Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 23PSCV02986, Date: 2025-02-13 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV02986, Date: 2025-02-13 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

DEFENDANT, INTERNATIONAL CHURCH OF THE FOURSQUARE GOSPEL’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED because adjudication of Plaintiffs’ claims would require the court to evaluate ICFG Board’s decision to revoke Pastor Mark Wilson’s credentials, the event that set into play the property disputes. As for leave to amend, that will likely be granted for Plaintiffs to clarify/add additional facts as to the form/type its entities take.

This case involves rights to certain property after Plaintiff Gilroy Foursquare Church, d/b/a Foothills Foursquare Church (“Gilroy Foursquare”) disaffiliated from Defendant International Church of the Foursquare Gospel (“ICFG”).

On September 27, 2023, Gilroy Foursquare and THE FOOTHILLS CHURCH OF GILROY, a California nonprofit corporation, as Successor in Interest filed suit.

On March 26, 2024, the court sustained with leave to amend Defendant Credit Union’s demurrer.

On August 8, 2024, the court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC).

On August 15, 2024, Plaintiffs and THE FOOTHILLS OF GILROY FINANCIAL SUPPORTERS, LLC, a California limited liability company, filed their SAC against CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION and INTERNATIONAL CHURCH OF THE FOURSQUARE GOSPEL for:

On August 22, 2024, Plaintiffs dismissed the Credit Union and all COAs against it.

On January 30, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their oppositions. (The oppositions raise similar arguments.)

ICFG requests the court take judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff, The Foothill Church of Gilroy’s Articles of Incorporation dated 6/16/22 and (2) Plaintiff’s Articles of Organization dated 6/3/24. (The RJN is unopposed.)

Here, the court takes judicial notice of the exhibits because the Plaintiffs have attached the Bylaws an exhibit to the SAC. The Court may properly take judicial notice of documents that have been incorporated by reference into the Complaint. (See Circle Star Center Associates, L.P. v. Liberate Technologies (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 1203, 1206 fn. 1 [considering a lease which had been incorporated by reference in the complaint when ruling on demurrer to the complaint] Pomona College v. Superior Court, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1716, 1727-28 [taking judicial notice of employment agreement and employee handbook referred to in plaintiff’s complaint in ruling on demurrer]; see also Cohen v. Ratinoff (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 321, 327, quoting Washer v. Bank of America (1943) 21 Cal.2d 822, 829-830 [court may examine the exhibit attached to a pleading if it is incorporated by reference].)

ICFG demurs to the COAs asserted against it on the grounds that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter alleged in the pleading (Code of Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (a)) and/or that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a COA. (Id., subd. (e).)

More specifically, the crux of the demurrer is grounded upon the following principle: that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution bars judicial review of claims challenging ecclesiastical decisions involving the appointment of clergy. (See e.g., Demurrer p. 11, quoting Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1168, 1170 [“[C]ivil courts will therefore not intrude into the church’s governance of ‘religious’ or ‘ecclesiastical’ matters, such as theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of members to standards of morality.”].)

Here, after a review of the well-established authority on the matter and reviewing all the inferences in the SAC in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the court agrees with Defendant ICFG that this court is precluded from adjudicating the dispute because adjudicating the property disputes would require the court to question ICFG’s Board’s decision(s), an undertaking of which courts are precluded to make.

Considering the breadth of cases on the matter, the court’s discussion will first begin with an overview of the law, then followed by an application of the law to the facts.

It is the “duty of th[e] court, as of every other judicial tribunal, [] to decide actual controversies through entry of a judgment that can be carried into effect, and not to … declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Bd. of Guide Dogs for Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) A lawsuit that fails to satisfy the justiciability requirement should generally be dismissed. (Wilson & Wilson v. City of Council of Redwood City (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1559, 1574.)

