Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 24PSCV00938, Date: 2024-06-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV00938, Date: 2024-06-17 Tentative Ruling

Defendant LRA, LLC’s Demurrer to the Complaint is SUSTAINED in part with leave to amend (i.e., as to 5^th COA for IIED), SUSTAINED in part without leave to amend (i.e., as to 2^nd COA for breach of covenant of quiet enjoyment (as agreed by Plaintiffs to be stricken)), and OVERRULED in part (i.e., as to 1^st COA, 3^rd COA, and 4^th COA).

This is a habitability case. Plaintiffs BRIANA GARCIA, an individual; MARIA ANA YELi GARCIA CASTILLO, an individual; and ELIJAH GARCIA, a minor by and through his Guardian ad Litem BRIANA GARCIA allege the following against Defendant LRA, LLC: In around December 2020, the parties entered into a rental agreement. However, the property has “a severe cockroach infestation; a severe spider infestation; aggressive mold contamination; lack of plumbing maintained in good working order; lack of heating facilities maintained in good working order; and complete deterioration and crumbling of the structure as a whole due to deterioration, water damage, and/or improper maintenance.” (Complaint ¶15.) Despite Plaintiffs’ complaints about the foregoing hazards, Defendant has “not responded at all or have responded ineffectively.” (¶26.)

On March 19, 2024, Plaintiffs filed suit asserting the following causes of action (COAs):

1.     Tortious Breach of Warranty of Habitability

2.     Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

3.     Negligence

4.     Nuisance (Intentional Tort) and

5.     Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (IIED)

a. Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. …

Here, on April 26, 2024, Defense Counsel sent a meet and confer letter, but Plaintiff did not respond. Plaintiffs do not maintain otherwise in opposition. For any future motions/hearing, the court orders the parties/Plaintiffs to meet and confer.

Defendant demurs to the entirety of the complaint on the grounds that each COA fails to state sufficient facts to constitute a COA (Code of Civil Procedure §§ 430.10(e)) and the complaint is subject to a special demurrer on the grounds of uncertainty. (§ 430.10(f).)

To prove a claim for breach of warranty of habitability, a tenant must allege (1) an uninhabitable condition; (2) actual knowledge by landlord or constructive knowledge; and (3) damages. (Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 918-919.)

Here, Plaintiffs have asserted multiple uninhabitable conditions including a severe cockroach infestation, aggressive mold contamination, lack of plumbing and heating facilities maintained in good working order, and deterioration and crumbling of the structure as a whole due to deterioration, water damage, and/or improper maintenance. (See also Opp. p. 4.) As for damages, they have asserted those include, but are not limited to, insect bites, allergic reactions to the conditions of the subject property, and insomnia. (Complaint p. 5.)

To the extent that Defendant argues Plaintiffs have provided a “generic complaint” (Demurrer p. 7:21-22) and that it is “entitled to more comprehensive details” (Reply p. 3:10-11), it advances this proposition without citation to any instructive authority.

To the extent that Defendant argues SB 235 requires “Plaintiffs and LRA not only to make initial disclosures but also to disclose witnesses and documents that are relevant to (including potentially harmful to) their case” (Reply p. 3:12-18), this argument fails on two counts. First, advancing new arguments in reply is improper. (Ponte v. County of Calaveras (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 551, 554, fn. 1, citing Kahn v. Wilson (1898) 120 C. 643, 644.) Second, a review of SB 235 indicates that it pertains to discovery. The court at this juncture, however, is concerned with pleading standards, not discovery.

To be actionable, the landlord's action or omission must substantially interfere with a tenant’s right to use and enjoyment the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy. The covenant is breached when there is an eviction, either actual or constructive, of the tenant. (Demurrer pp. 9-10, citing Marchese v. Standard Realty & Development Co. (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 144, 148.) An actual eviction occurs when there is an expulsion or ouster of the tenant by the landlord. (Demurrer p. 10, citing Giraud v. Milovich (1938) 29 Cal.App.2d 543.) A constructive eviction occurs when there is a substantial or material interference with tenant’s use of the premises, causing the tenant to vacate. (Demurrer p. 10, citing Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at pp. 925-926.)

Here, as Plaintiffs remain in possession and have not alleged facts that they were asked to relocate, Plaintiffs concede that their 2^nd COA fails. Plaintiffs intend to amend their Complaint by eliminating the 2^nd COA for Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment.

To state a cause of action for nuisance, a plaintiff must allege that the (1) conduct that interfered with plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of property, (2) an invasion of plaintiff’s interest that is substantial thereby causing plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage, and (3) the interference is unreasonable in its nature, duration, or amount. (Opp. p. 5, citing San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 937-38.)

Here, for similar reasons as explained in the 1^st COA, Plaintiffs have pled a valid nuisance COA.

“A nuisance may be either a negligent or an intentional tort.” (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 920.)

Here, for similar reasons as explained above, Plaintiffs have pled a viable nuisance/intentional tort COA.

Both parties cite to Stoiber and Stoiber has established that a landlord can be sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress “if the landlord's acts are extreme and outrageous and result in severe mental distress.” (Id, at p. 922.)

Here, the court finds that the IIED COA could use additional facts to establish how Defendant’s conduct allegedly “exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by a decent society.” (Id. at p. 921.) “Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiff's interest; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.” (Ibid.)

For example, as observed by the Stoiber court, facts sufficient for IIED include evidence that after a plaintiff opposed rent increases, the landlord insulted the plaintiff and directed she vacate the premises or else the landlord would “handle this the way [they] do down South.” (Id. at p. 921, citing Newby v. Alto Riviera Apartments (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 288, 297-298.) Or, after a plaintiff exercised his right to “repair and deduct” the landlord increased rent. (Stoiber, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d at p. 921, citing Aweeka v. Bonds (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 278, 281.) Here, Plaintiffs have not provided ultimate facts as to the complaints made and Defendant’s conduct upon receiving such complaints.

Therefore, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the 5^th COA with leave to amend.

Defendant argues that the complaint is uncertain because it fails to state facts including, but not limited to, as to (i) when the alleged violations occurred; (ii) the dates Plaintiffs made complaints to Defendant; and (iii) the physical injuries and emotional distress suffered.

However, a special demurrer for uncertainty is disfavored and will only be sustained where the pleading is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him/her. (CCP § 430.10(f); Khoury v. Maly’s of Calif., Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) Moreover, even if the pleading is somewhat vague, “ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures.” (Ibid.)

Here, the complaint is not “so bad” that Defendant cannot respond to the issues. Moreover, should any of the specifics be required, some of them are within Defendant’s knowledge such as (a) The citations or safety violations or code violations issued to LRA with respect to the Plaintiffs or the premises; (b)When the citations or safety violations or code violations occurred; (c) Which entity issued the citations or safety violations or code violations; (d) The dates of Plaintiffs’ complaints to LRA and to whom the complaints were made. (Opp. p. 10, citing Chen v. Berenjian (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 811, 822.)

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer is sustained in part and overruled in part.