v. Bank of America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 586 [The non statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings can be made at any time, even during trial, since the grounds for a general demurrer are never waived.]; Code Civ. Proc., § 438.) 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198) (emphasis added). Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Id.; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.)[3]  Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.  (Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677; Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp, (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27.)  On a motion for judgment on the pleadings a court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading.  (See Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468-469; Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549.) 

“Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the parties.¿¿[Citation.]¿¿Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits.”¿ (Schabarum¿v. California Legislature¿(1998)¿60 Cal.App.4th¿1205, 1216, fn. 5.)¿¿“Judgment on the pleadings does¿not depend upon a resolution of questions of witness credibility or¿evidentiary conflicts.¿¿In fact, judgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution.”¿¿(Id.¿at¿1216.)¿ In ruling on a [motion for a judgment on the pleadings], the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint. ¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” ¿(Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) 

Leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.  (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.) 

Discussion

The School District moves for judgment as to all causes of action (COAs) on various grounds including, inter alia, (i) the COAs fail to a statutory basis,[4] (ii) fail to plead specific, factual allegations, and (iii) the 5^th COA for violation of the Unruh Act is an impermissible COA as recently held the by the court in Brennon B. v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 367.[5]

Here, the court grants the motion because each COA is conclusory pled. In actions against public entities and their employees, California law requires a plaintiff to meet a heightened pleading standard and requires a complaint to allege specific factual allegations to establish the elements of each and every claim in the complaint. (Motion p. 5, citing Searcy, supra, 177 Cal. App. 3d at p. 802 [“[T]o state a cause of action every fact essential to the existence of statutory liability must be pleaded with particularity.”].) For example, as to 1^st COA (assault) and 2^nd COA (battery), Plaintiff pled the conclusory elements of an assault and battery claim. (See Complaint ¶17 [“committed acts which resulted in imminent apprehension of harmful and/or offensive contact with Plaintiff’s person”]; see ¶22 [“committed acts which resulted in imminent apprehension of harmful and/or offensive contact with Plaintiff’s person.”].) As for the IIED COA, Plaintiff conclusively pleads “[d]efendants engaged in outrageous conduct” (¶27) without pleading specific allegations as to what conduct of the School District was extreme and outrageous. Or as to the 6^th COA for violation of the Bane Act—wherein a defendant is liable if he or she interfered with or attempted to interfere with a plaintiff’s constitutional rights by the requisite threats, intimidation, or coercion—Plaintiff regurgitates the elements of the COA. (¶47.) And as to the 7^th COA, Plaintiff conclusively pleads the School District had a “duty to hire, train, and supervise an adequate number of competent and fit employees” without articulate what if anything the classroom teacher failed to do to supervise his conduct or safety on the date of Plaintiff’s incident.[6]

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, absent specific, factual allegations (and lack of alleged statutory liability), the court grants the MJOP.