One type of action that may be nonjusticiable is that presenting ecclesiastical controversies. (See e.g., Watson v. Jones (1871) 80 U.S. 679; Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696 (Milivojevich); Jones v. Wolf (1979) 443 U.S. 59; Higgins v. Maher (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1168.) An ecclesiastical matter includes the question of “which faction represents the ‘true’ church entitled to the property.” (Metropolitan Phillip v. Steiger (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 923, 925.) The Religious Clauses of the First Amendment “protect[] the right of religious institutions to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.” (Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. V. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732, 737 (Our Lady) [internal quotation omitted].)

Thus, courts must draw a careful line between judicial restraint and the need for resolution of matters involving intra-church disputes.

This affirmative defense afforded to religious institutions applies to its employment decisions, which is known as the ‘ministerial exception.’ (Markel v. Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America (2024) 124 F.4th 796, 803 [“The ministerial exception encompasses all adverse personnel or tangible employment actions between religious institutions and their employees and disallows lawsuits for damages based on lost or reduced pay.”]; see also Our Lady, supra, 591 U.S. at p. 803.].) Even “arbitrary decisions of religious organizations affecting the status of their clergy employees must be free from judicial oversight … [t]he employment decisions of religious organizations about their clergy employees ‘are per se religious matters and cannot be reviewed by civil courts….’” (Schmoll v. Chapman University (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1434, 1445, quoting Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp. (8th Cir.1999) 929 F.2d 360, 363, emphasis and underline added.)

Accordingly, the “selection and termination of clergy or ecclesiastical leadership should be essentially off-limits to courts.” (Silo v. CHW Medical Foundation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1097, 1106.)

The affirmative defense afforded to religious institutions also applies to property disputes,

The Court has established two basic frameworks for deciding church property cases: deference and neutral principles. Although some jurisdictions have held that the constitutional analysis applied to hierarchical organizations is the same as that applied to congregational organizations (i.e., hierarchical organizations are afforded the deferential approach), “[I]t remains unclear whether the constitutional analysis for congregational and hierarchical religious institutions is identical.” (Singh v. Singh (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1280, fn. 16, emphasis and italics added.)^[4] Regardless, “no matter whether the religious organization is hierarchical or congregational, it is clear that the decisions of the highest religious tribunal on questions of discipline, faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law must be accepted.” (Ibid.)

The deference approach established by the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones, supra is a product of the hierarchical organization of the church. In Watson, which was the first church dispute case before the Court, the Court was asked to decree the termination of an implied trust because of alleged departures from doctrine by the general church. The Watson court held that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final.” (Id., at p. 727.) Accordingly, once a church judicial body has decided an issue related to actual religious matters, courts defer to the church judicial body. T

This deference approach also assumes that local churches have given implied consent to the church hierarchy wherein some courts even extend this notion of implied to church hierarchy by finding that a “local church is holding the property in trust, caring for the property for the benefit of the diocese.” (Kathleen E. Reeder, Whose Church Is It, Anyway? Property Disputes and Episcopal Church Splits, 40 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 125, 136 (2006).) Overall, the deference approach “overwhelmingly factors the national church.” (Id. at p. 137, emphasis added.)

Watson’s deference approach was underscored in Milivojevich, supra. (Milivojevich is the case most heavily relied upon by Defendant ICFG. As noted in Reply, Plaintiffs do not address this case.)

In Milivojevich, the highest governing body of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Mother Church) defrocked one of its bishops, Dionisije Milivojevich, after investigation into the complaints against Dionisije. (Id. at p. 697-698, 702-703.) The Mother Church appointed an Administrator of the Diocese, which the Mother Church then reorganized into three Dioceses. (Id. at p. 698.) Dionisije filed suit arguing that his removal was procedurally and substantively defective under the internal regulations of the Mother Church; the Illinois Supreme Court agreed that his removal was arbitrary and invalid. (Ibid.) The Court, recognizing that the Mother Church was HIERARCHICAL (id. at p. 717),[2] disagreed.

Resolution of the religious disputes at issue here affects the control of church property in addition to the structure and administration of the American-Canadian Diocese. This is because the Diocesan Bishop controls respondent Monastery of St. Sava and is the principal officer of respondent property-holding corporations. Resolution of the religious dispute over Dionisije's defrockment therefore determines control of the property. Thus, this case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution of which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals. Even when rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. (Id. at p. 709, emphasis added.)

