Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 23STCV18426, Date: 2024-09-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV18426    Hearing Date: September 4, 2024    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

(1)   DEMURRER OF DEFENDANTS INTERNATIONAL CHURCHES OF CHRIST, INC., AND AL BAIRD is SUSTAINED with leave to amend because Plaintiffs have not alleged that ICOC “covered up” any assault as to these Plaintiffs.

(2)   MOTION OF DEFENDANTS INTERNATIONAL CHURCHES OF CHRIST, INC., AND AL BAIRD TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is GRANTED with leave to amend because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that pleading such overbroad background information is relevant to these Plaintiffs.

Background[1]

This case arises from alleged childhood sexual assault.

On August 3, 2023, Jane Roes filed the instant action against INTERNATIONAL CHURCHES OF CHRIST, INC (“ICOC”)., an unincorporated association and former California nonprofit corporation; THOMAS (“KIP”) McKEAN, an individual; AL BAIRD, an individual; JOE GARMON, SR. an individual; GARY SMITH, an individual; and DOES.

On March 25, 2024, Plaintiffs MICHELE ROLAND, CHRISTY MILLER, and LOUELLA COSCOLLEULA filed their first amended complaint (FAC) against ICOC, McKean, and Baird asserting the following causes of action (COAs):

On May 30, 2024, Plaintiffs dismissed McKean without prejudice.

On June 20, 2024, ICOC and Baird (hereinafter, “Defendants”) filed the instant demurrer.

On June 24, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion to strike (MTS).

On July 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to both the demurrer and MTS.

On August 2, 2024, Defendants filed their replies.

Discussion Re: Demurrer

Defendants demur to the FAC on two grounds: (1) the complaint is time-barred because CCP section 340.16 (the “lookback” statute) does not revive Plaintiffs’ claims that occurred over 20 years ago (Demurrer pp. 6-7) and (2) this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims as to Christy Miller[2] (Demurrer pp. 7-8.)

1.     Whether the Complaint is Time-Barred?

Code of Civil Procedure section 340.16 constitutes a “lookback” statute and in relevant part provides the following:

(b)(3) This section applies to any action described in subdivision (a) that is based upon conduct that occurred on or after January 1, 2009, and is commenced on or after January 1, 2019, that would have been barred solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired. Such claims are hereby revived and may be commenced until December 31, 2026. This subdivision does not revive any of the following claims:

(e)(1) Notwithstanding any other law, any claim seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that occurred on or after the plaintiff's 18th birthday that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2023, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2023, or, if not filed by that date, may be commenced between January 1, 2023, and December 31, 2023.

(2) This subdivision revives claims brought by a plaintiff who alleges all of the following:

(A) The plaintiff was sexually assaulted.

(B) One or more entities are legally responsible for damages arising out of the sexual assault.

(C) The entity or entities, including, but not limited to, their officers, directors, representatives, employees, or agents, engaged in a cover up or attempted a cover up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.

(3) Failure to allege a cover up as required by subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) as to one entity does not affect revival of the plaintiff's claim or claims against any other entity.

(4) For purposes of this subdivision:

(A) “Cover up” means a concerted effort to hide evidence relating to a sexual assault that incentivizes individuals to remain silent or prevents information relating to a sexual assault from becoming public or being disclosed to the plaintiff, including, but not limited to, the use of nondisclosure agreements or confidentiality agreements.

(B) “Entity” means a sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or other legal entity.[3]

(C) “Legally responsible” means that the entity or entities are liable under any theory of liability established by statute or common law, including, but not limited to, negligence, intentional torts, and vicarious liability. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 340.16, emphasis added.)

The alleged sexual assaults of Plaintiffs occurred in 1992 (FAC ¶¶ 130-136), 1996 (FAC ¶¶ 101-113), and 2000-2001 (FAC ¶¶ 153-164). Defendants argue that because (b)(3) applies to conduct that occurred after 2009 but here the conduct at latest occurred in 2001, then section 340.16 does not revive those claims. (Demurrer p. 7:6-15.) In Opposition, Plaintiffs do not dispute the applicable statute of limitations (SOL). (Opp. p. 2:5-6.) Instead, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants “overlook the remaining provisions of the statute” and focus on subsection (e) of the statute. (Opp. p. 3:13-14.) In reply, Defendants mainly focus on the lack of pleading facts as to subsection (3) subdivision (A) wherein an entity “covered up” any sexual assault and that to the extent facts are pled, they are as to other individuals. (Reply p. 2:25-28; Reply p. 3:25-28.)

