Judge Christian R. Gullon, Case Number: 24PSCV02289, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV02289, Date: 2025-04-17 Tentative Ruling

The Court may change tentative rulings at any time. Therefore, attorneys are advised to check this website to determine if any changes or updates have been made to the tentative ruling.

Counsel may submit on the tentative rulings by calling the clerk in Dept. O at 909-802-1126 before 8:30 the morning of the hearing. Submission on the tentative does not bind the court to adopt the tentative ruling at the hearing should the opposing party appear and convince the court of further modification during oral argument.

The Tentative Ruling is not an invitation, nor an opportunity, to file any further documents relative to the hearing in question. No such filing will be considered by the Court in the absence of permission first obtained following ex-parte application therefore.

(1) DEFENDANTS MAALAXMI, LLC AND HANIF HIRJI’S DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is SUSTAINED in part with leave to amend (1, 2, 5, 6, 9) and OVERRULED in part with leave to amend (remainder); the RJN is denied in its entirety; Defendants improperly seek to introduce irrelevant matter to adjudicate the truthfulness of the FAC which is improper on a demurrer.

(2) DEFENDANT HANIF HIRJI’S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is TBD as the reply advances new arguments and authority such that it would be prejudicial to issue a ruling without allowing Plaintiffs an opportunity to adequately research and respond to the arguments/authority.

This case involves the implied warranty of habitability. Plaintiffs WILLIAM CLYDE GRAHAM, an individual, SALWA GRAHAM, an individual, DELANEY BROOKE GRAHAM, an individual, WILLIAM CLYDE GRAHAM as Guardian Ad Litem for minors SHADIYA SOFIA GRAHAM, SARIYAH GRAHAM, WILLIAM WALEED GRAHAM, ADON TYREEK GRAHAM, SAMMY MALIK GRAHAM allege the following against Defendants MAALAXMI, LLC, a California Limited Liability Company; HANIF HIRJI, an individual: Plaintiffs have been tenants at the subject property since May 2019. (First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶17.) (The lease agreement is attached as exhibit A in the complaint, pp. 43-47 of PDF.) Throughout their tenancy, Plaintiffs have suffered uninhabitable condition arising from some of the following defects: pest infestation, mold, faulty lighting fixtures, and improper ventilation. (¶¶22, 23.) As for pest infestation, while Defendants did from the start provide pest control (¶26), from 2022 to 2023 Defendants took no action to address the pest infestation which resulted in the spread of bed bugs, requiring all Plaintiffs to sleep in one bedroom. (¶¶27-29.) As for the mold, in February 2024, the Los Angeles Department of Public Health (LADPH) notified Defendants of mold in various parts of the house. (¶55.) On or around July 2, 2024, LADPH notified Defendants of numerous health and safety violation at the Subject Property; Compliance date was set for July 23, 2024 (¶66), but the defects remain unrepaired. (In retaliation against Plaintiffs complaints to LADPH, Defendant texted Plaintiffs informing them that this text message shall serve as a 60 Day Notice from Plaintiffs to vacate the Subject Property. ¶79.) On July 9, 2024, Los Angeles County Development Authority (LACDA)[1] served Plaintiffs with a Notice of Termination of Housing Assistance, confirmed that the reason for such termination was due to Defendants failure to comply with the programs regulations and/or violation of Housing Quality Standards. (¶68.) All in all, Plaintiffs allege that defendants have intentionally and systematically failed to perform repairs and, moreover, in response to Plaintiffs requests for remediation of the defective conditions at the Subject Property, Defendants spray painted a derogatory racial slur on the side of Plaintiff William Clyde’s vehicle (¶77, see also ¶85) and installed cameras directly across Plaintiffs’ windows violating Plaintiffs’ right to privacy and uninterrupted enjoyment of their home. (¶75.)

On August 6, 2024, Plaintiffs filed their FAC asserting the following causes of action (COAs) against Defendants:

2. Statutory Breach Of The Warranty Of Habitability (Civil Code §§1941, 1941.1, 1942.4, And 1942.5

On December 6, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer; Defendant Hanif Hirji filed the motion to strike. (The parties and met and conferred telephonically.)

Defendants demur to the entirety of the FAC. (See Table of Contents, Arguments section.)