Therefore, civil courts must accept the property consequences “as the incidental effect of an ecclesiastical determination.” (Id. at p. 720; see also Episcopal Church Cases (2009) 45 Cal.4th 467, 485 [“[I]f resolution of a property dispute involves a point of doctrine, the court must defer to the position of the highest ecclesiastical authority that has decided the point.”].)

Despite the foregoing, it is also well-established that not all property disputes are outside the purview of the court’s jurisdiction.

To the extent the court can resolve a property dispute without reference to church doctrine, the court may apply “neutral principles law.” (Korean Philadelphia Presbyterian Church v. California Presbytery (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1081.) The “neutral principles of law” approach was first set forth in Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church (1969) 393 U.S. 440. Hull involved hierarchical religious organizations. In Hull, the disputes involved a decision by an association of a general church to take over the property of two local churches that had withdrawn from the association. (Id. at pp. 441–443.) In holding that the First Amendment barred courts from adjudicating this property dispute, the Court reasoned that “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to TURN ON the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.” (Id. at p. 449, emphasis and capitalization and underline added.) Then, the approach was clarified by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf, supra, 443 U.S. 595, another dispute over ownership of church property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization.

In Jones, the high court reviewed three Georgia Supreme Court opinions. (Episcopal Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 481.) As summarized in Episcopal Cases, “In all three of the Georgia Supreme Court cases, the deeds to the disputed property were in the name of the local church. In two of them … NO statute or CHURCH DOCUMENTED CREATED A TRUST IN FAVOR OF THE GENERAL CHURCH. In those case, the Georgia Supreme Court awarded the property to the local church. [internal citation omitted.] In the third case, however, involving a dispute within the United Methodist Church, the high court explained that the Georgia Supreme Court ‘observed [] that the constitution of The United Methodist Church, its Book of Discipline, contained an express trust provision in favor of the general church. On this basis, the church property was awarded to the denominational church.’” (Id. at pp. 481-482, citing Jones, supra, 443 U.S. at pp. 600-601, emphasis and capitalization added.) Accordingly, evidence that can be relied upon in the neutral principles method includes “the language of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, the state statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of the general church….” (Ibid.)

Therefore, “to the extent the court can resolve a property dispute without reference to church doctrine, it should apply neutral principles of law.” (Episcopal Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 485.)

iii. Providence Baptist Church of San Francisco v. Superior Court (1952) 40 Cal.2d 55 (Providence Baptist)

Lastly, Plaintiffs cite to Providence Baptist (Opp. p. 8:18-24) to support their proposition that courts will entertain jurisdiction of controversies in religious bodies even if some ecclesiastical matters are “incidentally involved.” The Reply does not address Providence Baptist. (Providence Baptist used the “incidentally involved” language as promulgated in Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Church (1952) 39 Cal.2d 121.)

Providence Baptist involved a CONGREGATIONAL type of church where its affairs were controlled by the members. The case was a declaratory relief action by church members who asserted they had voted to discharge the pastor, but he had refused to vacate the position or to surrender church funds and documents. The trial court found that the pastor had not been properly discharged, and it appointed a referee to supervise an election of directors. Despite the California Supreme Court acknowledging that the “Supreme Court has definitely aligned itself with those authorities which hold that the civil authorities cannot disregard the decisions of the church tribunals” (id. at p. 62), the California Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling by stating the following:

While we may not be dealing with the officer of a corporation in the strict sense (the pastor of a church is involved) the situation is similar and we see no reason why an election cannot be conducted where, as appears, a fair and proper election cannot be conducted by the church and the election previously held was irregular and of no effect. In other words the appropriate body of the church is assisted in acting within its proper sphere, according to its rules and regulations, to protect civil and property rights. If the problem was whether the pastor was preaching a theology contrary to the denominational doctrine or conducting religious services in a manner out of harmony with the ritual of the church, it would clearly not be within the province of a court to interfere, and the controversy would have to be settled by the church tribunals. But where, as here, the question presented is whether the property and funds of the church are being handled in accordance with the by-laws and rules of the church corporation or such by-laws and rules are being properly observed by the governing body of the church, those aggrieved may seek redress through court action.” (Providence Baptist Church, supra, 40 Cal.2d at pp. 63–64.)

