Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV00174, Date: 2024-04-16 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV00174    Hearing Date: April 16, 2024    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

TRAVELERS’ DEMURRER TO DEFENDANT’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES is SUSTAINED with leave to amend, notably for the reason that the Answer provides no ultimate facts to support each defense.

Background

This case arises from the breach of a purported settlement agreement. Plaintiff TRAVELERS PROPERTY AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA alleges the following against Defendant ADRIAN JUAN ZAVALA: Travelers covered a vehicle (issued to Coastal Pacific Food Distributors, Inc. and at the time driven by its employe David Alcantar) that struck Zavala. On April 25, 2023, after multiple negotiations, Zavala’s attorney, Eric S. Chun (and the Avrek Law Firm), called Travelers and said that Zavala accepted Travelers’ $415,000 offer. (Complaint p. 4.) Later, however, Chun stated he essentially made a mistake and would need to “undo” the settlement.[1] Travelers denied the request, resulting in Zavala’s 6/23/23 suit Zavala v. Coastal Pacific matter, Case No. 23PSCV01877 against Coastal Pacific and Alcantar.[2]

On January 17, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit.

On February 21, 2024, Defendant filed his answer.[3]

On March 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant demurrer.

On April 3, 2024, Defendant filed his opposition.

On April 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed its reply.

Legal Standard

Travelers brings this demurrer under Code of Civil Procedure sections 430.20(a), 430.30(a), 430.50(b) on the grounds that none of the affirmative defenses pleaded in Zavala’s answer state facts sufficient to constitute a defense.

A plaintiff may demur to a defendant’s answer within 10 days of being served with the answer (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.40(b)) on three grounds: (1) failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense; (2) uncertainty; or (3) failure to state whether a contract alleged in the answer is written or oral. (Id., § 430.20).  

The demurrer may be to the whole answer or to any one or more of the several defenses set up in the answer. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.50(b).) The plaintiff may not, however, demur to part of a defense and, in order to determine the sufficiency of a defense, it must be considered as a whole. Each defense must be considered separately without regard to any other defense, and one defense does not become insufficient because it is inconsistent with other parts of the answer. (South Shore Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733 (South Shore).)

The critical inquiry when a plaintiff demurs to an answer is whether the answer raises a defense to plaintiff’s stated cause of action. (Timberidge Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 873, 879-80.) The same pleading of “ultimate facts” rather than evidentiary matter or legal conclusions is required as in pleading the complaint. The answer must aver facts as carefully and with as much detail as the facts which constitute the cause of action and which are alleged in the complaint. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashimi (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 384 (a general denial puts in issue the material allegations of the complaint; court was considering whether general denial put at issue new matter for a motion for summary judgment).) CCP section 431.30(g) provides that the various affirmative defenses must be separately stated and must refer to the causes of action to which they relate “in a manner by which they may be intelligently distinguished.” 

“Generally speaking, the determination whether an answer states a defense is governed by the same principles which are applicable in determining if a complaint states a cause of action.”  (South Shore Land Co., supra, 226 Cal. App. 2d at 732.) “[T]he demurrer to the answer admits all issuable facts pleaded therein and eliminates all allegations of the complaint denied by the answer.”  (Id. at 733.)  Unlike a demurrer to complaint, “the defect in question need not appear on the fact of the answer” as “[t]he determination of the sufficiency of the answer requires an examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with reference to the complaint it purports to answer.” (Id.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Id.)  

Discussion

Plaintiff brings forth the general demurrer.[4] A general demurrer is “universally applied to a demurrer raising the fundamental ground: ‘The pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.’ [internal citation omitted.] “The absence of any allegation essential to a cause of action renders it vulnerable to a general demurrer.” (McKenney v. Purepac Pharmaceutical Co. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 72, 77.)

Plaintiff argues that “Zavala’s defenses are pleaded in conclusory fashion and do nothing more than recite the name of the defense being invoked…  Zavala [does] not provide any explanation of how or why [the defenses] [] apply to this case, let alone facts supporting that position.” (Demurrer p. 4.)

Here, while Zavala’s opposition is lengthy, it does not dispute that the answer doesn’t allege facts necessary to support any of the defenses.[5] For example, Zavala’s sixth affirmative defense for laches merely alleges that: “The Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of laches.”  (Answer, p. 3.) Nothing more. Or take Defendant’s eight affirmative defense for unclean hands which is equally defective and conclusory: “The Complaint is barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of unclean hands.” And another example: the ninth affirmative defense for bad faith is conclusive: “The Complaint fails because Plaintiff acted in bad faith in attempting to negotiate a contract for an illegal or improper purpose.” What of Plaintiff’s conduct was illegal or for an improper purpose? It is unclear because there are no facts. As observed by Plaintiff in Reply, the opposition is largely adding context and additional facts to support the defense, but, on a demurrer, the court cannot consider extrinsic matters.

To the extent that Zavala argues he has stated a general denial such that that alone is enough to withstand the demurrer, absent authority to show otherwise, it is unclear how so. The court need not analyze the sufficiency of Zavala’s general denial; instead, each affirmative defense is evaluated independently from any other defense raised in the answer. (See Reply p. 6, citing South Shore, supra, 226 Cal.App.2d at p. 733 [“Another rule, particularly applicable to the case of a demurrer to the answer, is that each so-called defense must be considered separately without regard to any other defense.”].)

In sum, based upon Defendant’s own citation, even when read with the complaint, the Answer largely restates the defenses such that the Answer has not “acquaint[ed] [plaintiff] with the nature, source and extent of [an affirmative defense].” (Opp. 16, quoting Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal. 2d 240, 245.)

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, notably as the answer does not provide ultimate facts, the demurrer is SUSTAINED with leave to amend.