Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 24PSCV01289, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV01289, Date: 2024-06-20 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiffs’ MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION is TBD/continued for supplemental briefing/pending results from Chicago Title.

This case arises from efforts to convert a golf course for housing development and other purposes. Plaintiffs RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT FOR RDW (“RDW”) and James W. Chu (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) allege the following against Defendants RV DEV LLC (“RV”) and SUNJOINT DEVELOPMENT, LLC (“Sunjoint”) (collectively, “Defendants”): Plaintiffs are the owners of real property and are beneficiaries of a protective covenant running with their land. (First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶1); Defendants are the owners of the Royal Vista Golf Club in the city of Walnut and the surrounding golf course properties, property that is subject to certain conditions and restrictions. (¶¶10-12.) Article II of the conditions and restrictions limits the use of Defendants’ land to be used only for the purpose of a golf course. (¶17.) Defendants, however, have recently closed the golf course and are changing the nature of the property. (¶18.)

On May 7, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their FAC for Injunctive Relief for Breach of Protective Restrictions.

On May 16, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for preliminary injunction.[1]

On May 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an ‘EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE AN ORDER DETERMINING AN OSC IS NOT REQUIRED’ (“ex-parte application”) (seeking an Order to Show Cause (OSC) re Preliminary Injunction pursuant to Rule 3.1150 of the California Rules of Court, or in the alternative an order determining that an OSC is not required).

On May 31, 2024, RV (specially appearing defendant at the time of filing the opposition) filed an opposition to the ex-parte application (namely on the grounds that there can be no irreparable harm for not operating or maintaining a golf course).

On June 6, 2024, RV filed its opposition to the preliminary injunction motion (including evidentiary objections). That same day, Sunjoint also filed its opposition to the motion.

RV’s unopposed RJN of Exhibits 1 through 6—which are all documents recorded in the Official Records of the Recorder’s Office of Los Angeles County—is granted. (Evid. Code §§ 452, 453.) The court will take judicial notice of the recorded property documents and accepts the fact of their existence, but not the truth of their contents. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375; Kalnoki v. First American Trustee Servicing Solutions LLC (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 23, 36-37 [trial court properly took judicial notice of recorded land documents and properly found that the recorded deed of trust was the “legally operative document designating the beneficiary”].)

Before engaging in the merit(s), the court finds it helpful to presents the following uncontroverted facts/evidence to establish a common understanding of the dispute.

- The general real property at issue is a former golf course property (“Royal Vista Golf Club” or “Golf Course”) that includes a clubhouse, 27-hole golf course, and driving range. The named Defendants are not the sole owners of the parcels that make up the Gulf Course. Nonparty Willington Investments, LLC is the owner of where the clubhouse is located. I

- On December 26, 1961, Huntington First Savings and Loan (“Declarant”) executed a Declaration of Protective Restrictions (“1961 Declaration” or “Protective Restriction”).

- The 1961 Declaration contains four pertinent sections: the Preamble, and Articles I, II, and III.

- The preamble of the 1961 Declaration states, in pertinent part, that the conditions and restrictions are for the benefit of “the surrounding property now owned by Declarant, and of the property now owned by Helene M. Airey and by Andre Moynier which is contiguous on the west to the property which is subject to this declaration, and of any and all persons who may become members and/or operators of proposed Willow Springs Golf and Country Club.” (RV’s RJN Ex. 1, p. 4 of 57 of PDF.) The 1961 Declaration does not specifically identify what are these “benefitted” properties because there is no legal description of the benefitted properties nor a map of the benefitted properties. (RV Opp. p. 9, Sunjoint Opp. p. 3.)

- Article I is entitled “Property Subject To This Declaration of Protective Restriction.” Per the map provided by RV, the red parcels/parcels 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 are subject to Articles I, II, and III. RV owns Parcels 10, 11, 13, and 14 (20% of the total golf course) and Sunjoint owns Parcles 7, 8, and 12 (5.8% of the total golf course). (Opp. p. 7.) Accordingly, about 75% of the golf course property is not burdened by the 1961 Declaration.

- Article II is entitled “Character of Improvements,” and contains the conditions and restrictions that the property in Article I is subject to. Article II, in relevance part, specifically provides the following:

Uses. All property described herein shall be used only for the purpose of a golf and country club and its appurtenances, including golf trees, greens, fairways and rough, water storage and landscaping. (RJN, Ex. 1, emphasis added.)