However, cases have questioned whether cases like Providence Baptist adhere to the First Amendment. (Singh, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1280 [“[S]ome California Courts of Appeal have asserted that the language, if not the holdings, in the earlier California cases of Rosicrucian, supra, 39 Cal.2d 121, 245 P.2d 481, Providence Baptist Church, supra, 40 Cal.2d 55, 251 P.2d 10, and Burnett, supra, 130 Cal.App.2d 631, 279 P.2d 579, is questionable.”]; see also p. 1281 [“To the extent that these cases held that all property disputes could be resolved by civil courts, THEIR HOLDINGS SHOULD BE REFINED TO RESTRICT REVIEW to the application of neutral principles of law taking care “ ‘to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.’”], emphasis and capitalization added.)

One of those cases is Vukovich v. Radulovich (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 281. Vukovich concerned a church, St. Sava, that had chosen to separate itself from the hierarchical Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church. Some members of St. Sava petitioned the board for a special meeting to vote on whether to reaffiliate with the mother church. After a vote, the diocese accepted the reaffiliation of the church. Some brought a court action to invalidate the vote on the ground the board had conducted it in violation of the church bylaws. After a court trial, the trial court ruled it had no jurisdiction to decide whether the vote violated the bylaws because the question was an essentially ecclesiastical one. The appellate court agreed. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ reliance upon Providence Baptist, the court stated the following: “IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT THIS HOLDING REMAINS GOOD LAW….” (Id. at p. 293, emphasis and capitalization added.)

Even assuming that the case adheres to guidelines set forth by the Court, Providence Baptist is inapposite as Plaintiffs concede that ICFG is a hierarchical church, not congregational (Opp. p. 10:1.)

Therefore, for purposes of this demurrer, the court will rely upon cases issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and California cases that strictly adhere to the authoritative interpretations of the First Amendment enunciated by the high Court.

- Plaintiff, Gilroy Foursquare Church, d/b/a Foothills Foursquare Church (“Gilroy Foursquare”), was at all material times a California unincorporated association and a church (SAC ¶1)

- Plaintiff, The Foothills Church of Gilroy, is a California nonprofit corporation and is the successor in interest to Plaintiff, Gilroy Foursquare Church, d/b/a Foothills Foursquare Church (“Successor”). Gilroy Foursquare and Successor are sometimes collectively referred to herein as “Plaintiffs.” (¶2)

- Gilroy Foursquare was AFFILIATED WITH International Church of the Foursquare Gospel (“ICFG”) (¶7, capitalization added)

- In May 2022, Gilroy Foursquare notified the President of ICFG stating that, due to operational and financial differences, Gilroy Foursquare WISHED TO withdraw, or DISSAFILIATE, from ICFG (¶8, capitalization added)

- In October 2022, Gilroy Foursquare’s congregation VOTED 114 to 1 in favor of disaffiliating from ICFG. (¶10, capitalization added)

- At the meeting on February 13, 2023, the ICFG officials advised Pastor Wilson and his wife that the ICFG Board, upon information and belief, decided to revoke Pastor Wilson’s credentials as a minister with ICFG and terminate Pastor Wilson and that ICFG was seizing all the assets and property, including the church building, of Gilroy Foursquare (¶13, emphasis added)

- Article 12.3.5 of the Bylaws of ICFG (the “Bylaws”) sets forth the grounds for revocation of ministerial credentials. None of the thirteen enumerated grounds for revocation was cited by ICFG as the basis for revocation of Pastor Wilson’s ministerial credentials (¶14, emphasis added)

- Contrary to the terms of Article 14.3, the Church Council did not request a meeting with the district supervisor and Pastor Wilson to discuss whether or not Pastor Wilson was functioning in the best interests of Plaintiffs and there was no attempt by ICFG to resolve any issues with Pastor Wilson. (¶17)