Here, the court agrees with Defendants that the FAC fails to plead sufficient facts.

Plaintiffs cite to the following allegations in the FAC that allege a cover up (Opp. p. 4): ¶¶2, 19, 33, 55, 69, 70, 71-95. None however allege a “concerted effort to hide evidence relating to a sexual assault” as to these plaintiffs. Take for example paragraphs 55 and 70:

Because of the ICOC’s strict rules, the expanse of its control over its members’ lives, and the severe consequences it could impose on members who questioned its teachings (let alone transgressed its instructions), the ICOC created the ideal conditions for child molesters, pedophiles, and other sexual abusers to fester and thrive. Furthermore, McKean and other abusers expressly leveraged the ICOC’s hierarchical system of authority to insulate predatory church leaders from exposure. Many of those predators continue to prey upon children without fear of repercussions.

…

In furtherance of efforts to protect the church and its primary source of revenue (i.e., its members) at all costs, McKean and the ICOC used psychological manipulation to conceal the incidents of abuse.

Accordingly, those allegations are not specific as to these Plaintiffs but rather accusations as to the church/entities in general. With that, section 340.16(e) does not revive their claims.

Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer with leave to amend.

Discussion Re: Motion to Strike

Defendants move to strike the following portions of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (FAC) as to them, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.10, et seq.:

1.     Paragraphs 36-43, in their entirety (relating to the alleged “ICOC enterprise”)

2.     Paragraph 48, in its entirety (relating to alleged “discipler structure”)

3.     Paragraph 57 line 7 to line 12, including footnote 5 (claims related to finances)

4.     Paragraph 58 (claims related to finances).

5.     Paragraph 59, line 21 to end of paragraph (claims related to auxiliary organizations)

6.     Paragraphs 60-76, in their entirety (claims related to finances)

7.     Paragraphs 77-80, in their entirety (claims related to children’s ministry)

8.     Paragraphs 81-84, in their entirety (allegations of physical abuse)

9.     Paragraphs 90 and 96-114, in their entirety (claims related to alleged child predators not involved in the instant case)

10.  All references to “torture.” FAC ¶ 158.

Defendants argue that those allegations are highly inflammatory, not essential to any claim or defense, and “neither pertinent to nor supported by an otherwise sufficient claim or defense,” as the allegations have no bearing on the claims actually being asserted by Plaintiffs, nor do the numerous persons alleged to be “sexual predators” have any bearing on the claims actually being made in this case, as none of those people is alleged to have abused any of the plaintiffs in this case. (Motion p. 4:11-17.)

Here, the court agrees with Defendants.

First and foremost, Plaintiffs concede that the allegations are not pertinent to these specific Plaintiffs and this specific case as they contend that the allegations provide “context and background information” about the organization. (See e.g., Opp. p. 3:12-14; p. 3:18-19; p. 4:4-6; p. 4:10-12.) Second, the allegations themselves tacitly illustrate that they are not relevant to the actual claims asserted by these Plaintiffs as the challenged paragraphs are repeated verbatim in the other three actions related to this case. (Reply p. 2:8-11.) In fact, the specific allegations as to the plaintiffs in this case do not start until paragraph 96 on page 27 of the FAC. Third, Plaintiffs cite to federal cases in support of their proposition that background or other historical information is permissible and helpful to explain the relationships between the parties,[4] but federal and state pleading standards differ. Plus, as noted by Defendants, the decisions of lower federal courts are not binding on this Court. (Reply p. 2:23-25, citing People v. Bradley (1969) 1 Cal.3d 80, 86 [“[A]lthough we are bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the federal Constitution, we are not bound by the decisions of the lower federal courts even on federal questions.”], internal citation omitted.) Fourth, as to allegations regarding the alleged abusers, none of these alleged abusers are alleged to have assaulted Plaintiffs; therefore, they are irrelevant. Lastly, as for references to “torture,” Defendants are not making claims of torture, which is defined by Penal Code section 206 as someone who, “with the intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any sadistic purpose, inflicts great bodily injury as defined in Section 12022.7 upon the person of another.” Plaintiffs do not provide authority that rape or sexual assault, no matter how painful the suffering, qualifies as torture.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, as the allegations subject to this motion are irrelevant to these Plaintiffs in this case and Plaintiffs have not otherwise provided authority that providing such extensive and overbroad “background information” is permissible, the court GRANTS the MTS with leave to amend.