Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 23PSCV04000, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23PSCV04000, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling

CROSS-DEFENDANTS' DEMURRER TO WALNUT VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S CROSS-COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.

This case arises from a student’s alleged sexual assault by another student while on campus. Plaintiff Y.O., a minor, and by and through her Guardian Ad Litem, Beatriz P. filed suit against Defendants WALNUT VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT (“District”) and SUSAN ARZOLA (the “Principal”) alleging the following: Plaintiff, a minor female special needs student attending the eighth grade at South Pointe Middle School, was sexually abused on multiple occasions by a fellow student, L.R., during school hours, on the South Pointe Middle School campus. (Second Amended Complaint (SAC) ¶24.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants had actual and constructive notice that L.R. was a danger to other students, specifically other special needs students, because in August 2020, Defendants received written complaints describing L.R.’s sexual misconduct with other students of the District, including another special education student, E.C. (¶¶29-34.) Despite the aforementioned actual knowledge of L.R.’s propensities for sexual misconduct with other special needs students and several written accounts of such acts while, Defendants failed to appropriately care for, supervise, and monitor Plaintiff. (SAC generally pp. 9-11.)

On January 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed her first amended complaint (FAC) against the same Defendants for:

2. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Training And Retention [Gov. C. § 815.2 And 820];

On May 1, 2024, the court sustained the 3/18/24 demurrer with leave to amend. The court did so on two grounds. First, that the pleading conclusively alleges that defendants knew or were on notice of the perpetrator’s past unlawful sexual assault, notably when Plaintiff alleges that the District should have been aware of. L.R’s dangerous propensities prior to 2/14/22 but the alleged assaults started on 2/14/22. Second, the pleading failed to comply with CCP section 425.10 subdivision (a), subsection (1), which provides that a complaint “shall contain . . . [a] statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language,” in that the FAC is largely a recitation of law.

2. Negligent Hiring, Supervision, Training And Retention [Gov. C. § 815.2 And 820]

On August 21, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed, without prejudice, Plaintiff’s complaint only as to Arzola; The District filed its answer; and the District filed a cross-complaint (CC) against L.R., a minor, a.k.a. JOHN ROE 1, by and through his guardian ad litem JENNIFER BUTLER and JENNIFER BUTLER, an individual, and Roes 1 through 30 (collectively, “Cross-Defendants”)[1] for:

On October 2, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed an ‘OPPOSITION TO CROSS-COMPLAINANT'S NOTICE OF RELATED CASE.’[2]

On October 9, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed the instant demurrer to the District’s CC.

On November 8, 2024, Cross-Defendants filed an ‘ANTI-SLAPP NOTICE OF AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANT AND CROSSCOMPLAINANT WALNUT VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT'S CROSSCOMPLAINT, PURSUANT TO C.C.P. §425.16.’ (The hearing on the anti-SLAPP motion is set for 1/15/2025.)

On December 4, 2024, the District filed its opposition to the Cross-Defendants’ demurrer.

As parents and guardians of L.R., a minor, a.k.a. JOHN ROE 1, each Cross-Defendant named herein were responsible to persuade their child that such improper sexual behavior misconduct as alleged by plaintiff was and is improper. Cross-Defendants, and each of them owed a duty of due care to plaintiff, and owed a similar duty to Cross-Defendant DISTRICT, and DISTRICT therefore has a right to indemnity against Cross-Defendants and each of them . . . That the negligence, carelessness and fault of cross-defendants would be the primary contributing and concurring causes of the injuries and damages allegedly sustained by plaintiff in the underlying action. That by reason of the foregoing, the primary liability for injuries or damages, if any, allegedly sustained by plaintiff rests solely upon the cross-defendants …. (CC ¶¶5-8, emphasis added.)

Cross-Defendants demur on the grounds that the CC does not state facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action (COA) pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §430.l0 (e) and/or that the COAs are otherwise uncertain, ambiguous and unintelligible pursuant to §430.10 (f). More specifically, Cross-Defendants argue that:

1. the Cross-Complaint does not provide any law establishing how a School District can file a cross-complaint for indemnity against a minor and his mother for indemnity and related claims (Demurrer p. 3:1-3).