- Plaintiffs believe, and therefore allege, that soon after Pastor Wilson was terminated, a person or persons acting at the direction of ICFG caused the names of the authorized signors on Plaintiffs’ Accounts with the Credit Union to be changed (¶30; The Corporate Tax I.D. Number reflected on the Signature Card is that of Gilroy Foursquare, not ICFG. ¶26)

As the SAC repeatedly references the Bylaws, the court turns to the following sections of the Bylaws:

- INTERNATIONAL CHURCH OF THE FOURSQUARE GOSPEL. A religious body incorporated as the formal organization of the Foursquare movement (sometimes referred to herein as “The Foursquare Church”.) (Section 3.1 of the Bylaws, p. 31 of 113 of Greer Decl, emphasis added.)

- Any local body of believers in the United States, which is established and operated in accordance with these Bylaws and accepted by Board action. A Foursquare church may be a Charter Foursquare church, a District Foursquare church or a Covenant Foursquare church.[3] Charter and District Foursquare churches are not separate legal entities. They are subordinate units of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel. Covenant Foursquare churches are separate legal entities. Each Foursquare church is organized and operated to carry out the ecclesiastical and evangelistic endeavors of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel. Each local church is accepted by Board action. All are affiliated with International Church of the Foursquare Gospel by these Bylaws and/or other covenants. (Section 3.3, p. 31, emphasis added)

- Charter Church. A church established and chartered by International Church of the Foursquare Gospel as a local Foursquare church or a church not previously established by International Church of the Foursquare Gospel which has elected to become a local Foursquare church having no legal existence, articles of incorporation, bylaws or other organizing documents apart from those of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel and which has transferred title to all of its property into the name of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel with no possibility of reversion unless specifically agreed to by the Board. (Section 3.3(A), p. 32 of 113)

- District Church. A local Foursquare church that has not yet developed to the point of being granted Charter or Covenant status pursuant to these Bylaws. A District church shall not be authorized to establish or operate a separate legal entity. (Section 3.3(B), p. 32 of 113)

- Covenant Church: A local church previously established by the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel that has elected, with Board approval, to have a legal existence apart from that of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel and to affiliate with the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel by mutual agreement in a covenant relationship which obligates the local church to operate by the Bylaws of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, with the rights and duties pertaining thereto; or a local church not previously established by or associated with the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel that is a separate legal entity that has elected to affiliate with the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel by mutual agreement in a covenant relationship which obligates the local church to operate by the Bylaws of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, with the rights and duties pertaining thereto. (Section 3.3(C), p. 32 of 113)

- FOURSQUARE ASSOCIATION. A network of Christian ministers and churches which are in fellowship with the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel to exalt Jesus Christ and to propagate and disseminate the religious principles embraced in the Foursquare Gospel as proclaimed by Aimee Semple McPherson and adhere to the Foursquare Global Distinctives and Values (sometimes referred to hereafter as ‘the Association’). The Association is in no way designed or intended to function as an unincorporated association or to be a separate legal or jural entity. The Board shall have the power to determine the requirements, procedures and regulations of membership and participation in the Foursquare Association. The Association shall have no bylaws or separate governing board and shall hold no assets. Members of the Association may not hold themselves out as agents for one another or of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel on the basis of membership in the Association. (Section 3.8, pp. 32-33)

- The Board is responsible for discipline as well as general corporate management. (Section 6.1, p. 39 of 113)

- Corporate property. All property shall be held in the name of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, except as otherwise expressly authorized by the Board, and at all times shall be used to carry out the purposes for which this corporation has been established. (Section 9.1 (A), p. 57 of 113, emphasis added)

