Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV00873, Date: 2024-01-08 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

Case Number: 23PSCV00873    Hearing Date: January 8, 2024    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

DEFENDANT, RICHARD ANTHONY GURROLA’S MOTION TO STAY CIVIL ACTION PENDING RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS is GRANTED in its entirety.

Background

This case arises from a motor vehicle accident.

On March 24, 2023, Plaintiff Antoinette Marie Lopez filed suit against Defendants Richard Anthony Gurrola (“Defendant Gurrola”) and Midway HFCA LLC (“Midway LLC”) asserting causes of action for (1) general negligence and (2) motor vehicle based upon the allegation that Defendant entered Plaintiff’s lane causing the vehicles to collide head on.[1]

On May 17, 2023, Defendant filed its answer.

On July 19, 2023, Plaintiff named Hankey Investment Company LP (“Hankey Company”) as Doe 1.[2]

On August 10, 2023, Hankey Company filed its answer.

On November 16, 2023, Defendant Gurrola filed the instant motion.

On December 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed her opposition.

On December 20, 2023, Defendant Hankey Company filed a ‘Declaration Of Mark M. Gnesin In Reply To Plaintiff’s Opposition To Motion To Stay Proceedings.’

Legal Standard

The motion is based principally on the 5th Amendment, because Defendant is facing criminal charges based on the allegations in this civil matter. (Motion p. 6.) The court turns to Pacers, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 162 Cal.App.2d 686 as it forms the basis of the motion. There, the appellate court stated the following:

Where, as here, a defendant's silence is constitutionally guaranteed, the court should weigh the parties' competing interests with a view toward accommodating the interests of both parties, if possible. An order staying discovery until expiration of the criminal statute of limitations would allow real parties to prepare their lawsuit while alleviating petitioners' difficult choice between defending either the civil or criminal case. This remedy is in accord with federal practice where it has been consistently held that when both civil and criminal proceedings arise out of the same or related transactions, an objecting party is generally entitled to a stay of discovery in the civil action until disposition of the criminal matter.

(Id. at p. 689-690.)

That said, defendants have no right to a blanket stay on Fifth Amendment grounds. (See  Keating v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 45 F.3d 322, 324 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 827 (1995).) The extent to which the pending civil action implicates the Fifth Amendment privilege of a defendant is a “significant factor,” but is “only one consideration to be weighed against others.” (Ibid.) Keating instructs that courts to consider the other five factors: (1) the interest of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously with the litigation, and the possibility that plaintiffs would be prejudiced by a delay; (2) the burden which the proceedings may impose on defendants; (3) the convenience of the court and the efficient use of judicial resources; (4) the interests of persons not parties to the civil litigation; and (5) the interest of the public in the civil and criminal litigations. (Id. at pp. 324-325.)

Discussion

i.                 Individual Defendant Gurrola

Defendant seeks a stay of this civil action pending resolution of a related criminal case (for driving under the influence), filed on October 30, 2023 and pending in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. CITKA134145- 01, People of the State of California v. Richard Anthony Gurrola. This civil case and pending criminal proceeding are related to the same facts involving the same accident, i.e., April 30, 2022. Thus, Defendant will be invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, meaning that he will not be positioned to provide substantive answers to Plaintiff’s anticipated discovery requests or meaningfully participate in a deposition until the criminal case has been resolved. (Motion p. 5.)

In opposition, Plaintiff appears to argue that there is a not commonality of issues because the criminal case involves causation whereas the civil case involves liability. (Opp. p. 5:9-10.) The argument is misplaced because liability requires addressing causing as the third element for negligence is causation. Next, Plaintiff argues that causation has been established because the accident was Defendant’s fault. (Opp. p. 5:5:8-9 [“Additionally, liability should not be disputed Defendant did cross-over the lane of travel and hit Plaintiffs vehicle head on.”].) While this strongly appears to be the case, liability is not presumed at the outset of litigation. 

Thus, as the issue of negligence will inherently require Defendant Gurrola to address facts regarding his intoxication (to establish breach of a duty) and such facts are also subject to the criminal case, the court finds that Fifth Amendment concerns here are significant.

Therefore, the court GRANTS the motion such that it prohibits any discovery as to the individual Defendant Gurrola.[3]

ii.               Entity Defendant

At the outset, the court notes that the Fifth Amendment is not invoked as to the corporate defendant because it is not facing criminal charges. Thus, in its determination as to whether discovery of other issues (course and scope and damages) should be allowed, the decision to defer civil proceedings is not as strong. (See SEC v. Dresser Indus., Inc. 628 F.2d 1368, 1375-1376 (D.C. Cir. 1980) [“[T]he strongest case for deferring civil proceedings until after completion of criminal proceedings is where a party under indictment for a serious offense is required to defend a civil or administrative action involving the same matter.”].)  

As noted above, any discovery is impermissible that would inquire as to Gurrola’s use of alcohol (e.g., whether other employees or employer noticed Gurrola intoxicated at work or outside work and whether other employees or employer observed Gurrola operating a vehicle under the influence of a substance). This leaves Plaintiff with only the opportunity to conduct very limited discovery regarding general inquiries about the employer-employee relationship (e.g., how long has/was Defendant employed). With such few questions to ask, that would be tantamount to a stay of discovery as to the corporate defendant. (SEC v. Alexander, No. 10-CV-4535-LHK, 2010 WL 5388000, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2010) [Staying a parallel civil proceeding in its early stages may prove more efficient in the long-run because disposition of the criminal action may narrow the issues and streamline discovery in the civil proceeding.”].) Such judicial convenience and efficiency weighs in favor of staying the case.

Moreover, as to Plaintiff’s interest, it would be more efficient to completely stay the proceedings because such limited discovery would not support Plaintiff’s interest in having the case resolved speedily. Furthermore, as to Plaintiff’s interest, Plaintiff does not contend that discovery as to the corporate defendant would aid in further discovery (e.g., witness testimony).

To the extent that Plaintiffs cite to Petrov v. Alameda County (N.D. Cal., Nov. 4, 2016, No. 16-CV-04323-YGR) 2016 WL 6563355, p. 5 for the proposition that discovery should be allowed against non-indicted defendants, the case is not entirely instructive. In Petrov, the non-indicted defendants were other police offers who joined in unjustified uses of force against plaintiff. Thus, the officers were sued in their individual capacities under direct liability. Here, however, the non-indicted defendant, the corporate defendant, is being sued via vicarious liability.

All in all, balancing the Keating factors, the court finds that a complete stay best preserves the myriad interests at hand.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted in its entirety.