Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV01870, Date: 2023-10-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23PSCV01870    Hearing Date: October 3, 2023    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT is GRANTED, with leave to amend. 

Background

This case arises from a motor vehicle accident.

On June 26, 2023, Plaintiff Perry Gerard Lucero filed suit against Defendant Jeadam Cho for (1) Motor Vehicle Negligence and (2) Negligence.

On August 17, 2023, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike punitive damages.

On September 6, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to strike damages.

On September 25, 2023, Defendant filed a reply.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure (CCP) section 435 provides, in pertinent part that the court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, “(a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or any order of the court.”

Discussion

Defendants seek to strike punitive damages because “Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state facts sufficient to plead the requisite factually allegations to support a claim for punitive damages against Defendant.” (Motion p. 4.) The court agrees.

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code § 3294(a).) Malice, as pertinent here, means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. § 3294(c)(1), emphasis added.) The conduct which permits punitive damages must include "proof of an evil motive" or "hav[e] the character of outrage frequently associated with crime." (Id; American Airlines, Inc. v. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1050-51.) That said, even absent evil motive or intent, a defendant’s conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences of his conduct is sufficient to find punitive damages. (See Ramona Manor Convalescent Hospital v. Care Enterprises (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 1120, 1141 (Ramona) [“There are many California decisions imposing punitive damages irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the victim's specific identity . . .  these cases require a conscious disregard of the probable dangerous consequences.”]); see also Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896 [“We concur with the Searle observation that a conscious disregard of the safety of others may constitute malice within the meaning of section 3294 of the Civil Code.”], emphasis added and underline added.)

Here, for one, the complaint is a negligence action based upon a car accident, which evidences that a claim for punitive damages is improper. (Kendall Yacht v. United Cal. Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958 [a claim for punitive damages claim cannot be based on conduct that is merely unreasonable, negligence, or even grossly negligent].)

Next, to the extent that Plaintiff attempts to illustrate malice or a conscious disregard for the safety of others, Plaintiff conclusively alleges that Defendant was “distracted, disabled, and/or impaired and [was] aware of the probable consequences of Defendant being in such a state.” (See e.g., Complaint ¶12). But what does it mean in this context to be distracted, disabled, and or impaired? Moreover, how was Defendant distracted, disabled, or impaired? Specific answers to those questions would provide the ultimate facts. (Weil & Brown, California Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, 6:158 (The Rutter Group 1996) [In pleading punitive damages, a plaintiff must allege specific facts].) 

To the extent that Plaintiff has filed an opposition, it generally recites allegations in the complaint. To the extent that Plaintiff cites to Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, the case is inapposite. First, at issue in the case was whether plaintiffs may seek at the pleading stage to recover both punitive damages as permitted by Civil Code section 3294 and statutory penalties for unlawful wiretapping pursuant to Penal Code section 637.2, subdivision (a). (Id. at 1256.) Here, however, statutory penalties are not issue. Second, the facts are inapposite as Clauson involved allegations of wiretapping, not a vehicular accident. Setting aside the factual dissimilarities, Clauson supports Defendant’s argument that ultimate facts are required. (Id. at p. 1255 [“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”].) Thus, even assuming the facts in the complaint to be true—which is the crux of the opposition—that truth amounts to no more than the fact that Defendant rear-ended Plaintiff, which clearly is insufficient for punitive damages.

Therefore, reading the Complaint in its entirety and assuming the allegations true, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient that Defendant acted with malice when he rear-ended Plaintiff.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted, with leave to amend.