2. the District “does not put forth any law or facts that support their contentions that Cross-Defendants owed a duty of care and instead provides declaratory statements and unfounded conclusions” (Demurrer p. 2:26-28) and

For reasons to be discussed below, the court agrees with Cross-Defendants that the CC fails for insufficient facts.

As to the first point, the court agrees with Cross-Defendants that the CC fails to provide an applicable statute for indemnity. To the extent that the District argues that Civil Code section 1714.1 is a statute that provides for parental liability for the torts of a child, the statute and the references subdivisions in opposition are not pled in the CC. Accordingly, while the District may heavily reference the statute in its opposition, a trial court is bound by the allegations in the complaint and “cannot consider the outré-judicial statements of counsel nor the additional facts found in the briefs.” (Melikan v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 113, 114.)

With that, the District’s heavy reliance upon Curry v. Superior Ct. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 180 is equally unavailing. While Curry involved nearly identical facts, the school district there pled a fifth cause of action for indemnification based on section 1714.1 (Id. at pp. 182-183.) The specific issue before the appellate court was “whether a tortfeasor seeking partial equitable indemnity may claim the benefit of Civil Code section 1714.1.” (Id. at p. 182.) “A case is not authority for a proposition not considered therein or presented by its own particular facts.” (McConnel v. Advantest America, Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 596, 611.) Perhaps in recognition of the foregoing, the District asks for leave to amend to “include the statute and the case authorities cited herein to demonstrate the viability of its claims.” (Opp. p. 7:3-5, emphasis added.)

Therefore, to the extent that the District relies upon Curry and section 1714.1 as law that allow the District to sue L.R. and his mother, the demurrer is sustained with leave to amend because said statute is not pled in the CC.

As to the second point about insufficient facts, both parties’ arguments warrant discussion.

The demurrer argues that Cross-Complaint is entirely devoid of allegations regarding why or how Cross-Defendants may be liable. That argument appears to be made based upon Cross-Defendants’ position that L.R. was the victim of repeated sexual assaults by another student on school grounds.[4] However, as noted by both parties, on a demurrer, material facts alleged in the cross-complaint are assumed true. (See e.g., Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 26 311, 318.) Effectively, as both the SAC and CC allege that L.R. was the perpetrator, then the court so to be true. For Cross-Defendants to essentially ask the court to make an evidentiary finding to determine otherwise is improper on a demurrer.

Notwithstanding, the CC does not allege the ultimate facts to apprise Cross-Defendants of how the Jennifer Butler/the mother actually knew of L.R.’s alleged tendencies to sexually assault students with special needs.[5] As noted by Cross-Defendants and not otherwise disputed by the District, to impose liability for the conduct of a third party, foreseeability must be measured by what the parent actually knew; liability for such conduct cannot be imposed merely on the basis of constructive knowledge or information that the defendant should have known. (Demurrer p. 4, citing to Margaret W v. Kelley R., (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 141, 156-157.) Here, there are no facts as to how the mother actually knew of L.R.’s alleged dangerous propensities.

Based on the foregoing, as the CC does not clearly set forth the facts and law that establish a duty owed to the District, the demurrer is sustained in its entirety with leave to amend.

[1] According to Paragraph 2 of the CC, “JENNIFER BUTLER is the natural parent of L.R., a minor, a.k.a. JOHN ROE 1. ROES 2 through 5, inclusive, are parents, stepparents and otherwise guardians of L.R., a minor, a.k.a. JOHN ROE 1. All such defendants are jointly and severally responsible for the misconduct alleged by plaintiff herein as committed by L.R., a minor, a.k.a. JOHN ROE 1.”

[2] This filing is unclear as the District did not file a ‘notice of a related case.’ The CC was filed in this case; the District did not file a separate case for there to be a related case.

[3] According to the Reply, the parties meet and confer effort lasted two minutes. (Reply p. 3:10-11.) For any future motions or filings, even if not required, the failure to meet and confer in good faith (i.e., telephone call with an in-depth discussion of the issues and pertinent law) will result in the motion being taken off calendar or otherwise continued.

[4] Though the demurrer states that this argument is stated in the demurrer (Demurrer p. 4:16-17), the details are found in the anti-SLAPP motion.

[5] The focus needs to be on the foreseeability of the particular criminal act itself, not the general nature of the harm that resulted. (See Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 1148.)