Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV01500, Date: 2025-03-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24PSCV01500    Hearing Date: March 6, 2025    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

DEFENDANTS WEN TUNG WENG AND WEN CHUN WENG’S NOTICE OF DEMURRER AND DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED in part and OVERRULED in part; the demurrer to the 1^st COA for quiet title and 3^rd for declaratory relief are SUSTAINED with leave to amend namely as the Grant Deed contradicts the FAC and the demurrer to the 2^nd COA for constructive trust is OVERRULED namely the SOL began to run in 2024 when Defendants attempted to eject Plaintiff.

Background

This action arises from a real property dispute. Plaintiff YU LING WONG alleges the following against Defendants WEN TUNG WENG aka WEN-TUNG WENG and WEN CHUN WENG aka WENG WEN-CHUN[1]: In 1997, Plaintiff’s father, Weng Tien, and mother, Wong LinYue -Ho,[2] purchased the subject property “with Plaintiff in mind, and specifically, so she had a home to reside in when she moved to the United States from abroad.” (First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶7.) Since Plaintiff was abroad at the time of purchase but Defendants were in the United States, title was transferred to Defendants’ names. (¶8.) However, since 1997, Plaintiff has resided at the residence and Defendants live in Taiwan full-time. (¶9.) Defendants have never made any payments related to the ownership or maintenance; Plaintiff is responsible for all financial responsibilities and expenses associated with the Subject Property, such as paying the property taxes, utilities, and all maintenance expenses. (¶¶11, 12.) In November 2022, the City of El Monte issued a Notice of Violation to Defendants for issues such as a deteriorating roof framing and shingles and improperly stored debris and possible fire hazards. (¶17.) While Plaintiff has made some repairs, other she cannot do as proper permitting is required, which would require the consent of Defendants, but they refuse to cooperate. (¶¶17-20.) Additionally, on January 4, 2024, Defendants served Plaintiff with an unlawful 60-Day Notice of termination of tenancy, claiming they would be demolishing or substantially remodeling the Subject Property. (¶21.) And, on April 23, 2024, Defendants served Plaintiff an unlawful 3-Day Notice to Quit alleging she is committing waste on the Subject Property. (¶22.) Plaintiff claims she is rightful owner of the Subject Property and seeks to quiet title to the Subject Property to obtain 100% interest. (¶22.)

On June 10, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit.

On June 17, 2024, the court determined that the 24WCUD01003 case filed by Defendants against Plaintiff was related to the instant case. (The related case was filed on 5/13/24.)

On October 24, 2024, Plaintiff filed a first amended verified complaint for:

1.     Quiet Title

2.     Constructive Trust

3.     Declaratory Relief

On December 3, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer to the FAC.

On December 31, 2024, Plaintiff filed her opposition.

On January 7, 2025, Defendants filed their reply.

Discussion

Defendants demur to the entirety of the FAC pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure § 430.10(e) and (f) on the grounds that the First Cause of Action for Quiet Title: (i) fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the Moving Parties, (ii) is barred by the doctrine of laches, (iii) is barred by statute of frauds, and (iv) is uncertain; the Second Cause of Action for Constructive Trust and Third Cause of Action for Declaratory Relief: (i) fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the Moving Parties, (ii) are barred by the doctrine of laches, (iii) are barred by statute of limitations, and (iv) are uncertain. (Demurrer p. ii.)

Preliminary, the court notes that the demurrer and Reply refer to a ‘lease agreement’ or a ‘contract’ between the parties. As the court is bound to the four corners of the complaint on a demurrer, such arguments/references exceed the scope of a demurrer and are thus will not be considered for purposes of this ruling.

1.     1^st COA for Quiet Title

a. Pleading the COA

To adequately plead a cause of action for quiet title, Plaintiff must plead the essential elements: (1) the legal description and street address of the real property at issue, (2) title sought and the basis of the same, (3) any adverse claims against the title Plaintiff seeks, (4) the date of which the determination is sought, and (5) prayer for relief.  (Code of Civ. Proc., § 761.020.)

