Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV00274, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

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Case Number: 23PSCV00274    Hearing Date: April 22, 2025    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

CROSS DEFENDANT JOHN STEVENS’ MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM WAIVER is DENIED; any reasonable indication provides that the responding documents to RFP No. 22 do exist, and they can be produced in a way to redact any private/otherwise constitutionally protected information.

Background

This is a landlord-tenant case. Plaintiffs Kuoyuan Tseng and Kuan-Yin Chen allege the following against Defendants JIN XIANG GAO (“Gao”); HEMING XU (“Xu”); MENGMEI XU aka JESSICA XU (“Mengmei”): In June 2019, Plaintiffs began renting a residential property from Gao. (Plaintiffs allege the multi-family property was illegally converted from a four to eight-bedroom house such that Defendants are not entitled to rent.) In October 2021, Defendants Xu and Mengmei purchased the property and made further illegal conversions and routinely entered the property. On March 24, 2022, the County of Los Angeles Department of Regional Planning issued a notice of violation to the Xu Defendants for maintaining an illegal boarding house. On April 7, 2022, Mengmei sent a text message to the Plaintiffs stating providing a 30-days written termination notice and stated that Plaintiffs had until May 9 to leave as failing to do otherwise would result in Plaintiffs being fined by the County. Plaintiffs did not vacate the premises which resulted in Defendants filing an unlawful detainer action in July 2022.

On January 30, 2023, Plaintiffs filed the instant action.

On March 17, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (FAC) for:

1.     Violation Of The Implied Warranty Of Habitability

2.     Retaliation For Engaging In Activity Protected By California Civil Code 1942.5

3.     Violation Of Los Angeles County Tenant Antiharassment Ordinance

4.     Violation Of Los Angeles County Rent Stabilization Ordinance

5.     Trespass

6.     Breach Of Contract

7.     Breach Of Covenant Of Quiet Enjoyment

8.     Negligence

9.     Unfair Business Practices In Violation Of Business And Professions Code Section 17200

10.  Unjust Enrichment

11.  Constructive Eviction

On April 13, 2023, a notice of related case was filed indicating that the case of 22WCUD01284 entitled HEMING XU vs KUOYUAN TSENG, et al. was filed on 7/5/22 and involved similar parties and claims.

On April 27, 2023, Xu filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiffs and John Stevens, who is Chen’s boyfriend and was residing at the property. (Cross-Complaint ¶14.) (The gravamen of Xu’s cross-complaint against Stevens is unjust enrichment as Xu alleges that he stayed at the property without permission.)

On September 16, 2023, the parties attended an IDC.

On February 21, 2024, default was entered against Gao.

On March 14, 2024, the parties attended an IDC. The minute order provides, in relevant part, the following: “The Court and Counsel confer re: the status of outstanding discovery sought by Defense Counsel, specifically with regards to damages and witness information. Plaintiff's Counsel is to provide the agreed upon discovery (with regards to damages and full names of witnesses with a summary of what said witness will testify to) due on or before March 29, 2024, to opposing Counsel. The Court and Counsel confer re: discovery sought by Defense Counsel, specifically Plaintiff's current or former employment information. After conducting the Informal Discovery Conference (IDC), the above indicated issues remain unresolved. In light of the above and by order of the Court, Defense Counsel is now permitted to file Formal Discovery Motions with regards to the above indicated issue.”

On August 27, 2024, the parties attended an IDC. According to the minute order, “The Court and Counsel confer re: discovery sought by the Cross-Complainant. After conducting the Informal Discovery Conference (IDC), the issues remain unresolved.”

On September 12, 2024, the parties attended an MSC; the matter did not settle.

On March 5, 2024, the parties attended another IDC; discovery remained unresolved.

On March 14, 2025, CROSS DEFENDANT JOHN STEVENS filed the instant Motion FOR RELIEF FROM WAIVER.

On April 8, 2025, Xu filed an opposition to the motion.

On April 14, 2025, Stevens filed a reply.

There are numerous discovery motions on calendar.

Legal Standard

The court may relieve a party from its waiver of objections if the Court determines that “[t]he party has subsequently served a response that is in substantial compliance” with the requirements for [the subject discovery], and that “[t]he party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290, subds. (a)(1) and (2) and 2031.300, subds. (a)(1) and (2).)

