Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV00458, Date: 2024-12-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24PSCV00458 Hearing Date: December 9, 2024 Dept: O
Tentative Ruling
(1) DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED with leave to
amend.
(2)
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT is MOOT (as the MTS seeks to strike punitive damages
on the grounds that there are no allegations that amount to the requisite level
of recklessness or neglect but the court in the demurrer has given Plaintiff
leave to amend on the respective claim(s).
Background
This is an elder abuse case.
On February 9, 2024, Plaintiffs RIGOBERTO DAVILA by and
through his successor-in-interest (“Plaintiff” or “decedent”), Araceli Miranda;
ARACELI MIRANDA, an individual; AMPARO ROMERO, an individual; MARIBEL ROMERO,
an individual; MARIA HURTADO, an
individual; ARMANDO DAVILA, an
individual; LETICIA DAVILA, an individual;
JESSIE DAVILA, an individual;
EVELYN DAVILA, an individual;
JOEL DAVILA, an individual (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed suit
against Defendant INLAND VALLEY PARTNERS, LLC dba INLAND VALLEY CARE AND
REHABILITATION CENTER.
On July 9, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a first amended complaint
(FAC) asserting the following causes of action (COAs) against Defendant:
1)
Statutory Elder Abuse/Neglect
2)
Negligence
3)
Violation of Patient’s Rights and
4)
Wrongful Death
On August 28, 2024, Defendant filed the instant demurrer and
motion to strike.
On November 5, 2024, Plaintiffs
filed their opposition.
Legal Standard
A demurrer may be asserted, in pertinent part, on the
grounds that the pleading does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. (Civ. Proc. Code §430.10 (e).) (Demurrer p. 3.) A demurrer tests the
sufficiency of a pleading, and the grounds for a demurrer must appear on the
face of the pleading or from judicially noticeable matters. (Id. at
§430.30, subd. (a); Blank v. Kirwan, (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Discussion
Defendant demurs to the entirety of the FAC on the grounds
that it is devoid of facts and certain COAs are time barred.
1.
First COA for Elder Abuse/Neglect (Elder Abuse
And Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA) and Second COA for Willful
Misconduct/Negligence
“The
purpose of the [EADACPA was] essentially to protect a particularly vulnerable
portion of the population from gross mistreatment in the form of abuse and
custodial neglect.” (Covenant Care, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004)
32 Cal.4th 771, 787.) The EADACPA excludes liability for acts of
professional negligence; it does not apply to simple or gross negligence by
health care providers. (Delaney v. Baker (1999) 20 Cal.4th 23, 32; Covenant
Care, Inc., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 785.) Several factors “must be present
for conduct to constitute neglect within the meaning of the Elder Abuse Act and
thereby trigger the enhanced remedies available under the Act.
The
plaintiff must allege (and ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence)
facts establishing that the defendant: (1) had responsibility for meeting the
basic needs of the elder or dependent adult, such as nutrition, hydration,
hygiene or medical care; (2) knew of conditions that made the elder or
dependent adult unable to provide for his or her own basic needs; and (3)
denied or withheld goods or services necessary to meet the elder or dependent
adult's basic needs, either with knowledge that injury was substantially
certain to befall the elder or dependent adult (if the plaintiff alleges
oppression, fraud or malice) or with conscious disregard of the high
probability of such injury (if the plaintiff alleges recklessness).
“Recklessness,
unlike negligence, involves more than ‘inadvertence, incompetence,
unskillfulness, or a failure to take precautions’ but rather rises to the
level of ‘conscious choice of a course of action . . . with knowledge of the
serious danger to others involved in it.’” (Delaney, supra, 20
Cal.4th at p. 31-32) (emphasis added). The plaintiff must also allege (and
ultimately prove by clear and convincing evidence) that the neglect caused the
elder or dependent adult to suffer physical harm, pain or mental suffering. Finally, the facts constituting
the neglect and establishing the causal link between the neglect and the injury
must be pleaded with particularity, in accordance with the pleading
rules governing statutory claims.” (Carter v. Prime Healthcare
Paradise Valley LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 396, 406-407
[quotation marks and citations omitted], emphasis added.) This is
because recovery is based on a statutory cause of action. Thus, “the plaintiff
must set forth facts in his [or her] complaint sufficiently detailed and
specific to support an inference that each of the statutory elements of
liability is satisfied. General allegations are regarded as inadequate.” (Mittenhuber
v. City of Redondo Beach (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5.)