- Property of Charter and District Foursquare churches. Title to all property of all Charter and District Foursquare churches shall at all times stand in the name of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, except as otherwise expressly authorized by the Board or these Bylaws, and shall be used to carry out the purposes of the Foursquare movement. While individual members, including an entire congregation of a Foursquare church, have the right at any time to resign as members, the Foursquare church of which they were formerly members, including all property both real and personal, shall remain at all times vested in the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, or as otherwise expressly authorized by the Board, and shall remain irrevocably dedicated to the Foursquare movement. Consistent with the provisions of its Articles of Incorporation and these Bylaws, the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel, operating through its Board, has the authority to determine the use or disposition of all property standing in the name of the International Church of the Foursquare Gospel and formerly used by an inactive or seceding Charter or District congregation. (Section 9.1(B), p. 57 of 113, emphasis added)

- At the discretion of the Board, the credentials of any Foursquare minister may be suspended. (Section 12.3.3, p. 63 of 113)

- DISCONTINUING A FOURSQUARE CHURCH . . . Should a Charter church or District church desire to withdraw from Foursquare . . . all assets of the church shall remain the property of International Church of the Foursquare Gospel. (Section 13.4 (D), p. 68 of 113)

- The pastor of a Foursquare church shall . . . (D) . . . be one of the co-signers on all church accounts as set forth in Bylaw Article XVI, Section 16.1. F.1.3. . . . (O) . . . (6) Comply with the following upon termination of a pastoral assignment: . . . Remove the pastor’s name from all church accounts and agreements involving the church (which, if not accomplished by the terminating pastor, may be performed by the district supervisor, or the supervisor’s appointed representative, as attorney-in-fact for the terminating pastor). (Section 14.4 (D), (O)(6), pp. 72-73 of 113)

1. The case does not involve an ecclesiastical dispute but rather involves neutral principles of law (Opp. pp. 7-10, Header ‘A’)

2. ICFG misused Plaintiffs’ restricted donations (Opp. pp. 10-12, Header ‘B’)[4]

3. There is ambiguity as to whether Gilroy Foursquare and/or some of its attendees constituted a charter church or an unincorporated association (Opp. pp. 12-14, Header ‘C’).

a. Resolution of the Religious Dispute Determines Resolution of the Church Property

As noted by Plaintiffs, the facts in the SAC are deemed admitted by the demurrer. (Opp. p. 6, citing Rodas v. Spiegal (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) But Plaintiffs are mistaken in that this analysis “must begin with the assumption that the SAC alleges claims founded on a property dispute, not ecclesiastical matters.” (Opp. p. 6:3-5.) That is because the SAC itself is replete with claims inextricably related to ICFG’s ecclesiastical decision to revoke Pastor Mark Wilson’s ministry credentials and remove him from pastoral leadership. (See Reply p. 4.)

For example, the 2^nd COA for Breach of Contract asserted against ICFG asserts that ICFG “breach[ed] the Bylaws when they removed Pastor Wilson without procedure and converted monies maintained by Plaintiffs under Pastor Wilson’s name at the Credit Union.” (¶60, emphasis added.) Accordingly, this COA is inherently tied to a determination whether the ICFG Board followed the proper procedure as set forth in the Bylaws. As stated above, the U.S. Supreme Court in Milivojevich emphasized in its opinion that when the resolution of the religious dispute over Dionisije's defrockment determines control of the property, then the case does not involve a church property dispute, but a religious dispute, the resolution of which is not for civil tribunals.” (Milivojevich, supra, 426 U.S. at p. 709.)

Another example is set forth in the 6^th COA for Breach of Fiduciary Duties/Ultra Vires asserted against ICFG. That COA alleges that “ICFG exceeded the scope of its corporate authority by revoking Pastor Wilson’s ministerial credentials without establishing the grounds for revocation among the enumerated grounds in Article 12.3.5 of the Bylaws, which constitute ultra vires actions of ICFG” and by “failing to meet with the Church Council and Pastor Wilson to discuss whether or not Pastor Wilson was functioning in the best interests of Plaintiffs and failing to attempt to resolve any issues with Pastor Wilson prior to terminating Pastor Wilson”. (¶¶101-104, emphasis added.) As with this above, this COA is inherently tied to a determination of whether the ICFG Board followed the proper procedure as set forth in the Bylaws.

