Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 22STCV08077, Date: 2024-04-19 Tentative Ruling

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Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

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Case Number: 22STCV08077    Hearing Date: April 19, 2024    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

DEFENDANT BONITA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’S (ERRONEOUSLY SUED AS LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT) NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS is GRANTED. As for leave to amend, as the complaint fails as a matter of law (and not fact), leave to amend is NOT granted.

Background

This case arises from the alleged sexual assault of a minor. Plaintiff STEVEN OJEDA alleges the following against Defendant Doe 1 School: In approximately 1977, when he was approximately ten (10) years of age, Plaintiff was sexually abused and assaulted on a regular basis for approximately one year by a teacher on premises of the school. The acts of sexual abuse included but “fondling Plaintiff's genitals, forcing Plaintiff to masturbate [the teacher], and forced oral copulation.” (First Amended Complaint (FAC) p. 5.) Plaintiff reported the sexual abuse to the vice principal, but no action was taken.

On March 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed suit alleging the following causes of action (COAs):

On May 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed a FAC naming Los Angeles Unified School District as the Doe 1 School.

On July 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed an ‘Amendment to Complaint’ replacing Los Angeles Unified School District with Bonita Unified School District (“Defendant” or the “District”).

On October 20, 2022, Defendant filed its answer.

On October 16, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings (MJOP).

On October 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition.  

On November 2, 2023, Defendant filed its reply.

On February 15, 2024, the court conducted a status conference and noted the following: “The Court states it has read and considered the Minute Order dated November 9, 2023, indicating the matter is transferred to Department O for all purposes except trial.”

Legal Standard

It is well established in California that either prior to trial or at the trial the plaintiff or the defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings and that the appropriate ground for such a motion is the same as that arguable by general demurrer, namely, the failure to state a cause of action or defense.  (Dobbins v. Hardister (1966) 242 Cal.App.2d 787, 791; see also Sofias v. Bank of America (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 583, 586 [The non statutory motion for judgment on the pleadings can be made at any time, even during trial, since the grounds for a general demurrer are never waived.]; Code Civ. Proc., § 438.) 

A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed. (Lance Camper Manufacturing Corp. v. Republic Indemnity Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 194, 198.) Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Id.; Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) Both a demurrer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings accept as true all material factual allegations of the challenged pleading, unless contrary to law or to facts of which a court may take judicial notice.[1]  (Mechanical Contractors Assn. v. Greater Bay Area Assn. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 672, 677; Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp, (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27.)  On a motion for judgment on the pleadings a court may take judicial notice of something that cannot reasonably be controverted, even if it negates an express allegation of the pleading.  (See Columbia Casualty Co. v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 457, 468-469; Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549.) 

“Matters which are subject to mandatory judicial notice may be treated as part of the complaint and may be considered without notice to the parties.¿¿[Citation.]¿¿Matters which are subject to permissive judicial notice must be specified in the notice of motion, the supporting points and authorities, or as the court otherwise permits.”¿ (Schabarum¿v. California Legislature¿(1998)¿60 Cal.App.4th¿1205, 1216, fn. 5.)¿¿“Judgment on the pleadings does¿not depend upon a resolution of questions of witness credibility or¿evidentiary conflicts.¿¿In fact, judgment on the pleadings must be denied where there are material factual issues that require evidentiary resolution.”¿¿(Id.¿at¿1216.)¿ In ruling on a [motion for a judgment on the pleadings], the court must “liberally construe[]” the allegations of the complaint. ¿(Code Civ. Proc., § 452.)  “This rule of liberal construction means that the reviewing court draws inferences favorable to the plaintiff, not the defendant.” ¿(Perez v. Golden Empire Transit Dist. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1238.) 

Leave to amend should be granted if there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action.  (Virginia G. v. ABC Unified School Dist. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1848, 1852.) 

Discussion[2]

In 2019, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill 218 (“AB 218”), which took effect January 1, 2020, and made several significant changes to Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 (“CCP § 340.1”)—the statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse.[3] Among other things, the law revives all claims of childhood sexual abuse not previously litigated to finality for a 3-year period; it extends the SOL for such claims to 22 years after the age of majority (or age 40); it authorizes treble damages for “cover ups”; and it retroactively eliminates the protection previously afforded to public school districts by Government Code section 905, subdivision (m), which provided a bright-line rule that public entities could not be held liable for abuse claims arising from conduct occurring prior to January 1, 2009.

The crux of the District’s argument is that AB 218’s imposition of liability on public entities for past conduct where no enforceable claim existed (for failure to comply with claims presentation requirements) is unconstitutional because it violates Article XVI, section 6 of the California Constitution (“Gift Clause”). The constitutional provision provides that “[t]he Legislature shall have no power to give or to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending … in any manner whatever, for the payment of liabilities of any individual, association, municipal or other corporation whatever; nor shall it have power to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money….” (Cal. Const. Art. XVI, sec. 6.)

