Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV00030, Date: 2023-11-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV00030    Hearing Date: November 15, 2023    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

 

(1)   UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. AND JIANG XU’S NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION TO SEAL UNREDACTED MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS is GRANTED.

 

(2)   UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.’S AND JIANG XU’S JOINT MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT is GRANTED.

                                                                                                          

Background

 

This case arises from a motor vehicle accident.

 

On January 5, 2023, Plaintiff FRANCISCO ROMERO filed suit against Defendants JIANG XU, an individual; UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC., a Corporation; ANTONIO PEREZ, an individual for negligence. (Plaintiff was the passenger in an Uber vehicle operated by Defendant Xu when Defendant Xu’s and Perez’s vehicles collided.)

 

On February 22, 2023, Uber filed its answer.

 

On March 14, 2023, Defendant Perez filed his answer and a cross-complaint against Xu, Romero, and Uber for indemnity (total and implied), declaratory relief, and apportionment of fault. That same day, Xu filed his answer.

 

On September 21, 2023, Uber and Xu (collectively, “Uber Defendants”) filed the instant motions.

 

On November 7, 2023, Uber Defendants filed a reply to both, indicating that no oppositions (due 11/1) were received by either Plaintiff Romero or Defendant Perez.[1]

 

 

Legal Standard for Motion to Seal

 

A party that requests that a record or portion of a record be filed under seal must file a motion or an application for an order sealing it, which must be accompanied by a supporting memorandum and a declaration containing facts sufficient to justify the sealing. (Cal. Rules of Ct., Rule 2.551(b)(1).) A copy of the motion or application to seal must be served on all parties that have appeared in the case. Unless the judge orders otherwise, any party that already has access to the records to be placed under seal must be served with a complete, unredacted copy of all papers as well as a redacted version. (Id., subd. (b)(2).) Other parties must be served with only the public redacted version. The moving party must lodge the record with the court when the motion or application is made, unless good cause is shown for not lodging it or it has been lodged previously. The lodged record is conditionally under seal pending the judge's determination of the motion or application. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 2.551(b)(4).) 

 

Here, the Settlement Agreement entered by the Settling Parties contains a confidentiality clause restricting the disclosure of information, including, but not limited to, the terms of the agreement, settlement amount, and parties. (See Motion p. 6, citing Hinshaw, Winkler, Draa, Marsh & Still v. Superior Court (1986) 51 Cal.App.4th 233, 241 [confidential settlement agreements are afforded the same privacy protection as a bank account or tax information].) The purpose is to protect the vested interest of the settling parties in keeping their financial information private. (See Motion p. 7, citing Carmel-bv-the-Sea v. Young (1970) 2 Cal.3d 259, 268 [Financial privacy concerns can be overriding interests that overcome a right of public access.].) More specifically as to Uber, it regularly keeps the terms and amounts they agree to pay in settlement confidential in order to protect themselves in future settlement discussions with other parties during pre-litigation and litigation processes. Otherwise, public disclosure of the terms of the Settlement Agreement could prejudice the Uber Defendants’ ability to negotiate specific provisions in other future settlement agreements.

 

Conclusion

 

Based on the foregoing, the court grants Uber Defendants’ unopposed motion. 

 

Legal Standard for Good Faith Settlement (GFS)

 

Under section 877.6 of the California Code of Civil Procedure,[2] “[a] determination by the court that [a] settlement was made in good faith shall bar any other joint tortfeasor . . . from any further claims against the settling tortfeasor . . . for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (c).) “The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof on that issue.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 877.6, subd. (d).) 

 

Section 877.6 requires “that the courts review [settlement] agreements made under its aegis to insure that the settlements appropriately balance the . . . statute’s dual objectives” (i.e., providing an “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault” and encouraging parties to resolve their disputes by way of settlement). (Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 494 (Tech-Bilt).)

 

In Tech-Bilt, the California Supreme Court set forth the factors to consider when determining whether a settlement was made in good faith. The Tech-Bilt factors are:

 

(1) A rough approximation of plaintiff’s total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability;

(2) The amount paid in settlement;

(3) The allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs;

(4) A recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial;

(5) The financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants; and

(6) The existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of the non-settling defendants.

 

(Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 498-501.)

 

Discussion

 

Mindful that the financial terms of the agreement are confidential, the court will provide a vague analysis.

 

In cases involving multiple tortfeasors, the common-law principle that each tortfeasor is personally liable for any indivisible injury of which is or her negligence is a proximate cause has commonly been expressed terms of “joint and several liability,” which is central to California negligence law. Under joint and several liability, each tortfeasor whose negligence is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury remains individually liable for all compensable damages attributable to that injury. (Aidan Ming-Ho Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 291.) Whether individuals are "joint tortfeasors” depends upon whether they caused one indivisible injury or the same wrong; the "same wrong" may emanate from two successive independent torts and does not require unity of purpose, action, or intent by the two or more tortfeasors. (In re JTS Corp. (2010) 617 F.3d 1102, 1116-1117. Put simply, a plaintiff need only claim that the tortfeasors caused the same harm. (Id. at p. 1117, citing Lafayette v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 547, 555-556.)

 

As for economic damages (e.g., medical expenses, loss of earnings, loss of use of property, etc.), liability is held by each defendant, provided that the plaintiff recovers only once for the full amount. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 875 (1977).) On the other hand, for noneconomic damages, Section 1431.2 provides that the liability of each defendant “shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against the defendant for that amount.” (Motion p. 5, quoting Cal. Code of Civ. Proc., §1431.2.)

 

Here, though only portion of the Uber Defendant’s settlement proceeds will be attributed to non-economic damages, the Defendants’ settlement with Plaintiff more than accounts for their several obligation to Plaintiff’s non-economic damages since the settlement covers more than two times Plaintiff’s past economic damages. (Motion pp. 5-6.) Thus, though the purpose of GFS motions is to encourage settlements—which may entail a settling defendant to pay less than his proportionate share of the anticipated damages (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 874-875)—here, Uber Defendants’ payment of more than its share of economic damages suggests that the settlement was made in good faith.

 

To the extent that the settlement is so far “out of the ballpark,” Defendant Perez has not filed an opposition. (City of Grand Terrace v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1251, 1261 [“[C]onclude that only when the good faith nature of a settlement is disputed, it is incumbent upon the trial court to consider and weigh the Tech-Bilt factors. That is to say, when no one objects, the barebones motion which sets forth the ground of good faith, accompanied by a declaration which sets forth a brief background of the case is sufficient.”].)

 

With that, as a GFS motion does not require perfect or even nearly perfect apportionment of liability but rather that the settlement not be grossly disproportionate to the settlor’s fair share and moving Defendants have made that showing, the court grants the motion. (Motion p. 4, citing Abbott Ford, Inc., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 874-875). 

 

 

 

 

Conclusion

 

Based on the foregoing, the GFS between Plaintiff and Uber Defendants is granted.



[1] Though, presumably, Plaintiff Romero would not file an opposition as it is a party to the settlement agreement and the recipient of the settlement amount.

 

[2] All statutory references, unless otherwise noted, are to the Code of Civil Procedure.