At the outset, however, and as noted in opposition, the demurrer largely is seeking to provide a different explanation of events: “Only after Mr. Graham had: (a) punched out another tenant on video; (b) was given a 60 day notice to quit; (c) sought a TRO against Mr. Hirji that the court would not extend; (d) having a UD action filed against him; (e) vandalized cameras on the property leading to two police reports, and a criminal complaint filed against him by the District Attorney—did he allege habitability issues that did not exists at the time the Lease was executed.” (Demurrer p. 12:11-18.) It is axiomatic that extrinsic evidence is not to be considered on a demurrer. (See Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881; see also Hacker v. Homeward Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280 [plaintiff’s allegations must be accepted as true]; see also Marian Pacific Hotel & Suites, LLC v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 96, 104-105.)

To the extent that Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of various court orders (Exhibits A through K), that RJN is DENIED in its entirety.[2] Under Evidence Code section 452 subdivision (c) and (d), judicial notice may be taken of the following: “(c) Official acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States and of any state of the United States. (d) Records of (1) any court of this state or (2) any court of record of the United States or of any state of the United States.” While Evidence Code section 453 provides that the trial court “shall take judicial notice” of the foregoing, the matters must ultimately be RELEVANT to a material issue before the court. (See Opp. to RJN p. 3, citing People v Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 [“There is, however, a precondition to the taking of judicial notice in either its mandatory or permissive form—any matter to be judicially noticed must be relevant to a material issue.”], emphasis added; see also Opp. to RJN p. 3, citing Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 881, 901-902 [“Because judicially noticed matters are a ‘substitute for proof,’ the trial court retains its usual discretion not to take judicial notice of matters that are irrelevant….”]emphasis added; see also Opp. to RJN p. 3 citing Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal. 4th 739, 748 fn. 6 [“The parties' requests for judicial notice included other legislative materials and copies of other courts' decisions. However, the requests present no issue for which judicial notice of these items is necessary, helpful, or relevant.”], emphasis added; see also Opp. to RJN p. 3 citing Unruh-Haxton v Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 364 [“Judicial notice is the recognition and acceptance by the court, for use by the trier of fact or by the court, of the existence of a matter of law or fact that is relevant to an issue in an action without requiring formal proof of the matter.”], emphasis added.) No Reply has been filed as to Plaintiffs’ opposition to the RJN to address the foregoing authority. Thus, the RJN of most exhibits is denied.

To the extent that Defendants are arguing that Plaintiffs’ action is lacks evidentiary support or was filed for improper purposes, there are other procedural vehicles to challenge the pleading, but a demurrer is not the one.

Notwithstanding, the only potentially relevant matters are the LACDA inspection reports found in Exhibits C and D. (See RJN pp. 17-34 of 256 of PDF.)[3] Ex. C is a 12/7/23 ‘Inspection Checklist’ from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. According to the form, the information is collected as part of Section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act of 1937. Exhibit D is an ‘official inspection report’ from the County of Los Angeles’ Department of Public Health with an inspection date of 3/13/24 and a reinspection date of 3/27/24. However, as noted in opposition to the RJN, the re-inspections in and of themselves indicates that the home was inspected and failed inspections due to several habitability issues. In fact, according to Exhibit D, outstanding violations remained after the 3/13/24 inspection. (RJN p. 33 of 256 of PDF.)

Having resolved the RJN, the court now turns to the merits of each COA as presented in the order in the demurrer.

“To establish a cause of action for breach of contract, the plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff.” (Demurrer p. 14, citing Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants breached the lease agreement by, inter alia, “[a]llowing dangerous and defective conditions, including but not limited to, mold infestations, water leaks, deteriorating ceiling, and or inadequate heating devices.” (¶100, subd. (b).)

Here, as stated in the RJN discussion section, the fact that re-inspections had to occur indicates that there were purported habitability issues. To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiffs accepted the property “as is” and that minor repairs were assigned to Plaintiffs per the lease agreement (FAC, Ex. A, ¶ 26.B), that still would not allow Defendants to evade responsibility when problems do arise at any point in the tenancy.[4] (Erlach, infra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1297 [“Moreover, a landlord's obligation to maintain premises in a habitable condition is one that continues throughout the term of the lease.”].) Moreover, the “as is” provision applies to “windows, doors, plumbing and electrical facilities, hot and cold water supply, building grounds and appurtenances” (Lease ¶6) which does not encompass all the habitability problems alleged.