Here, the pertinent allegation is found in paragraph 10,
which provides in totality the following:
The FACILITY
repeatedly failed to provide care, monitoring, and supervision of the ELDER.
The FACILITY failed to create and execute interventions for the ELDER to avoid
falls despite the FACILITY assessing the ELDER as a high fall risk. The FACILITY failed to chart all of the
ELDER’s falls and timely notify the physician and the ELDER’s family of the
changes in condition and injuries.
Consequently, the ELDER fell repeatedly.
Moreover, on or about January 2, 2023, the ELDER was found on the ground
at the FACILITY with his head on the ground with a bloody gash and contusion on
the back of his head, bruise near his eye, abrasion to his right middle finger
such that the ELDER required hospitalization.
The injuries the ELDER suffered were the result of physical abuse and
neglect by the FACILITY.
The foregoing, however, is a conclusion—in that Plaintiff
fell—without pleading with particularity as to how Defendant acted with
the requisite reckless neglect or how often Plaintiff fell. (The FAC
does not state when Plaintiff was admitted to the facility.) Put differently,
Plaintiffs are making a conclusion that because Plaintiff fell, then
Defendant must have acted with recklessness (i.e., Defendant did not implement
measures to keep Plaintiff secure knowing that the failure to do so will likely
result in injury).
To the
extent that Plaintiff relies upon Fenimore v. Regents of the University of
California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1339 and Sababin v. Superior Court
(2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 81, those cases actually support Defendant’s position.
For example in Fenimore, the plaintiff, who had a
host of diseases and was just transferred from another facility, fell within
minutes of entering the new hospital. (Fenimore, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1343.) Not only that, but the hospital “engaged in [a] fraudulent
cover-up” by stating that nurses were changing the plaintiff’s adult diaper. (Id.
at p. 1344.) “For the next four days after his fall, [the plaintiff] received no
medical attention or further assessment.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the
plaintiff’s medical charts were inconsistent and the family was not being
informed of falls or pains. Then, the plaintiff fell again, which was
not even addressed until four days after he was transferred for totally
unrelated reasons and the hospital there realized he had a left hip fracture. (Ibid.)
Here, however, there are no such facts. The facts are merely that Plaintiff
fell; Plaintiffs do not allege the number of times or even how Plaintiff fell
or how is falls were a result of the failure to provide care or supervision.
The facts also fall short of those alleged in Sababin. There,
the plaintiff had Huntington’s Chorea, which is a condition characterized by
loss of cognitive and mental functions. (Sababin, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th
at p. 85.) People affected with the disorder are at increased risk for weight
loss and infection. (Ibid.) When the plaintiff was admitted to the
hospital, her weight fluctuated from 83 pounds to 75.4 pounds to then 105
pounds then 91 pounds. (Ibid.) As for the plaintiff’s skin problems, the
plaintiff developed diarrhea and was transferred to the emergency room because
her condition did not improve. (Ibid.) But the defendant had no
documentation of those conditions nor had a physician been notified for a
treatment order. (Ibid.) It was revealed that her cause of death was
MRSA sepsis to an infected sacral skin ulcer. (Id. at p. 86.) The
appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the summary judgment
motion asserting that “[a] trier of fact could find that when a care facility's
employees ignore a care plan and fail to check the skin condition of a
resident with [the disease], such conduct shows deliberate disregard of
the high degree of probability that she will suffer injury.” (Id. at p.
90.) In doing so, the court explained that “if a care facility knows it must
provide a certain type of care on a daily basis but provides that care
sporadically, or is supposed to provide multiple types of care but only
provides some of those types of care, withholding of care has occurred. In
those cases, the trier of fact must determine whether there is a
significant pattern of withholding portions or types of care. A
significant pattern is one that involves repeated withholding of care
and leads to the conclusion that the pattern was the result of choice or
deliberate indifference.” (Id. at p. 90, emphasis and underline added.) Here, as explained above, no pattern
has been provided because no specifics about the purported falls
have been provided. Even as to the 1/2/23 fall, that appears to have been
documented.
Even if the foregoing was insufficient to sustain the
demurrer as to the elder abuse COA, when an elder abuse claim is brought
against a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must further show that an officer,
director or managing agent authorized or ratified the abuse or neglect. (Welf
& Inst. Code, § 15657, subd. (c); Civ. Code, § 3294; see also see also CACI
section 3102B.)
Here, however, Plaintiff has not identified any specific
employee who engaged in any wrongful conduct and has otherwise failed to plead
that the corporate defendant was aware of such unfitness and allowed the
employee to perform his/her work. Rather, the complaint conclusively alleges the FACILITY ratified
the conduct. (¶18.)
