Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 24PSCV00169, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV00169, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling

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PLAINTIFF ALFONSO ROJAS VILLA’S MOTION TO QUASH SUBPOENAS BY DEFENDANT HUIHUI DONG; AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS is GRANTED.

On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff ALFONSO ROJAS VILLA filed suit against Defendant HUIHUI DONG for: (1) General Negligence and (2) Motor Vehicle.

On July 29, 2024, Plaintiff dismissed TAOMORE SUPPLY CHAIN, LTD, and Defendant MOVING BOX, LLC.

Defendant has issued twelve subpoenas to Plaintiff’s medical providers--Complete Balance Chiropractic, Integrated Injury Specialists, Shin Imaging Center, Placentia Surgery Center, HealthyU Clinics, and Aquila Medical Management Services--requesting any and all Plaintiff’s medical records and bills without limitation as to time or body parts at issue.

Any and all medical records within the last 10 years from the date of incident, May 27, 2023, for body parts related to his neck, chest, back (especially lower back radiating to left buttock, right thigh – front, left leg, bilateral foot and left toes), bilateral shoulders (especially right), right arm, and cognitive injuries such as headaches and double vision. (Motion pp. 5-6.)

The party seeking the constitutionally protected information has the burden of establishing that the information sought is directly relevant to the claims. (Tylo v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal. App. 4th 1379,1387.) Defendant argues the subpoenas are properly tailored because Plaintiff indicates in discovery that he “Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement or amend this response at a later date.” (Opp. p. 3, citing form interrogatory 6.2.) The court is unpersuaded that such language warrants discovery as to Plaintiff’s entire medical history. As noted in Reply, should additional claimed body parts later be identified, Defendant can bring a subsequent motion.

To the extent that Defendant relies upon Slagle v. Superior Court (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1309 to support his position that the subpoenas are reasonably calculated, that case actually supports Plaintiff. For one, Slagle involved Evidence Code section 999, an exception to the physician-patient privilege. That aside, in Slagle, the plaintiff made clear on his motion to quash that he was not seeking to recover for any injury to his eyes such that the patient-litigant exception body part at issue was the plaintiff’s eye, as someone had overheard the plaintiff tell the doctor on the day of the accident that he was blind in both eyes six months prior to the accident. (Id. at p. 1312.) Notwithstanding the court’s holding, the court observed that if the medical records will irrelevant information relevant to the condition of his eyesight at the time of the accident, “he may request an in camera inspection of the records to segregate the irrelevant information.” (Id. at p. 1315, emphasis added.) This suggests that records are to be with limitation, not without limitation.

As for the timeliness argument, Defendant argues that motion is untimely by two days because the subpoenas in question were issued on July 26, 2024, with a production date of August 26, 2024. A motion to quash is typically filed before the time for production. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 1985.3, subd. (g)).) However, as noted in Reply, the court has authority to consider the motion even if brought after the date for production. (See Motion p. 6 citing Slagle, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1312-1313; see also In re R.R. (2010) 187 Cal. App. 4th 1264, 1278; Mancinelli v. Siewak (2009) No. D051591, 2009 WL 924274, at *4.) Moreover, as noted in the motion and reply and otherwise unaddressed in opposition, Defendant has e-served everything prior to the subpoenas (and the parties have an e-service agreement), which provided Plaintiff with less time for Plaintiff to review the subpoenas. Therefore, the court declines to deny the motion based on timeliness grounds.

As for monetary sanctions, C.C.P. § 1987.2 states that, “(a) [e]xcept as specified in subdivision (c), in making an order pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section 1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney’s fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the subpoena was oppressive.” Though this court generally refrains from imposing monetary sanctions, the fact that the subpoenas were so overbroad suggest sanctions are appropriate. Plaintiff seeks sanctions in the amount of $2,000.00 against Defendants and their Counsel of record. Utilizing a Lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the court finds the hourly rate and hours expended on the matter reasonable.[1] It is unclear whether the $2,000 includes the filing fees, but should Plaintiff seek those costs, the court will award an addition $75.80.

[1] Plaintiff’s total sanctions against Defendants and their Counsel of Record is for $3,925.80, which includes $75.80 in costs, and $3,850.00 in attorney fees. However, Plaintiff is reducing the demand for sanctions, and is only requesting $2,000.00. (Motion pp. 1-2.)