- Article III is entitled “Scope and Duration of Conditions and Restrictions.” This Article specifically provides:

All of the conditions and restrictions set forth in this declaration shall run with the land and continue to be in full force and effect until January 31, 2016, and shall, as then in force, be continued automatically and without further notice from that time for a period of twenty (20) years, and thereafter for a successive period of twenty (20) years, unless, within the six months prior to expiration of any period as set forth hereinabove, the then owners of the property covered in this declaration shall be able to show that the property is no longer suitable for use as a golf course. (emphasis added).

- On August 12, 2021, the then-owner (RVGC Partners, Inc.) signed a ‘Declaration’ (attempting) to terminate the 1961 Covenant, which was recorded on August 27, 2021. (RJN, Ex. 2, pp. 10-13 of 57 of PDF.)[2]

- On February 29, 2024, the golf course operation closed (though the clubhouse continues to host events).

As argued by both Defendants, the threshold issue in this case is standing. Though it was not entirely clear from the motion, Plaintiffs in Reply clarify that they are demanding that Defendants cease violating the 1961 Declaration/Protective Restriction because they are successors in interest.[4] Effectively, the issue of whether Plaintiffs have standing (i.e., a vested, enforceable property right) turns on whether Plaintiffs (the homeowners) falls into one of the following four categories of benefitted properties:

(iii) of the property now owned by Helene M. Airey and by Andrew Moynier which is contiguous on the west to the property,” or

(iv) and of any and all persons who may become members and/or operators of proposed Willow Springs Golf and Country Club.” (See 1961 Declaration.)

Of note, Article II, paragraph 2, ‘fencing’ does make express reference to adjacent residents.

2. Fencing. No fencing is to be allowed to be constructed between the golf course and contiguous residential property, except as specifically required in certain locations for the protection of the golf club property and the golf club members and of the adjacent residents and/or their property, and except as required by law. (emphasis added.)

Thus, as this is a matter of contract interpretation[5] and it is axiomatic in contract interpretation that that the intention of the parties govern and here, the Declarant’s definition of the property subject to the Protective Restriction does not list/identify the adjacent residents and/or property are not benefitted property, then the pertinent way for Plaintiffs to be successors in interest would be to own, for example, property owned by “Helene M. Airey and by Andrew Moynier which is contiguous on the west to the property.”

However, despite bearing the burden and despite Plaintiffs’ stating that they are “beneficiaries of a protective covenant running with their land,” they fail to provide sufficient evidence of what land they own that is rightly benefitted by the Covenant, which is a requirement to enforce any benefit to a covenant running with the land. This leads to the court’s ruling: continue the hearing pending receipt of documents that have been ordered from Chicago Title. (Supp. Decl., Chu.)

Therefore, as the title documents would satisfy that a request for an injunction be supported by the evidence[6], the court continues the hearing. At this juncture, the court will not address other arguments.

Based on the foregoing, the hearing is continued. The court is amenable to offering supplemental briefing pending title documents.

[1] A motion was also filed on 5/15/24, but as the two appear identical and though the 5/16/24 motion is not labeled as “amended,” the court will presume the 5/16/24 motion is the moving paper.

[2] The issue of whether the then-owner complied with the timeline such that the Declaration was effective is disputed between RV and Plaintiffs.

[3] RV provides considerable analysis on the 1961 Declaration, if enforceable, being an equitable servitude, but Plaintiffs make clear that they “do not need to make this argument” as they instead focus on the protective restriction/1961 Declaration being a covenant running with the land. (Reply to RV Opp. p. 5, fn. 1.)

[4] “Plaintiffs allege that they are successors in interest and are entitled to enforce the Protective Restriction pursuant to the express provisions of the Protective Restriction, not because they claim the right to be permanently next to a golf course.” (Reply to Sunjoint Opp. p. 7:10-12.)

[5] Motion p. 14:17-19 [“The language of the Protective Restriction uses the present tense of the verb “is”. Covenants running with the land, like CC&Rs, 2 are subject to the same rules governing the interpretation of contracts.”].)

[6] See, e.g., ReadyLink Healthcare v. Cotton (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1016; Ancora-Citronelle Corp. v. Green (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 146, 150 [Preliminary injunctive relief requires the use of competent evidence to create a sufficient factual showing on the grounds for relief.]; see also Weil & Brown, California Procedure Before Trial, 9:579, 9(ll)-21 (The Rutter Group 2007).)