The term ‘gift’ in the constitutional provision ‘includes all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim,’ even if there is a moral or equitable obligation.” (Jordan v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 431, 450 [quoting Conlin v. Board of Supervisors (1893) 99 Cal. 17, 21-22].) Interpreting this constitutional provision, the California Supreme Court has stated that “the legislature has no power to create a liability against the state for any [ ] past act of negligence.” (Motion p. 7, quoting Chapman v. State (1894) 104 Cal. 690, 693.) Doing otherwise “would, in effect, be the making of a gift.” (Motion p. 7, quoting Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 517.)

Here, Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a timely claim presentation would otherwise create liability for a past act of negligence when none existed because the claims presentation requirement is a substantive element of the COA against the District. Government Code section 905 provides that, aside from some exceptions, an action for money or damages may not be maintained against a public entity unless a written claim has first been timely presented to the defendant and rejected in whole or in part. Government Code section 945.4 reinforces that such suits are prohibited absent compliance with a timely claim presentation, which is to be filed not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action. (Gov. Code § 911.2 (a).) And case law is clear that timely claim presentation is not merely a procedural hurdle akin to a statute of limitations but is considered a substantive element of the claim. (Motion p. 10, citing Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 209 [“Complaints that do not allege facts demonstrating either that a claim was timely presented or that compliance with the claims statute is excused are subject to a general demurrer for not stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.”]; see also Motion p. 10, citing Rubenstein v. Doe No. 1 (2017) 3 Cal.5th 903, 906 [“Compliance with the claim requirement is a condition precedent to suing the public entity.”], emphasis added.)

Accordingly, prior to AB 218, Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely claim presentation—again, a substantive element of the claim—would result in no valid claim against the District. (Motion p. 18, citing Hom v. Chico Unified Sch. Dist. (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 335, 339 [court does not have jurisdiction over a matter wherein the plaintiff fails to make a timely claim presentation].)

To the extent that there is alternative argument, the foregoing, though extensively briefed by Defendant, is NOT addressed Plaintiff.[4]

Therefore, based on the foregoing binding authority, it appears that the Legislature has indeed overstepped its constitutional authority when it attempted to impose liability on public entities for past conduct where no enforceable claim existed, which runs afoul of the Gift Clause.

Notwithstanding, both parties acknowledge that if public funds are used for a public purpose, they are not a gift within the meaning of the Gift Clause. (See Motion p. 14, citing Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 450; Opp. p. 7, citing Scott v. State Bd. of Equalization (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1597.)

“The determination of what constitutes a public purpose is primarily a matter for the Legislature to determine and its discretion will not be disturbed by the courts so long as that determination has a reasonable basis.” (Opp. p. 4, quoting County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.2d 73, 746, citing County of Alameda v. Janssen (1940) 16 Cal.2d 276.) That said, an appropriation for an unenforceable claim serves no public purpose.” (Motion p. 14:18-20; see Conlin, supra, 99 Cal.17 at pp. 21-22 [“all appropriations of public money for which there is no authority or enforceable claim” are unconstitutional regardless of whether “a sufficient motive appears for its appropriation.”].) Put plainly, if the claim is unenforceable, there is no public purpose as a matter of law. (Motion p. 15, citing Jordan, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at 450 [appropriation beyond the public entity’s “maximum exposure” serves no public purpose and is a gift of public funds as a matter of law]; see also (Motion p. 15, citing Orange County Foundation v. Irvine Co. (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 195, 200 [“[W[hen state funds are expended pursuant to a settlement agreement in exchange for the relinquishment of such a claim, no ‘public purpose’ is achieved. Such an expenditure violates the gift clause.”].)

Accordingly, even if the public purpose of AB 218 is to ensure that the “victims severely damaged by childhood sexual abuse are able to seek compensation from those responsible” (Opp. p. 4, quoting Coats v. New Haven Unified School Dist. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 415, 422) and to “increas[e] the availability of the courts for victims of child sexual abuse” (Opp. p. 4:25-26),[5] that is inapposite.[6]

In sum, the Legislature by enactment of AB 218 created a liability where one did not previously exist because the claim presentation requirement is a substantive element of a claim. And when the Legislature creates a liability where one did not previously exist, whether the enactment was for a public purpose is irrelevant because all appropriations of public money for which there is no statutory or enforceable claim are unconstitutional. (Conlin, supra, 99 Cal.17 at pp. 21-22.)

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, though the court is sympathetic to Plaintiff’s trauma caused by the perpetrator/teacher and the court is cognizant that the Legislature has the right to excuse claim presentation prospectively, doing so retroactively and consequently creating liability when none existed appears to be unconstitutional. Therefore, the motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.