Perhaps the 8^th COA for declaratory relief illustrates the presence of an ecclesiastical matter best. Plaintiffs inherently concede that determination of the property rights hinges upon the Bylaws: “Plaintiffs request that in the event the Court determines that, UNDER THE ICFG BYLAWS, ICFG is the owner of the Church Property, that the Court then determine that ICFG be estopped from asserting any ownership interest in the Church Property….” (¶133, emphasis added.)

In cases involving hierarchical churches, civil courts are “bound to look at the fact that the local congregation is itself but a member of a much larger and more important religious organization, and is under its government and control, and is bound by its orders and judgments,” and therefore courts cannot adjudicate “the rights of such bodies to the use of the property . . . by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations.” (Reply p. 6, citing Episcopal Church Cases, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 480, quoting Watson, supra, 80 U.S. at pp. 726-727.)

ICFG argues that Gilroy Foursquare Church is a charter Foursquare church. As explained in the Reply, Plaintiffs have formed an unincorporated association with the same name yielding an illusory that they are separate entities to the ICFG. But, as the Bylaws make clear, Charter Foursquare churches have “no legal existence . . . apart from . . . [ICFG].” (Section 3.3(A).)

Plaintiffs argue that whether Plaintiffs were a Charter church, an unincorporated association, or another undefined entity is a question of fact and the determination of that factual question is not proper for demurrer.[5]

Here, the inferences drawn from the allegations support ICFG’s position. (Demurrer p. 10, citing Young v. Gannon (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 209, 220 [“In determining whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, the trial court may consider all material facts pleaded in the complaint and those arising by reasonable implication therefrom….”].)

For example, Plaintiffs invoke provisions in the ICFG Bylaws that apply solely to Charter churches, leaving the only plausible inference that Gilroy Foursquare Church is a Charter church i.e., a subordinate unit of ICFG. (Demurrer p. 7) Additionally, if it were not a local body, there would be no need to withdraw from the general church.

To the extent that Plaintiffs argue that a demurrer should not be turned into an evidentiary hearing, that is very well true, but Plaintiffs are also to plead that ultimate facts to apprise a defendant of the nature, source, and extent of each COA. If who Plaintiffs are is a key issue in determining who can sue ICFG, then this may be grounds to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend.

At this juncture, the court is inclined to grant leave to amend for Plaintiffs to plead for facts as to the entity type; the court will not reach the merits of the demurrer at this juncture.

[1] The court notes that the demurrer states the Bylaws are attached as an exhibit to the SAC. However, the SAC filed on 8/15/24 does not attach the Bylaws. Instead, the Bylaws are attached to ‘DECLARATION OF KATHRYN GREER IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT TO JOIN ADDITIONAL PARTY DEFENDANT’ (“Greer Decl.”) filed on 7/12/24.

[2] See also p. 715, fn. 9 [Aside from the concession by both parties, the hierarchical nature of the relationship between the American Canadian Diocese and the Mother Church and the Diocese’s subordinate nature was evidenced in a number of ways such as by (i) the Dionisije submitted “corporate bylaws, proposed constitutional changes, and final judgments of the Diocesan Ecclesiastical Court to the Holy Synod or Holy Assembly for approval” or (ii) the provisions in the constitutions of both the Diocese and the Mother Church setting forth that hierarchical relationship.

[3] The Foursquare movement also includes “Community Churches.” While those are separate legal entities affiliated with ICFG, Community churches are “completely autonomous and independent.” (Section 3.8(A)(2), p. 33 of 113.) In fact, the 2022 Bylaws make it clear that ICFG “shall no control over the governance or management of any Community church.” (Ibid.) ICFG explains that this case does not involve any Community churches, which is otherwise undisputed by Plaintiffs. (Demurrer p. 5, fn. 2.)

[4] The court will not address this argument as it is moot pending an amended complaint.

[5] According to the opposition, “unincorporated association” currently is defined as “an unincorporated group of two or more persons joined by mutual consent for a common lawful purpose, whether organized for profit or not.” Under California law, unincorporated associations possess many characteristics of other legal entities and may (1) sue or be sued, (2) own and transfer an interest in real or personal property.