Here, Defendants provide no analysis as to how the quiet title COA fails to state sufficient facts (i.e., Defendants do not state which element of CCP section 761.020 has not been alleged).[3] That said, Plaintiff clearly identified the legal description and street address of the Subject Property; that she seeks 100% interest in the property; that the basis of her claim is rooted in a constructive trust, which was created when Defendants promised and represented to Plaintiff and her parents that they would hold title to the Subject Property in trust for Plaintiff, the intended beneficiary, at the time of the property’s purchase; and her brothers hold adverse claims as they refuse to transfer ownership to Plaintiff.

Notwithstanding, the only element not alleged in the complaint is the “date of which the determination is sought.” Plaintiff concedes that she did not specify a particular date for the court to determine title in her pleading but such that said date will be the date of filing the complaint. (Opp. p. 4, citing Code of Civ. Proc., 761.020 § (d) [date complaint filed governs date of which determination is sought]; see also Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. McGurk (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 201, 213 [same]. (The Reply does not address the foregoing.)

Thus, to the extent that Defendants demur on the grounds that this COA fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a COA, the court OVERRULES the demurrer.  

b. Statute of Frauds (SOF)

Defendants cite to Civil Code section 1624(a)(3) to support the proposition that the COA is barred by the SOF. Civil Code section 1624 governs the ‘Manner of Creating Contracts’ and holds that certain “contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged….” (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1624, italics added.) Section(a)(3) specifically states the following: “An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.”

Defendants argue that Plaintiff alleged that there is a ‘mutual understanding’ among the parties that the Premises belong to Plaintiff” but that this mutual understanding is not in writing. (Demurrer p. 3:15-20.)

Here, however, as acknowledged by both parties, this COA is not predicated upon a contract. Plus, a “mutual understanding” does not necessarily equate to a legal agreement. Thus, Civil Code section 1624 appears inapplicable.

Even assuming there was an agreement regarding the interest in the property that should have been in writing, Plaintiff argues that the exception of part-performance applies. (Opp. p. 6, citing Sutton v. Warner (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 415; see also Demurrer p. 4 citing In re Marriage of Benson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1096, 1108 [“However, where assertion of the statute of frauds would cause unconscionable injury, part performance allows specific enforcement of a contract that lacks the requisite writing.”].)  

Under the doctrine of part performance, the oral agreement for the transfer of an interest in real property is enforced when the buyer has taken possession of the property and either makes a full or partial payment of the purchase price, or makes valuable and substantial improvements on the property, in reliance on the oral agreement. [internal citation omitted]. Payment of the purchase price alone, without the buyer obtaining possession or making substantial improvements to the property, is not sufficient part performance to preclude application of the statute of frauds. [internal citation omitted]. The part performance by the buyer must clearly relate to, and must be pursuant to, the terms of the oral agreement. (Sutton, supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 422, emphasis added.)

Here, this exception to the SOF applies because Plaintiff has (i) retained complete possession since 1997 (actual, visible, notorious and exclusive) (FAC ¶10) and (ii) she has made substantial and valuable contributions to the property (e.g., maintenance repairs ¶¶11, 14), conduct of which unequivocally refers to the oral promise that the Subject Property was intended for her.

Thus, to the extent that Defendants demur on the grounds that this COA is barred by the SOF, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

c. The Grant Deed

If a plaintiff “attaches a written agreement to his complaint and incorporates it by reference into his cause of action, the terms of that written agreement take precedence over any contradictory allegations in the body of the complaint.” (Demurrer p. 4, citing Kim v. Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 282.) If a “written instrument is the foundation of a cause of action and is attached to a pleading as an exhibit and incorporated into it by proper reference, the court may, upon demurrer, examine the exhibit and treat the pleader’s allegations of its legal effect as surplusage.” (Demurrer p. 4, citing Weitzenkorn v. Lesser (1953) 40 Cal.2d 778, 785-786.)

