Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV00738, Date: 2024-05-20 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 23PSCV00738 Hearing Date: May 20, 2024 Dept: O
Tentative Ruling
DEFENDANT CITY OF POMONA’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER TO
PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.
Background
This is a
negligence case. Plaintiffs JUAN ALVARRAN, an individual; AMANDA DOW, an individual;
and LILAH ALVARRAN, a minor through her Guardian Ad Litem JUAN ALVARRAN allege
the following against Defendants CITY OF MONTCLAIR, a public entity and ANTHONY
ALMEDA: On 1/14/2023, Defendant Almeda was being pursued by Police Officer Sean
Mackey #401 of the Montclair Police Department when Defendant Almeda collided
with Plaintiff’s vehicle and caused a chain-reaction of collisions with other
motor vehicles.
On March 13,
2023, Plaintiffs filed suit for:
On October 6,
2023, the City of Montclair filed its answer.
On January
22, 2024, the City of Montclair filed a cross-complaint against the City of
Pomona for:
1. IMPLIED INDEMNITY
2. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
3. DECLARATORY RELIEF
On February
8, 2024, Plaintiff named the City of Pomona as Doe 1 and Sean Mackey as Doe 2.
On February
21, 2024, City of Pomona filed its answer to the Cross-Complaint.
On April 11,
2024, the City of Pomona filed a demurrer, which it withdrew on 4/19/24.
On April 19,
2024, the City of Pomona filed the instant demurrer.
On May 6,
2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition.
On May 13,
2024, the City of Pomona filed its reply.
Legal
Standard[1]
The City of
Pomona brings forth the motion pursuant to CCP section 430.10 subdivisions (e)
(failure to state sufficient facts to constitute a COA) and subdivision (f)
(uncertainty).
Discussion
The City of
Pomona brings forth the demurrer on the following grounds:
1. The City of Pomona is immune pursuant
to Vehicle Code section 17004.7(b)(1), see also Ramirez v. City of Gardena (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 811, 818.
2. Complaint fails to plead particular
facts about the City of Pomona’s alleged negligence/omission
3. The complaint fails to identity a
statute that imposes liability on the City of Pomona
4. The complaint fails to allege
compliance with the Tort Claims Act
1. Immunity
Vehicle Code
§ 17004.7(b)(1) provides as follows:
(a)
The
immunity provided by this section is in addition to any other immunity provided
by law. … (b)(1) A public agency employing peace officers that adopts and
promulgates a written policy on, and provides regular and periodic training on
an annual basis for, vehicular pursuits complying with subdivisions (c) and (d)
is immune from liability for civil damages for personal injury to or death of
any person or damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle
being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, has
been, or believes he or she is being or has been, pursued in a motor vehicle by
a peace officer employed by the public entity. (Veh. Code, § 17004.7(b)(1).)
The opposition does not address the statute. To the
extent that Plaintiffs focus on CACI 730, which is used to guide jurors in
determining whether a law enforcement officer's pursuit of a suspect was
conducted with reasonable care, that but supports the City of Pomona’s ultimate
point: the complaint fails to specific facts as to the accident to determine
whether any such action on behalf of the City of Pomona was reasonable. Mere
pursuit of vehicles does not implicate Vehicle Code §17001 as mere pursuit is not
negligent operation of a vehicle. (Reply p. 4, citing Reenders v. City of
Ontario (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1052.)
Thus, absent facts that indicate any negligent operation
of the police vehicle by the police officer, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer on
the grounds of immunity with leave to amend.[2]
Though the court need not necessarily address the other
arguments, for the sake of judicial economy/purposes of amendment, the court
will address the other arguments.
2. Specific Facts as to the City of
Pomona
The original complaint is directed at the City of
Montclair. To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that the City of Pomona was
named as a Doe defendant such that the pleading is proper, not so. First, it is
improper to lump allegations against multiple defendants. (See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.
(1990) 51 Cal. 3d 120, 125 n.1 & 134 n.12; Wilson v. Household Fin. Corp.
(1982) 131 Cal. App. 3d 649, 653 [noting that plaintiff cannot allege claim
against defendant HFC by merely lumping it together with the other defendant, as HFC
did not have duties of an insurer].) Pleadings like this that assert
claims against multiple defendants without specifying which defendants are
liable for which acts or omissions make it difficult for Defendants to make
informed responses to a plaintiff's allegations. (See e.g., Harman v. City
and County of San Francisco (1972) 7 Cal.3d 150, 156-57; Semole v.
Sansoucie (1972) 28 Cal. App. 3d 714, 721 [complaint should state the
essential and substantial facts to apprise defendant of the nature of the cause
of action.].)
Therefore, as the four corners of the complaint do not
state what the City of Pomona has allegedly done (notably when the City of
Montclair was engaged in the pursuit), the demurrer is also sustained on this
ground with leave to amend.
3. Statute
Plaintiffs assert that the City of Pomona is liable under
Government Code sections 815.2(a) and 820 (vicarious liability), but, as noted
by the City of Pomona, it is unclear how this statute applies when no City of
Pomona employee has even been identified. The opposition does not address this
point.
Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer with leave to
amend for the failure to identify a statute that imposes liability on the City
of Pomona.
4. Claims Presentation Requirement
Another of the City of Pomona’s arguments is that
Plaintiff’s complaint fails to plead compliance with the tort claims act.
(Demurrer p. 7, citing Gurrola v. County of Los Angeles (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 145, 153; Dujardin v. Ventura County General Hospital (1977)
69 Cal.App.3d 350, 355.) That is true; the four corners of the complaint only
reference a timely Tort Claim filed with the City of Montclair on
February 15, 2023. (Complaint P20.) In Reply, the City of Pomona argues that it
‘never received these claims.” (Reply p. 2:26-27.) But the City of Pomona, by its own concession, has
received the claim. (See Demurrer, Ex. G [email between counsel
dated 4/19/24 at 11:48 PM] [“As discussed, we will be withdrawing our demurrer
based on your office providing copies of the claim forms plaintiffs claim were
mailed to the City of Pomona.”].)
Thus, while leave to amend should be used to allege
that Plaintiffs have complied with the claims act presentation requirement, the
court finds the issue of the filing of the presentation itself to be
moot.
Conclusion
All in all, the liability of the City of Pomona is
unclear based upon the lack of facts and should specific facts later be
alleged, they need be enough to overcome the immunity afforded by Vehicle Code
section 17004.7(b)(1). Leave to amend is granted.
[1] The parties have met
and conferred.
[2] The court grants
leave to amend as Plaintiffs contend in opposition that they have footage of
the City of Pomona at the scene, which suggest that Plaintiffs have facts to
use in an amended complaint.