Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 23PSCV04000, Date: 2024-05-01 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV04000, Date: 2024-05-01 Tentative Ruling

(1) Demurrer To Complaint On Behalf Of Walnut Valley Unified School District And Susan Arzola is SUSTAINED with leave to amend, notably for the reason that the FAC does not comply with heightened pleading standard.

(2) Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiff’s Complaint On Behalf Of Walnut Valley Unified School District And Susan Arzola is MOOT.[1]

This case arises from a student’s alleged sexual assault by another student while on campus.[2]

On December 28, 2023, Plaintiff Y.O., a minor, and by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Beatriz P. filed suit against Defendants WALNUT VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (“District”); SUSAN ARZOLA (the “Principal”).

On January 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint (FAC) against the same Defendants for:

1.     Negligent Supervision Of Students [Gov. C. §§ 815.2, 815.6, And 820];

2.     Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Training And Retention [Gov. C. § 815.2 And 820];

3.     Public Disclosure Of Private Information [Gov. C. § 815.6 And 820];

4.     Intentional Infliction Of Emotional Distress

On March 18, 2024, the District filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike (MTS).

The District brings forth the instant demurrer on the grounds that the 1^st and 2^nd COAs fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and/or are uncertain, vague, ambiguous and unintelligible. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e), (f), respectively.) A demurrer tests the sufficiency of the pleading; thus, the grounds for the demurrer must appear on the face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (CCP §430.30(a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The face of the pleading includes attachments and incorporations by reference (Frantz v. Blackwell, (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94); it does not include inadmissible hearsay. (Day v. Sharp, (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 904, 914.)

Turning to the FAC, the factual allegations begin on page 6 (paragraph 23). The pertinent allegations are as follows:

From or about February 14, 2022, and continuing to or about March 22, 2022, Plaintiff, a minor female special needs student attending [school], was sexually abused on multiple occasions by a fellow student, L.R., during school hours, on the [school] campus… Prior to February 14, 2022, Defendants, and each of them, were aware that Plaintiff was a special needs student, who, among other things, required the presence of a 1:1 aide during school hours. Prior to February 14, 2022, Defendants, and each of them, were aware that because of Plaintiff’s special needs, she was at an increased risk of being subjected to inappropriate misconduct, including sexual misconduct, by other students attending South Pointe Middle School.[3] Prior to February 14, 2022, Defendants, and each of them, had actual and constructive notice that L.R. was a danger to other students. Defendants, and each of them, had prior knowledge that L.R. had exhibited significant behavioral problems before and during the period of time when the acts of sexual battery and sexual assault were performed upon Plaintiff. Defendants, and each of them, were acutely aware of L.R.’s history of engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior with other students at WVUSD. Defendants, and each of them, actually knew of the potential danger and direct threat L.R. posed to WVUSD’s other students, including Plaintiff, a special needs student. (FAC pp. 6-7.)

Effectively, what is alleged is that Plaintiff was sexually harassed by another student and that the District knew. But a negligence cause of action must be pleaded with particularity as to a public entity. (Demurrer p. 7, citing Lopez v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., (1985) 40 Cal.3d 780, 795; Zipperer v. County of Santa Clara (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1020.) Here, however, the pleading conclusively alleges that defendants knew or were on notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual. To the extent that Plaintiff in opposition argues that the California Supreme Court in C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist. (2012) 53 Cal.4th 861, 872 has “rejected” the particularity requirement, Plaintiff’s own excerpt of the case does not support her proposition. (Opp. pp. 8-9.) What the court observed was that the “identity of a government employee whose alleged negligence is made the basis for vicarious liability” need not be pleaded prior to discovery.

Particularity requirements aside, the pleading also fails to comply with CCP section 425.10 subdivision (a), subsection (1), which provides that a complaint “shall contain . . . [a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.” The FAC, however, is largely a recitation of law, the relevance of which is unclear.[4]

For the foregoing reasons, an amended complaint is needed to better adjudicate the merits of the demurrer as the court is bound by the pleadings on a demurrer. With that, the court will not, at this juncture, address the individual liability of Arzola (the principal).

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend, rendering the MTS moot.

[1] The motion seeks to strike paragraph 59 as it lacks alleging an underlying statute and any reference to a mandatory duty statute regarding training because none exists. As the complaint is to be amended again, the MTS is moot.

[2] The minimal factual background but further evidences the lack of ultimate, specific facts lacking in the FAC.

[3] It is unclear how the District would have known of. L.R’s dangerous propensities prior to 2/14/22 when the allegations state that the alleged assaults started on 2/14/22. Put another way, if it was not happening before 2/14/22, then there is nothing for the District to have been aware of.

[4] And to the extent that Plaintiff will continue to incorporate by reference previous portions of the pleading, the civil, it may do so for informational purposes only. (Cal-West Nat. Bank v. Superior Court (1986) 185 Cal. App. 3d 96, 101.) It is not the court’s responsibility to determine what allegations form what elements of the cause of action.