Here, Plaintiff attached the Grant Deed of the Premises as an Exhibit to the FAC, where it shows that Defendants are the owners of the Premises. (FAC, Ex. B, p. 14 of 15 of PDF.) However, throughout the FAC, Plaintiff alleged facts contrary to the Grant Deed such as that “Plaintiff is the rightful owner of the Subject Property” (FAC ¶22) or that Property “entirely belongs to [Plaintiff].” (FAC ¶25). (Demurrer pp. 4-5.) However, since the Grant Deed takes precedence over these contradictory allegations in the FAC, then the FAC does appear uncertain. The opposition does not address this point.

For this reason, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the quiet title COA WITH leave to amend. At this juncture, the court need not address whether the defense of laches apply. The ruling on this COA also applies to the 3^rd COA for declaratory relief since the declaratory relief seeks a judicial declaration of Plaintiff’s purported interest in the property.

2.     Constructive Trust

A constructive trust is an involuntary trust created by operation of law and not by the intention of the parties as an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment and to enforce restitution. (See e.g., Day v. Greene (1963) 59 Cal.2d 404, 411.) The trust is created in equity based on the principle that a person cannot take advantage of his or her own wrong, and the creation of the trust is necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant. (Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381.) A person who acquires property by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence, in violation of a trust, or other wrongful acts, holds the title as an involuntary trustee for the benefit of the person who is rightfully entitled to the property. (Code of Civ. Proc., § 2224.) The remedy is not based on the plaintiff's legal title but is available because a party has an equitable title to real property when legal title is in another. (Cramer v. Biddison (1968) 257 Cal.App.2d 720, 725.)  The remedy compels the transfer of property from the person wrongfully holding it to the rightful owner. (Communist Party v. 522 Valencia, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 980.) Accordingly, to plead a COA for constructive trust, a plaintiff must plead the following elements: (1) existence of a property; (2) plaintiff’s right to that property; and (3) defendant’s acquisition of the res by some wrongful act. (Opp. p. 7, citing Optional Capital, Inc. v. DAS Corp. (2014) 222 Cal. App. 4th 1388, 1402.)

i.                 Statute of limitations (SOL)

The SOL is based on the legal theory that is relied upon for imposition of the trust, which is three years when the action is based on actual or constructive fraud or mistake. (Code of Civ. Proc., §338, subd.(d); Day, supra, 49 Cal.2d at p. 411.)

Here, the gravamen of Plaintiff’s claim for constructive trust is false promise, a form of fraud (FAC, ¶ 34).[4] As such, a three-year statute of limitations applies, and Plaintiff appears to acknowledge this much. (Opp. p. 9:5-7 [“The statute of limitations for such an action is governed by California Code of Civil Procedure section 338, which establishes the statute of limitations at three years.”].)

Defendants argue that the SOL has expired because Plaintiff waited nearly three decades to bring forth this action. (Demurrer p. 5.) In opposition, Plaintiff maintains Plaintiff did not have notice that Defendants were holding the Subject Property adversely until they began their unlawful efforts to eject Plaintiff. (Opp. p. 9, citing Martin v. Kehl (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 228, 240 [In an action for constructive trust, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the beneficiary has actual knowledge of the repudiation or breach of trust].) More specifically, Plaintiff contends that it was not until January 2024 that Plaintiff was “confronted with this legal action.” (Opp. p. 9:8-9.) The reply does not address this point.

Thus, to the extent that Defendants demur on the grounds that the COA is time barred, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

ii.               Laches

As noted in opposition and not otherwise address in reply, the doctrine of laches does not begin to operate until the trustee acts in hostility to the obligation or repudiates the trust in a manner that alerts the beneficiary. (Opp. p. 8, citing Isakoolian v. Isaacoulian (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 255, 230.) For similar reasons above, as Plaintiff had no reason to act until she was confronted with Defendant’s efforts to eject her, laches does not apply.[5]

Therefore, to the extent that Defendants demur on the grounds that the COA is barred by laches, the demurrer is OVERRULED.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the demurrer as to the 1^st COA for quiet title and 3^rd COA for declaratory relief are SUSTAINED with leave to amend but the demurrer to the 2^nd COA for constructive trust is OVERRULED.