Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case 22PSCV02058 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 22PSCV02058, Date: 2023-01-30 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling. Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. R at 909-802-1117 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing.

DEFENDANTS FCA US LLC AND MOSS BROS. CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE

DEFENDANTS FCA US LLC AND MOSS BROS. CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM’S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE is GRANTED, however the court does not order Plaintiffs to pay for associated costs and fees because Plaintiffs made several meritorious arguments.

This is a lemon law case arising from Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2018 Jeep Cherokee, specifically that the vehicle had a known transmission defect.

On November 28, 2022, Plaintiffs BRENDA JIMENEZ AND TRAVIS JIMENEZ filed suit against Defendants FCA US, LLC; MOSS BROS. CHRYSLER DODGE JEEP RAM for VIOLATION OF STATUTORY OBLIGATIONS.

On December 29, 2022, Defendants filed the instant Motion to Transfer Venue (“Motion”).

On January 23, 2023, Defendants filed their Reply. That same day, Defendants filed their Answer.[1]

“The plaintiff’s choice of venue is presumptively correct.” (Easton v. Superior Court (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 243, 247.) A party seeking to change venue has the burden of showing that the action has been brought in the improper county. (Id.) “The term venue denotes the particular county within the state where a case is to be heard.” (K.R.L. Partnership v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 490, 496.) “Which county constitutes the proper venue in a particular case is determined according to the venue statutes.” (Id.) “In applying these statutes to determine the county . . . where venue is proper, the courts generally look to the main relief sought, as determined from the complaint as it stands at the time of the motion for change of venue.” (Id. at 496-497) (emphasis added). “Generally . . . when the main relief sought in a case does not relate to rights in real property, the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (Id. at 497.) “When a case is founded on a contractual obligation, venue is also proper where the contract was in fact entered into.” (Id.) “If a case is filed in a county that is not the proper venue . . . the defendant may move to transfer the case to a proper venue.” (Id.)

California Code of Civil Procedure, Section 397 allows the Court to change the place of trial on its own motion: (1) when the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court; or (2) when the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.

Defendants move to transfer venue from Los Angeles County Superior Court to Riverside County Superior Court.

As both Defendants are business entities, the court first turns to rules governing the residence of a corporation. (See Request for Judicial Notice, Ex. 1, 2 [Indicating that Moss Bros. is a corporation and FCA is an LLC.)[3] Code of Civil Procedure §395.5 states that “[a] corporation or association may be sued in the county where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated, subject to the power of the court to change the place of trial as in other cases.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 395.5.)

Here, as for Defendant Moss Bros, the following facts indicate that Riverside County is the location of its (i) principal place of business, (ii) where the contract was entered into, and (iii) where the alleged breach occurred:

3. All warranty repairs to the subject vehicle performed by Moss Bros.’ were performed in Moreno Valley, meaning any purported breach of warranty or negligent repair occurred in Moreno Valley, and

4. According to the operative Carfax Report, the only other repair facilities to which Plaintiffs took the vehicle to two facilities, both in Riverside County.

In Opposition, Plaintiffs heavily object that venue is proper in Los Angeles based upon Plaintiffs’ residence in city of Pomona at the time of filing suit. Specifically, Plaintiffs rely on Code of Civil Procedure § 395, subdivision (b) which provides that actions arising from the sale of goods – such as the action here, which arises from the sale of a motor vehicle – may lay proper venue in one of three counties: (1) the county in which the buyer entered into the contract, (2) the county where the buyer resided at the time of the contract, or (3) the county where the buyer resided at the commencement of this action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395, subd. (b)) (emphasis added). And here, though Plaintiffs do not provide evidence of their residence at the commencement of the action, Plaintiffs allege that at the time of filing suit, they were “residents of Los Angeles County, California.” (Complaint ¶2; see also Bajaj Dec., Ex. B, pg. 1, top [Plaintiffs’ address at time of entering into the contract was 277 E. 10th Street, Pomona, CA 91766, Los Angeles.”].)

Accordingly, Los Angeles County is a proper venue under subdivision (b) of Code of Civil Procedure § 395.

Further, a defendant corporation cannot have venue changed to some other county in which plaintiff could have brought the action initially: “[T]he provision allowing suit against a corporation in certain counties other than that of its residence is for the benefit of the plaintiff and does not give the defendant corporation the same rights.” [Beutke v. American Secur. Co. (1955) 132 Cal.App.2d 354, 361.)

Accordingly, even though Plaintiffs could have filed suit in Riverside County as all the relevant transactions and conduct occurred there, that does not warrant mandatory transfer of venue.

As for Defendant FCA, the Statement of Information provides that ‘state or place of organization’ is Delaware and that its members/managers (Richard Palmer and Mark Stewart) retain addresses in the state of Michigan; there is no mention of California. Accordingly, if a foreign corporation has “qualified” to do business in California, it will have filed a statement designating the county in which it maintains its principal local office. (See Corps.C. § 2105(a)(3)].) In such event, the foreign corporation can be sued only in a county in which venue would be proper in an action against a California corporation, under CCP § 395.5.

Here, however, FCA has not filed such statement designating a principal office in California. Effectively, venue is proper in any county in the State, includes Los Angeles County. Moreover, such an instant where multiple defendants are sued, a defendant seeking a change of venue must show that no other defendant is a resident of the challenged venue. (Tokuzo Shida v. Japan Food Corp. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 443, 447.)

