Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV01105, Date: 2025-05-08 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

Case Number: 24PSCV01105    Hearing Date: May 8, 2025    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is DENIED due to both unjustifiable delay and prejudice to Defendant; the court requests Defendant file a proposed order.

Background

This is a lemon law case.

On April 8, 2024, Plaintiff BENJAMIN VILLA filed suit against Defendant General Motors, LLC for SBA violations.

On May 8, 2024, Defendant filed its answer.

On March 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion.

On April 25, 2025, Defendant filed its opposition.

On April 29, 2025, Plaintiff filed a reply.

Legal Standard

The court may, in furtherance of justice and on any proper terms, allow a party to amend any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Association (2006) 39 Cal.4th 235, 242.) The court may also, in its discretion and after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a); Branick, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 242.) The court may deny the plaintiff’s leave to amend if there is prejudice to the opposing party, such as delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added costs of preparation. (Id.) Leave to amend is also properly denied where the proposed amendment is not actionable under substantive law. (Opp. p. 5, citing to Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 148.)

Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, a motion to amend a pleading before trial must (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number, the deleted allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the additional allegations are located. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a).) A separate supporting declaration specifying (1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; AND (4) the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier must accompany the motion. (Id., rule 3.1324(b).

Discussion

Plaintiff briefly argues that in light of the recent legal development, Plaintiff believes there are valid grounds to amend the complaint. As a result, Plaintiff intends to replace the claim under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act with a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. The declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel is equally devoid of a meaningful reason to satisfy the requirements above. As noted in opposition, the motion is likely made as a result of Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that “a motor vehicle purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as a ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ under [Song-Beverly]’s definition of ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty was issued with the sale.” (17 Cal.5th at 196 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.22(e)(2))). As a result of Rodriguez, Plaintiff’s Song Beverly claims—which relate to the purchase of a used vehicle in a transaction in which GM did not extend a new car warranty—are no longer viable.

However, as noted in opposition, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to replace the Song-Beverly claims with an entirely new claim that he could have asserted from the outset but chose not to. In fact, as noted in opposition, at the time this lawsuit was filed, the Court of Appeal had already held that Song-Beverly does not apply to vehicles that are purchased used with only the balance of the original new car warranty remaining. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209, 225).  And, at the time this lawsuit was filed, the California Supreme Court had already granted review of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Rodriguez. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US, 512 P.3d 654, 295 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 (Cal. 2022)). Despite being on notice of these decisions, however, Plaintiff chose to pursue only Song-Beverly claims against GM. Where, as here, the Plaintiff was aware of the facts relevant to the proposed amendment and waited without justification to assert them, leave to amend is appropriately denied. (See e.g., Opp. p. 4, citing Record v. Reason (1993) 73 Cal. App. 4th 472, 486 (leave to amend was properly denied where the plaintiffs “had knowledge of the circumstances on which they based the amended complaint … almost three years before they sought leave to amend”); see also Roemer v. Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 940 (affirming denial of leave to amend and noting that a “long delay in offering the amendment after knowledge of the [relevant] facts could very reasonably be construed by the court to constitute a lack of due diligence”)). (The reply does not address Defendant’s citations.)

Aside from the element of unjustifiable delay, allowing Plaintiff to add this cause of action at this stage would “open[ ] up an entirely new field of inquiry without any satisfactory explanation as to why this major change in point of attack had not been made” at an earlier stage, when Plaintiff first became aware of the facts and allegations supporting this additional cause of action. (Opp. p. 6, citing Estate of Murphy v. Gulf Ins. Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 304, 311).

To the extent that a reply has been filed, it is unpersuasive, and somewhat contradictory. One the one hand, Plaintiff argues there would be no prejudice as “[t]he proposed amendment neither alters the fundamental issues nor significantly broadens the scope of discovery” (Reply. p. 5:7-8) and on the other hand argues that the Magnuson COA could not initially be asserted because of “the evolving state of the law.” (Reply p. 2:22-24.) But if, as Plaintiff is saying, that SBA and Magnuson-Moss claim(s) are essentially, one in the same, then the latter could have initially been asserted. To the extent that Plaintiff argues that the Magnuson-Moss claim could not initially have been asserted, because it was unclear whether it was a viable COA, not only does that contradict the foregoing, but also, it doesn’t comport with the pleading practices. Parties assert various COAs which are then subject to demurrers, summary judgment motions, or motions for judgment on the pleadings which then challenge the viability of COAs. The practice is not to assert one COA, see if it survives, and then to continually amend complaints when a COA could have been asserted to begin with.

To the extent that Plaintiff cites to Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003)109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760 to support his proposition that courts allow amendments when necessary to align with clarification in binding precedent, those cases are distinguishable. In Atkinson, after the trial court granted Elk's motion for summary adjudication. Thereafter, the plaintiff sought to amend his complaint, which the trial court denied reasoning that the plaintiff “was simply trying to circumvent the trial court's clear ruling” and that the “new causes of action were simply a retooling of the allegations which formed the basis for the former third cause of action based on a violation of the Consumer[s] Legal Remedies Act and upon which summary adjudication was granted….” (Id. at p. 760.) The appellate court reversed because “[the defendant] [did] not claim[] that it will be prejudiced by this amendment.” (Id. at p. 761.) Here, to the contrary, Defendant has claimed that it will be prejudiced as discovery will need to conducted on a new cause of action.

To the extent that Plaintiff relies upon and Voelker v. Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (2003) 353 F.3d 516, 525 for a similar proposition, that case did not involve California law (but Illinois law).

To the extent that Plaintiff relies upon Hastings v. Ford Motor Co., 495 F. Supp. 3d 919 (2020), that case did not involve a motion for leave to amend; it involved a FRCP 12b6 (motion to dismiss).

All in all, as Plaintiff himself claims, he “alleges that Defendant issued a written warranty, that the vehicle experienced covered defects during the warranty period, and that Defendant failed to fulfill its repair obligations. These allegations are sufficient to support a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act alone.” (Reply p. 7.) With that, Plaintiff could have asserted his Manguson-Moss claim from the outset such that the failure to do so constitutes as unwarranted delay and would create prejudice by requiring discovery as to this COA. (See also Opp. p. 5, citing Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 224 (“Unreasonable delay may be found where a plaintiff … seeks leave to amend only after the defendant … moves for summary judgment on grounds addressed by the proposed amendment and the proposed amendment is based on facts previously known to the plaintiff.”)

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, considering the unjustifiable delay and the unfair prejudice, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is denied.