On October 17, 2022, the court issued its final ruling as to Defendant’s demurrer to the 4^th COA found in the FAC wherein the court overruled the namely because “employees of the school district other than Northrop—specifically teachers and the vice principal—observed Northrop’s inappropriate behavior and/or were aware of information regarding Northrop’s improper/criminal activities involving Plaintiff and other students. Yet, these employees who in the scope of their employment, have a duty to protect students from certain known/suspected abuses failed to take appropriate actions to safeguard Plaintiff.” (See 10/17/22 Final Ruling, emphasis original.)

 

On November 17, 2022, the District[2] filed a cross-complaint (CC) against Northrop for:

 

1. Total Equitable Indemnity

2. Partial Equitable Indemnity

3. Declaratory Relief

 

On November 17, 2022, the District filed its answer to Plaintiff’s FAC.

 

On December 19, 2023, Northrop filed her answer to the CC.

 

On January 22, 2024, Northrop filed a substitution of attorney indicating Counsel William Blasser is no longer serving as her counsel and she is representing herself.

 

On April 29, 2024, the District filed the instant MOTION TO STAY THE TRIAL.

 

On May 15, 2024, Northrup filed a NON-OPPOSITION TO NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR STAY.[3]

 

On May 16, 2024, the District filed a summary judgment motion (with a hearing date set for August 5, 2024).

 

On May 16, 2024, the court issued the following minute order re: ‘Vacating Mandatory Settlement Conference with Honorable Salvatore Sirna’: “After review of the immediate case, this Court notes that no Mandatory Settlement Conference Briefs have been filed and were ordered to be filed on or before 05/13/2024. On the Court's own motion, the Mandatory Settlement Conference (MSC) with Hon. Judge Salvatore Sirna scheduled for 05/23/2024 is advanced to this date and vacated. If the parties seek another Mandatory Settlement Conference, parties are to contact their Home Court to make arrangements.” (emphasis added).

 

On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the Motion.

 

On May 30, 2024, the District filed its Reply.

 

On May 31, 2024, Northrop filed a ‘NON-OPPOSITION TO NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO STAY THE TRIAL.’

 

Legal Standard[4]

 

“The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” (Landis v. North American Co. (1936) 299 U.S. 247, 254.) In exercising its discretion the court should consider the (i) “importance of discouraging multiple litigation designed to harass an adverse party,”[5] (ii) “avoiding unseemly conflicts with the courts of other jurisdictions,” and (iii) “whether the rights of the parties can best be determined by the court of the other jurisdiction because of the nature of the subject matter, the availability of witnesses, or the stage to which the proceedings in the other court have already advance.” (Motion p. 10 and Opp. pp. 4-5 both citing Farmland Irrigation Co. Dopplmaier (1957) 48 Cal.2d 208, 215 (Farmland).)[6]

 

Notwithstanding, “California courts are guided by the strong principle that any elapsed time other than that reasonably required for pleadings and discovery is unacceptable and should be eliminated.” (Alpha Media Resort Investment Cases (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1132.)

 

Discussion

 

The District seeks a stay of the case pending resolution of two cases before the appellate court: West Contra Costa Unified School District v. The Superior Court of Contra Costa County (Case No. A169314) and Roe #2 v. Superior Court (Cas No. B334707).[7] Both cases seek a writ compelling the trial court to reverse its decision overruling a demurrer and MJOP, respectively. More specifically, the District argues that this lawsuit “is on a collision course” because either of the pending appellate cases could resolve the entirety of the action. (Motion p. 12, relying upon Caiafa Prof. Law Corp v. State Farm Firm & Casualty Co. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 800.)

 

The circumstances here, however, are different to those presented in Caiafa. In Caiafa, attorney Caiafa entered into an agreement with State Farm wherein Caiafa represented a defendant as independent Cumis counsel. After a couple years of State Farm ceasing to make payments to Caifa for his representation of the defendant, State Farm filed da civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against Caiafa (not his law corporation) in federal court for alleged fraudulent billing. (Id. at p. 802.) Then, Caiafa, through his law corporation, filed a state suit compelling arbitration to recover his unpaid Cumis fees. (Id. at pp. 802-803.) State Farm opposed the petition on the grounds that the matter should be stayed pending resolution of the Federal RICO action. Caifa appealed the trial court’s ruling to stay further proceedings pending the outcome of the RICO action. (Id. at p. 803.) In affirming the trial’s court decision, the appellate court observed that “Caiafa's appointment as Cumis counsel and his claim for fees pursuant to that appointment represent collateral matters to the main litigation… [t]o put it another way, no matter what happened in the state section 2860 arbitration it could not resolve all the issues implicated in the far broader Federal RICO action. So this Federal action will proceed to decision in any event. The potential for ‘unseemly conflict’ is great, unless both forums should reach the exact same resolution of the issues.” (Id. at pp. 805-807, emphasis added.)

 

Here, however, for one, the “unseemly conflicts with courts of other jurisdictions” is not an issue because whereas in Caiafa there was a matter in federal and state court, here, the matter is only within state court (i.e., one jurisdiction).[8] Additionally, the cases on appeal while they involve the same legal issue (i.e., constitutionality of AB 218), they do not involve similar parties (different plaintiffs and/or school districts) nor similar facts (i.e., specifics of the grooming/sexual assault, whether the district was put on notice, etc.). (See also Opp. p. 11.)

 

Thus, as the main litigation is the instant case (not the cases on appeal), the second factor of the need to avoid conflict rulings is not at issue here. (See Motion p. 12.)

 

Ultimately, on such a motion, the “burden is a heavy one, requiring the District to ‘make out a clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone else.’” (Opp. p. 9:15-17.) However, as conceded by Defendant, “no one knows the outcome, it is reasonable to infer that the appellate courts will either find that AB 218 is constitutional or not” (Reply p. 4:3-4.) Moreover, writ proceedings do not even automatically stay the very trial proceedings from which the petitions are taken. (Opp. p. 11, citing Paul Blanco’s Good Car Company Auto Group v. Sup. Ct. of Alameda County (2020) 56 Cal. App. 5th 86, 97-98 [writ proceedings not entitled to automatic stay].) In fact, neither of the trial courts where the writs on which the District relies has entered a stay of its own proceedings. (Opp. p. 11:22-24.)

 

With that, as staying a case for months[9] based upon speculation of what the appellate courts may do, the court, exercising its sound discretion, determines that Defendant has not met its burden.

 

Conclusion

 

Based on the foregoing, as the District can adequately defend itself in this action without work from the appellate courts (Landis, supra, 299 U.S. at p. 254), the motion is denied.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

---