Accordingly, Defendant Moss Bros. cannot show that the other defendant (FCA) is not a resident of the challenged venue because the challenged venue is Los Angeles, which can be FCA’s residence based on their failure to file a statement designating a principal office in California.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, though a plaintiff may have the right to file wherever venue is “proper,” the court still has discretion to transfer “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by change.” (CCP section 397(c)) (emphasis added). Convenience to witnesses only is important, and not the convenience of parties or employees of parties. (Wrin v. Ohlandt (1931) 213 Cal. 158, 159-160.)[4]

Plaintiff argues where a party moves to transfer venue based on the convenience of witnesses, it must submit affidavits showing the names of each witness expected to testify for both parties, the substance of their expected testimony, whether the witness has been deposed or given a statement, the reasons why it would be inconvenient for the witnesses to appear, and the reasons why the ends of justice would be promoted by transfer to a different county. (Juneau v. Juneau (1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 14, 16; Edwards v. Pierson (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 72, 75 [“The burden rests upon one who seeks a change of venue . . . to prove that both the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice will be promoted thereby . . . This he must do through affidavits which contain something more than generalities and conclusions.”].)

In its Reply, Defendants distinguish the instant facts from Juneau by arguing that in Juneau the sole basis for transfer of venue was the convenience of the witnesses whereas here, the basis is “ancillary to the venue requirements.” (Reply p. 4.)

Indeed, though in Juneau, the “notice of motion for change of venue [was] based upon an affidavit, setting forth as the ground for such change that at all times” that the defendant was a resident of a different county, here, the notice for the motion is based upon six grounds and only one of those six points is predicated upon the convenience of witnesses.[5] (Id. at p. 15) (emphasis added). As such, even though Defendants rely on “common sense” and “logical” inferences that the witnesses reside in Riverside County based upon their work location, (Motion pp. 2, 7), the court finds that Defendants need not have provided affidavits/declarations with the exact residences.

Assuming Defendants were bound by such a requirement, “the convenience of the witnesses in attending the trial, rather than the places of their actual residences, is the issue to be decided by the trial court. It doubtless often occurs that the convenience of witnesses would be promoted by their testifying in a county where they are ‘stationed’ or actually engaged in performing services in their chosen professions, even though their residences might be in a county far distant from the county where the trial is held.” (Willingham v. Pecora (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 289, 293) (emphasis added). And here, nonparty witnesses such as employees of Valvoline Instant Oil Change and Sam’s Club Tire & Battery Center (who may have witnessed the alleged “nonconformities to warranty”) have their facilities in Moreno Valley and Riverside such that taking time off work and travelling to Los Angeles County to participate in trial could amount to immense hardship.

Therefore, as events pertaining to the vehicle’s “unsuccessful attempts to repair [the defects]” (Complaint ¶8) arise in Riverside County, the non-witness parties’ convenience is an important consideration.[6]

Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted. However, the court does not order Plaintiffs to pay for fees and costs as Plaintiffs made numerous meritorious arguments.[7]

[1] Therefore, while Plaintiffs are correct that a motion to transfer on grounds of convenience of witnesses cannot be entertained until a defendant has answered, here, Defendants have done so, even if they answered after the opposition was filed. (Opp. p. 8.)

[2] As a prefatory matter, the court notes that the action is transitory. “For venue purposes, actions are classified as local or transitory. To determine whether an action is local or transitory, the court looks to the “main relief” sought. Where the main relief sought is personal, the action is transitory. Where the main relief relates to rights in real property, the action is local.” (Brown v. Superior Court¿(1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482, fn. 5, citing 2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure,¿(2d ed.1970)¿Actions, § 424, at pp. 1255–1256.) Here, Plaintiffs seek personal relief. For example, they seek restitution and civil penalties for Defendants’ failure to repair or replace the Vehicle.

Thus, the action is transitory. In a transitory action, the general rule of venue applies. That is, defendants have the right to have the action tried where they reside. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 395(a); Brown, supra, 37 Cal.3d 477.)

[3] The complaint identifies FCA as a “corporation organized and in existence under the laws of the State of Delaware and registered with the California Department of Corporations to conduct business in California. Defendant FCA’s principal place of business is in the State of Michigan. At all times relevant herein, Defendant was engaged in the business of designing, manufacturing, constructing, assembling, marketing, distributing, and selling automobiles and other motor vehicles and motor vehicle components in Los Angeles County” and Moss Bros. as an “unknown business entity s an unknown business entity organized and in existence under the laws of the State of California. At all times relevant herein, Defendant was engaged in the business of selling automobiles and automobile components, and servicing and repairing automobiles in Riverside County.” (Complaint ¶¶4, 5.) However, the court notes that the information from the Secretary of State does not explicitly provide that Moss Bros.’s principal place of business is in Riverside County. Rather, Statement of Information states that the corporate address is in Riverside County and that corporate officers retain addresses in Riverside County.

[4] Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants erroneously classify “service managers, technicians, and other employees of Moss Bros.” as “non-party witnesses” is correct considering that Defendant Moss. Bros is a party to the action, meaning so are its employees. (Opp. p. 7.) The Reply does not address this point.

[5] See Notice of Motion p. 2 [five enumerated points (1)-(5) and the sixth point set forth in lines 12-19].

[6] While Plaintiffs’ contention that CCP 2025.250 allows for the deposition of a witness at distance greater than 40 miles is skillfully made, Defendants predominant focus is on trial, not discovery.

[7] What’s more, though Defendants premise their request for Plaintiffs to pay for costs based upon their purported refusal to sign a stipulation, Plaintiffs argue that the offer was not made in good faith because Defendants offered less than 24 hours to consider the offer and the extension only provided an extra approximately 3 hours to respond. (Opp. p. 9.) Defendants’ Reply does not address this concern.