Discussion

According to the motion: On April 24, 2024, Xu served discovery requests on John Stevens, including written discovery requests. The discovery at issue is the following: Requests for Production (RFP) No, 22, which states: “Produce any and all DOCUMENTS evidencing the address listed for YOU on invoices or other communications from your cable, internet and/or cell phone, bank statements, credit card statements, loan applications, mortgage bills, vehicle registration records, insurance.” On May 28, 2024 Stevens’ attorney’s office requested a two week extension; Xu’s attorney granted the initial extension request but stated that no further extensions would be granted. (Frish Decl. ¶3). Stevens’s responses were due on or before June 11, 2024. However, Stevens’s initial responses were not provided until July 3, 2024.

1.     Attorney Mistake/Inadvertence/Excusable Neglect

Stevens’ attorneys maintain that because of a calendaring error and staff turnover, the new deadline was not sent to the attorneys handling the file and the attorneys did not serve timely responses.

In opposition, Xu, citing to Hearn v. Howard (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1193, 1206, maintains that courts have consistently held that a calendaring error or similar mistake by counsel is insufficient to justify relief where the error results from a lack of diligence. (The reply does not address this case.) Hearn, however, is inapposite for a few reasons. First, Hearn, involved a motion to vacate a default and default judgment, not a relief from waiver of objections. Second, nowhere in Hearn does the court discuss calendaring or internal errors that affect a firm’s untimely responses to discovery. Third, even assuming factual and procedural similarities between the cases, in Hearn, court determined that there was no excusable neglect/mistake because the defendant had “multiple opportunities” to do something, but she failed to do so. (Id. at p. 1206.)

Here, Stevens’ promptly notified Xu that code-compliant responses will be served.

Therefore, the court determines that the first prong is met: the party’s failure to serve a timely response was the result of mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect of the attorneys.

2.     Substantially Compliant Responses

The Civil Discovery Act does not provide a definition of “substantial compliance” applicable to the context of motions for relief from waiver of objections to the various discovery methods. See St. Mary v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 762, 769.) As a general matter, however, “[s]ubstantial compliance … means actual compliance in respect to the substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.” (Stasher v. Harger-Haldeman (1962) 58 Cal.2d 23, 29; see also Freeman v. Vista de Santa Barbara Associates, LP (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 791, 793.) In turn, “a trial court must be mindful of the Legislature's preference for discovery over trial by surprise, must construe the facts before it liberally in favor of discovery, may not use its discretion to extend the limits on discovery beyond those authorized by the Legislature, and should prefer partial to outright denials of discovery.” (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 540.)

Here, Stevens’ response to RFP No. 22 is not substantially compliant with the purpose of the discovery statutes. Stevens’ initial response was that “Responding Property is unable to comply because no such documents exist.” (Motion, Ex. 2, p. 37 of 43 of PDF.) The amended response was that “Responding Property is unable to comply because no such documents exist as to the Property which is the subject of this dispute; Responding Property objects to production of records related to other addresses on the basis that such request violates his privacy records.” (Motion, Ex. 2, p. 37 of 43 of PDF.)

Essentially, Stevens is stating that he does not have cable, he does not have internet, he does not have a phone, he does not have a bank account, he does not have a car, he does not own a home, and that he does not have insurance. But this argument is unavailing for a few reasons. For one, most functioning members of society have at least one of those of things (i.e., a phone statement). Second, even assuming the bank records may reveal protected financial information (e.g., social security number), there is no reason that such information cannot be redacted to produce the otherwise relevant information that Xu seeks: Stevens’ address from October 1, 2021 to February 28, 2023. Third, the response is contradictory. On the one hand, Stevens is asserting that he does not have documents from a bank (i.e., “no such documents exist”) but on the other hand, the crux of his objection is that he does have statements/documents from a bank, but he should otherwise be precluded from providing them for privacy reasons.

All in all, any reasonable indication provides that the responding documents do exist, and they can be produced in a way to redact any private/otherwise constitutionally protected information. Thus, the court determines that this prong for relief of waiver of objections is not satisfied. 

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion is DENIED.