Therefore, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the 1st
COA for elder abuse/neglect.
2.
Wrongful Death/Medical Negligence
The elements of the cause of action for wrongful death are
the tort (negligence or other wrongful act), the resulting death, and the
damages consisting of pecuniary loss suffered by the heirs. (Lattimore v.
Dickey (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 959, 968.)
Defendant argues that “Plaintiff’s FAC sets forth no causal
nexus between any alleged wrongful conduct that might be attributable to this
Defendant and the Decedent’s death. The FAC fails to even allege Decedent’s
cause of death.” (Demurrer p. 19.) The certificate of death indicates that
Plaintiff died from acute renal failure due to chronic hypoxemic respiratory
failure and aspiration pneumonia.[1] Plaintiff does not address causation.
Therefore, the court sustains the demurrer as to the wrongful
death/negligence COAs on the grounds of causation.[2]
(For clarity, the court does not reach the issue of statute of limitations.)[3]
3.
Patient’s Bill of Rights[4]
To safeguard nursing care
patients, who have been recognized as “one of the most vulnerable segments of
our population” the Legislature enacted the Long-Term Care, Health, Safety, and
Security Act of 1973 (Long-Term Care Act or Act; § 1417 et seq.). (Jarman v.
HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2020) 10 Cal.5th 375, 380.) Section 1430, subdivision (b) (section 1430(b)),
which Plaintiffs allege as one of the alleged violations, is part of the
Long-Term Care Act. (Ibid.)
The parties
disagree about the applicable statute of limitations. On the one hand,
Defendant argues that the statute amounts to a penalty such that per CCP
section 340, a one-year SOL applies. (Demurrer p. 14, citing to Melamed v.
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1271.) On the other hand,
Plaintiff avers that the plain language of the statute provides for “civil
damages.”
For purposes of this demurrer, the court need not
address the SOL as the COA fails to plead any facts with strict particularity
in support of a violation of any one of the 26 specific rights and fails to
identify which of the 26 specific rights were allegedly violated by Defendants. (Demurrer pp.
18-19.)
Therefore, the
court sustains the demurrer as to the COA for violation of the Patient’s Bill
of Rights.
Conclusion
In sum, statutory
causes of action must be pleaded with particularity and supported by specific
facts. (See e.g., Carter, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 410; see also Wilhelm
v. Pray, Price, Williams & Russell (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1324, 1332 [every
element of the claim must be alleged fully, factually, and specifically.)
Accordingly, the demurrer as to the first cause of action for elder
abuse/neglect is sustained with leave to amend as it amounts to nothing more
than that Plaintiff fell more than once, and also fails to plead corporate
ratification. The demurrer is likewise sustained as to the third cause of
action for violation of resident rights for the failure to plead the COA with
particularity. Lastly, the demurrer as to the wrongful death/negligence COAs
are sustained with leave to amend for the failure to plead causation. This
renders the MTS moot.
Based on the
foregoing, the demurrer is sustained in its entirety with leave to amend and
the MTS is moot.
[1] The request for judicial notice is granted. (See FAC
p. 13 of 13 of PDF.)
[2] Defendant also argues that “since Plaintiffs
acknowledge Decedent’s death was due to natural causes Decedent could never be
liable for his death. (See Civil Code § 1714.8).” (Demurrer p. 20:8-9.) However,
Defendant does not provide a citation as to where Plaintiffs make such an
acknowledgement.
[3] A claim for wrongful death based on medical
negligence must be brought within one year of the complained of conduct. (Code
Civ. Proc. § 340.5) The one-year limitations period begins to run when a
plaintiff discovers or suspects (subjective test) or should discover or suspect
(objective test) that his or her injury was caused by wrongdoing. (Reply p. 10,
citing Gutierrez v. Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892.) However, as noted in
opposition, a complaint is not subject to demurrer for violation of the statute
of limitations unless the complaint unequivocally shows on its face that it is
time barred. (Opp. p. 8 citing Greninger v. Fischer (1983) 81 Cal.App.2d 549,
553.) Moreover, as further noted in opposition, pursuant to C.C.P. §452, the
complaint must be read liberally. Additionally, according to Plaintiffs and not
otherwise disputed by Defendant, California Code of Civil Procedure section
364(d) provides that when a notice of intent to sue is “served within 90 days
of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the
commencement of the action shall be extended 90 days from the service of the
notice.”
[4] At this juncture, the Plaintiffs’ request for
judicial notice of non-binding authority is denied.