To the extent that Defendants argue that Plaintiffs breached the agreement by failing to pay rent since March 2024, as noted in opposition, tenants in “untenantable” units may choose not to pay rent (or withhold part of their rent). (See Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 635 [“we now conclude that the tenant's duty to pay rent is ‘mutually dependent’ upon the landlord's fulfillment of his implied warranty of habitability”].)

Notwithstanding, Plaintiffs admit in the lease that they “inspected the Premises, and every part thereof, at the outset of the tenancy . . . ha[ve] found no signs of moisture, mold or mildew therein.” The defects with a complaint must appear on the face of the complaint. “Face of the complaint” includes matters shown in exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference. (See e.g., Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“we rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader's allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits”]; George v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1130; see also Demurrer p. 14, citing Edmon, Lee Smalley, et al., California Practice Guide Civil Procedure Before Trial (Rutter Group 2024).) Accordingly, Plaintiffs allegations that problems were there from the outset is contradictory to the lease.

Therefore, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the 1^st COA with leave to amend.[5]

2. 2^nd and 5^th COAs for STATUTORY BREACH OF THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY and TORTIOUS BREACH OF WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY, respectively

To state a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a material defective condition affecting the habitability of the premise; (2) notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant discovers the condition; (3) the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency; and (4) resulting damages.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298-99.)

Under Civil Code § 1942.4, a residential landlord may not demand or collect rent, increase rent, or serve a three-day notice to pay rent or quit if:

(1) the dwelling is untenantable as defined under Civil Code [§] 1941.1, is in violation of [§ 17920.10 of the Health and Safety Code[HSC], or is deemed and declared substandard under section 17920.3 of the [HSC];

(2) public officer inspects the premises and gives the landlord written notice that it must abate the nuisance or repair the property;

(4) the substandard conditions were not caused by the tenant’s acts or omissions.

Defendants argue that the Plaintiffs fail to plead the existence of any written notices to abate made to Defendants. (Demurrer p. 18:2-5 [“The FAC does not allege that Plaintiffs have written proof of Defendants’ knowledge of the alleged inhabitable conditions and that Defendants had an opportunity to repair them.”]; see also Reply p. 5:22-24.)

Plaintiffs cite to paragraphs 122 and 123 of their FAC to argue that they do allege that these inspections resulted in written notices to Defendants identifying habitability violations and requiring abatement of substandard conditions. (Opp. p. 10:9-17.) Those paragraphs do not make any reference to written notices.

However, other paragraphs of that COA do provide that written notice was given to Defendants. For example, paragraph 126 alleges that “On or around February 21, 2024, LADPH notified Defendants regarding defects at the Subject Property, including but not limited to, presence of mold in the kitchen walls, cabinets, and ceiling, as well as water damage in the kitchen and bathroom ceiling. Compliance date was set for March 13, 2024. Regrettably, Defendants failed to comply with this notice within 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice.” As not otherwise disputed in reply, LACDA is an entity responsible for enforcing housing laws, and their inspectors qualify as public officers or employees under Civil Code §1942.4(a)(2).

Civil Code §1942.5 prohibits a landlord from retaliating against a tenant who exercises their rights under housing laws, including making complaints to the landlord or appropriate agencies regarding tenantability. The statute explicitly provides that within 180 days of such complaints, a landlord may not recover possession of the dwelling, cause the tenant to quit involuntarily, increase rent, or decrease services, provided the tenant is not in default on rent.

Here, the COA improperly incorporates numerous allegations by reference—as evidenced by Plaintiffs’ citation to paragraphs to 44, 55-68—when this COA encompasses paragraphs 135 to 146.

Therefore, the court SUSTAINS the demurrer as to the 4^th COA with leave to amend.

