Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 24PSCV01314, Date: 2024-07-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV01314, Date: 2024-07-17 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

BISHOP AMAT MEMORIAL HIGH SCHOOL’s MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT is GRANTED (see CCP section 425.14, infra); leave to amend is TBD.

This case arises from an assault on campus. Plaintiff LUKE VIOLA alleges the following against Defendant BISHOP AMAT MEMORIAL HIGH SCHOOL, an entity unknown (the “School”): On September 8, 2022, a student (Moises Escobedo) spit on and slapped Plaintiff; the assault was recorded by other students. (Complaint ¶14.) Over a month later, Plaintiff told his mother about the video. (¶15.) Plaintiff alleges that the School knew of the video but kept it a secret.[1] (Complaint p. 6.) The complaint alleges that Plaintiff endured ongoing abuse[2] and lost his senior year.

Code of Civil Procedure section 435(b) provides, in relevant part, that “Any party within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” The Court may, upon such motion, or at any time at its discretion “(a) [s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading; and (b) [s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of the state, a court rule or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 436.) An MTS is the proper procedural vehicle to challenge improper remedies, including punitive damages. (Motion p. 4, citing United Western Medical Center v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 500.)

The School seeks to strike punitive damages on two grounds: (i) punitive damages are precluded by Code of Civil Procedure section 425.14 and (ii) the complaint fails to plead facts that the School is guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. As the first argument is dispositive of the issue, the court will focus its analysis on whether Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages against a religious organization (Complaint ¶10) without first obtaining an order from this court is proper. For all the reasons set forth by the School, the motion is granted.

CCP section 425.14 is unambiguous in its requirements for the pleading of punitive damages against a religious corporation.

No claim for punitive or exemplary damages against a religious corporation or religious corporation sole shall be included in a complaint or other pleading unlesss the court enters an order allowing an amended pleading that includes a claim for punitive or exemplary damages to be filed. The court may allow the filing of an amended pleading claiming punitive or exemplary damages on a motion by the party seeking the amended pleading and upon a finding, on the basis of the supporting and opposing affidavits presented, that the plaintiff has established evidence which substantiates that plaintiff will meet the clear and convincing standard of proof under Section 3294 of the Civil Code. (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.14) (emphasis added).

The legislative history of the statute reflects an intent to afford religious organizations protection against unsubstantiated punitive damages claims without regard to the conduct giving rise to the claim. (See Motion pp. 4-5 citing Little Co. of Mary Hosp. v. Superior Court (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 261, 265; Rowe v. Superior Court (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1711, 1721, 1723, fn. 13.) “By its terms, section 425.14's requirements must be satisfied whenever the defendant is a religious organization, regardless of the nature of the conduct giving rise to the plaintiff's claim.” (Little Co. of Mary Hosp. supra, 162 Cal.App.4th at p. 269.)

Plaintiff does not dispute the applicability of the foregoing authority. (Opp. p. 3:5-6 [“I was not aware of Code of Civil Procedure 425.14.”].) Instead, Plaintiff argues that the statute is unconstitutional, and he raises the issue to preserve it for appeal. (Opp. p. 3:8-13 [“Students in religious schools should have a constitutional right, without court permission, to sue for discrimination and the conduct alleged in the complaint.”].)

Here, even if the statute is unconstitutional, Plaintiff has presented no analysis. "'Issues do not have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to authority, [they are] ... waived.' [internal citation omitted.] It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness. When [a party] fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived." (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 838, 852, emphasis added.) Thus absent an analysis, the issue of the statute’s constitutionality is waived.

As for leave to amend, though failure to provide leave to amend on the first motion generally constitutes as an abuse of discretion, leave to amend would likely not resolve the underlying issues involved in the complaint. The court will hear from Plaintiff on leave to amend.

Based on the foregoing, the MTS punitive damages is GRANTED; leave to amend is TBD.

[1] Admittedly, the complaint is unclear namely as it largely asks questions (see e.g., “Why wasn’t everyone enrolled in Period 7 PE brought in together to find out who the second video was taken by? Why did SCHOOL not do their job to protect PLAINTIFF and ensure a safe environment?” (¶20).) There is then another allegation stating that “On April 26, 2023, Plaintiff was on SnapChat with the baseball team from 2021.” (¶21.) The relevancy of Plaintiff being in a video is unclear.

[2] No other events of abuse are articulated aside from the fact that the school experiences a high frequency of fights (¶25) and that Escobedo has a propensity for violence (¶28.)

[3] It is unclear how Plaintiff is truly ignorant of a doe defendant’s identity when Escobedo is identified as one of the students physically assaulting Plaintiff. (Complaint p. 12.)