Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 22PSCV02309, Date: 2024-05-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22PSCV02309    Hearing Date: May 7, 2024    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff’s Application for Default Judgment is DENIED with prejudice, notably for the failure to plead particular, sufficient facts that establish an UCRA violation.

Background

This is a disability rights action. Plaintiff Rebecca Castillo is a visually impaired and legally blind individual.

On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant CATSA, INC for VIOLATIONS OF THE UNRUH CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 51 et seq (“UCRA”).

On November 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint (FAC).

On February 8, 2024, default was entered against Defendant.

On March 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant application.

Discussion

The application is denied with prejudice for two reasons.

1.     First Defect

First, the FAC fails to adhere to California Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 425.10 subdivision (a), subsection (1), which provides that a complaint “shall contain . . . [a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”

Here, the FAC is 20 pages with 53 factual allegations, most of which provide no relevant or material facts to the UCRA COA. Rather, the complaint largely provides case citations and statutory citations. What is more, despite being a statutory cause of action, which are required to be pled with particularity (see e.g., Vedder v. City of Imperial (1974) 36 Cal.App.3d 654, 659), Plaintiff does not plead specific, relevant facts. Thus, absent specific, particular, and relevant facts that establish an UCRA violation, the complaint fails to meet basic pleading standards.

Therefore, for the foregoing reason, the application for entry of default judgment is denied with prejudice.

2.     Second Defect

Related to the issue of pleading, the court turns to Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267 as the appellate court articulated the following regarding a trial court’s role in determining default judgments:

The second cautionary tale is for trial courts. And it is not the first time we have told this tale. As we previously explained [citation], [i]t is imperative in a default case that the trial court take the time to analyze the complaint at issue and ensure that the judgment sought is not in excess of or inconsistent with it. It is not in plaintiffs' interest to be conservative in their demands, and without any opposing party to point out the excesses, it is the duty of the court to act as gatekeeper, ensuring that only the appropriate claims get through. That role requires the court to analyze the complaint for itself—with guidance from counsel if necessary—ascertaining what relief is sought as against each defaulting party, and to what extent the relief sought in one cause of action is inconsistent with or duplicative of the relief sought in another. The court must then compare the properly pled damages for each defaulting party with the evidence offered in the prove-up . . . Because [plaintiff’s] complaint does not state any cognizable cause of action against defendants, it does not support any judgment in his favor . . . But [plaintiff’s] problems do not end there, because his complaint also fails to set forth any clear demand for damages, let alone one which would support the enormous judgment he obtained from the trial court. As this court has iterated and then reiterated, Code of Civil Procedure section 580 prohibits the entry of a default judgment in an amount in excess of that demanded in the complaint.

(Id. at pp. 272-286) (emphasis added).

In short, a necessary condition prior to the entry of default judgment is that a complaint be well-pled, i.e., state sufficient facts to support a cause of action.

Alleging an UCRA Violation

Pursuant to UCRA, “All persons within the jurisdiction of this state . . . no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” (Civil Code, § 51, subd. (b).)

“A plaintiff can recover under the [UCRA] on two alternate theories:

(1) a violation of the ADA [Civil Code section 51, subd. (f)]; or

(2) denial of access to a business establishment based on intentional discrimination.

(Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (SDCCU).)

a.     Method #1: Establishing an ADA Violation

In turn, to establish a violation of the ADA, “a plaintiff must show: (1) a covered disability; (2) ‘the defendant is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3) the plaintiff was¿denied¿public accommodations¿by the defendant because of [the] disability.’”[1] (Id., at p. 1060, quoting Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc. (9th Cir. 2007) 481 F.3d 724, 730.) Websites alone are not considered places of public accommodation under the ADA. (Martinez v. Cot’n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1043-1044, 1052-1053 (Cot’n Wash).) However, pursuant to the nexus test, courts will “consider whether the alleged website deficiencies impinge on the plaintiff's ability to have equal access to, and enjoyment of, the products and services offered at the physical location.” (SDCCU, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 1067.) That said, even if there are accessibility issues, “a plaintiff who fails to allege any connection between the website barriers and a physical location does not have an ADA claim.” (Gomez v. Trinitas Cellars, LLC (N.D. Cal. March 9, 2022) 3:21-cv-09006-WHO [2022 WL 704857, at *3], quoting Langer v. Pep Boys Manny Moe & Jack of California (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2021) 20-cv-06015-DMR [2021 WL 148237, at *5],.)

b.     Method #2: Establishing Intentional Discretion

Pursuant to the UCRA, if a claim is not an ADA violation, the plaintiff must prove the discrimination was intentional or willful and affirmative misconduct. (Id., at p. 1036.) “A claimant may not ‘rel[y] on the¿effects¿of a facially neutral policy on a particular group . . . to infer¿solely¿from such effects a discriminatory intent.’” (Ibid, quoting Koebke v. Bernardo Heights Country Club (2005) 36 Cal.4th 824, 854.)

Merits

Here, Plaintiff claims to have “multiple” barriers in that the homepage had, for example, incorrectly labeled graphics, links, and buttons. (See Castillo Decl., p. 2.) But Plaintiff does not specify how those barriers have a connection to Defendant’s physical store locations. The only explanation Plaintiff provides is that she “intended to browse the products, place an order, sign up for email notifications, and [sic] before visiting the nearest brick-and-mortar location.” (Castillo Decl., p. 2.) Without a factual showing of a connection between the website barriers and a physical location, there is no ADA claim. Without an ADA claim, that leaves the other method of establishing an UCRA violation: “denial of access to a business establishment based on intentional discrimination.” (Martinez v. San Diego County Credit Union (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1059 (SDCCU).) However, even as to intentional discrimination, Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing Defendant’s website was intended to discriminate against the visually impaired. While Plaintiff claims Defendant’s actions amounted to intentional discrimination, these allegations are conclusory without any facts pled as support. (Complaint ¶50.)

Therefore, without either a showing of an ADA violation or intentional discrimination, Plaintiff has not pled a violation of UCRA to reach the merits of the default judgment application.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the default judgment application is denied with prejudice.