A plaintiff alleging unfair business practices under the UCL must state with “reasonable particularity” the facts supporting the statutory elements of the violation. (Reply p. 7, citing Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto Superstores Calif. (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1261 (2018). As restitution is an equitable remedy, “[e]quitable principles govern, and the plaintiff must show the legal remedy is inadequate.” (Green Valley Landowners Ass’n v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425, 442.) “Unjust enrichment is generally an inapplicable basis for restitution where the parties have an enforceable express contract….” (Demurrer p. 19, citing Sepanossian v. National Ready Mixed Concrete Co. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 192, 207.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim pleads the existence of an enforceable agreement (FAC ¶ 97] and their unjust enrichment claim did not deny the existence or enforceability of that agreement. Thus, as Plaintiffs’ remedies at law are adequate (i.e., their first COA for breach of contract), a separate claim for restitution is unnecessary.

The opposition does not meaningfully address the remedies available for a UCL claim.

The elements for a cause of action for private nuisance are:(1) the plaintiff must prove an interference with his use and enjoyment of his property; (2) the invasion of the plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of the land must be substantial, that is, that it causes the plaintiff to suffer substantial actual damage; (3) “the interference with the protected interest must not only be substantial, but it must also be unreasonable, i.e., it must be of such a nature, duration, or amount as to constitute unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the land.” (Demurrer p. 20, quoting Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 262-63.)

To the extent that Defendants rely upon the inspection reports, those respective RJNs were denied.

To the extent that Defendants argue that this COA is duplicative of Plaintiffs’ negligence COA, the court cannot find the Silvestro v. Grand Apts on other research databases such as Westlaw. In any event, it appears to be a trial court order, which has no precedential value. (Bolanos v. Superior Court (2008) 169 Cal.App.4^th 744, 761; Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4^th 439, 448, fn. 4 [“(I)n the absence of some additional showing—such as the conditions for claim or issue preclusion—the actions of other judges are simply irrelevant”].) What is more, the case, as a trial court case, is unpublished, such that may not be cited according to California Rules of Court rule 8.1115.[6]

As with above, as Defendants rely upon denied RJNs, the court OVERRULES the demurrer to the 8^th and 11^th COAs.

“[T]he covenant of quiet possession in a lease is not breached until there has been an actual or constructive eviction. Any interference by the landlord that deprives the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of the premises or renders the premises unfit for the purposes for which they are let amounts to a constructive eviction if the tenant so elects and vacates within a reasonable time” (Demurrer pp. 21-22 citing Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1299-1300; see also Demurrer p. 22 citing Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal. App. 4th 873, 897-98 [““In order that there be a constructive eviction it is essential that the tenant should vacate the property. There is no constructive eviction if the tenant continues in possession of the premises however much he may be disturbed in the beneficial enjoyment”].)

Here, as Plaintiffs remain in possession and the opposition does not address the foregoing authority, the demurrer as the 9^th COA is sustained with leave to amend.

To state an IIED claim, the plaintiff must allege facts showing:(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff's suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. . . .Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” (Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc., 64 Cal. App. 5th 138, 147(2021) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)

Here, to the extent that Defendants rely upon a superior court case and denied RJN, the court OVERRULES the demurrer. Defendants have offered no binding authority that allegations like those found in the FAC in a landlord tenant dispute may not constitute an IIED COA. Notably, as argued in opposition, Plaintiffs repeated notifications to the Defendants about habitability issues, particularly the bedbug infestation, major water damage from faulty or malfunctioning plumbing, toxic mold, damaged ceilings and walls and uneven flooring were met with intentional disregard to Plaintiff’s health and safety. Such actions as illustrated above, can be found by a jury to exceed all bounds of that is usually tolerated in a civilized community.

Defendants demur on the grounds that the lease in the FAC is not an insurance contract and therefore tort liability for the breach of the implied covenant is not available. The relevancy of that argument is unclear. While the court in Chu v. Old Republic Home Prot. Co., Inc. (2021) 60 Cal. App. 5th 346 states that “tort remedies are available for a breach of the covenant in cases involving insurance policies” (id. at p. 23), here, Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is primarily contractual. (Opp. p. 22.) After all, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants acted in bad faith by systematically frustrating Plaintiffs’ ability to enjoy the benefits of the lease. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants not only failed to maintain the premises in a habitable condition but also actively ignored complaints, delayed responses, and refused to make meaningful repairs even after inspections by public health agencies. (Opp. p. 23, citing FAC ¶¶ 44, 55–67.) Accordingly, the court agrees with Plaintiffs that these actions demonstrate a deliberate effort to frustrate Plaintiffs’ rights under the lease and are distinct from the breach of contract and warranty claims.

11. Plaintiffs’ thirteenth and fourteenth COAs for claim under the Unruh Act and FEHA, respectively

The Unruh Civil Rights Act (California Civil Code §51) provides broad protection against discrimination by business establishments, including housing providers, based on protected characteristics such as race, disability, and veteran status. To state a claim under the Unruh Act, a plaintiff must allege: (1) they were denied equal treatment or discriminated against by a business establishment, (2) the discrimination was based on a protected characteristic, (3) they suffered harm, and (4) the business’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing that harm. Similarly, California Government Code §12955, part of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), prohibits housing discrimination and harassment based on protected characteristics, including race, disability, and veteran status.

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that they are African American, that Plaintiff William Clyde has a disability, and that Defendants engaged in discriminatory and harassing conduct targeting their race, disability, and veteran status. This conduct includes spraying a racial slur on Plaintiff Clyde’s vehicle (FAC ¶ 77) and threatening to report Plaintiff Clyde to the Veterans Administration. (FAC ¶ 78.)

To the extent that in reply Defendants argue that the painted slur may be a hoax or that the painted slur is not evidence of differential treatment, the slur speaks for itself.

Both parties do not appear to dispute the applicable law which is that Directors of an LLC are liable to third persons injured by their own tortious conduct regardless of whether they acted on behalf of the LLC and regardless of whether the LLC is also liable so long as the plaintiff shows that the director specifically authorized, directed or participated in the allegedly tortious conduct.

In reply, however, Defendants advance numerous new arguments and authority such that it would be unfair to rule on the matter without allowing Plaintiffs an opportunity to respond. Notably in reply, Defendants, for the first argue, that any statements made about reporting Mr. Graham to the Department of Veteran Affairs is privileged. Thus, the court will either allow for supplemental briefing on the motion or hear from the matters during the hearing and issue a final ruling thereafter.

[1] A predominant portion of Plaintiff monthly rent for the Subject Property is paid for by the LACDA due to Plaintiff William Clyde’s status as a disabled veteran. (¶20.)

[2] In reply, Defendants file another RJN, which appear duplicative.

[3] While in opposition Plaintiff avers that it is unclear which property the inspection pertains to (as the property has two other separate groups of tenants), the inspection checklist does state that “[u]nit is the center unit between 3211 and rear unit” and that Plaintiff Mr. Graham authorized entry.” Plus, according to the FAC, there are four bedrooms (¶30), which is the number of bedrooms subject to the inspection. (p. 12 of 25 of PDF.) Thus, the court disagrees with Plaintiffs that the inspection checklist is unclear as to what part of the property was subject to the (re)inspections.

[4] Plaintiffs cite to Stoiber v. Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 913 for the proposition that California law imposes a non-delegable duty on landlords to maintain rental properties in a habitable condition. (Opp. p. 5-7.) However, as noted in reply, Stoiber provides no such holding. (Reply p. 3:26-28.)

[5] To the extent in opposition Plaintiffs maintain that “Plaintiffs did not admit there were no habitability issues at the time of move-in,” not so. The complaint states that throughout their tenancy, habitability issues have persisted and that in fact, as to bed bugs, was noticed “[s]ince the INCEPTION of their tenancy.” (¶25, capitalization added.) Thus, the court takes Plaintiffs’ statement in opposition as inherent concession that the complaint is unclear as to when and what habitability issues arose.

[6] Defendants cite to multiple other superior court cases. (See e.g., Demurrer p. 25 citing Roehi v. Allgeyer, 2024 LEXIS 36475, *48-49 (Los Angeles Super. Feb. 23, 2024); see also Motion to Strike p. 9 citing to Kimberle Marie v. Pinto, 2023 LEXIS 49351, *6 (Los Angeles Super. Jul. 20, 2023) and Bingham v. Cent. Valley Specialty Hosp., 2022 LEXIS 71809, *5 (Sacramento Super. Oct. 27, 2022.)