Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 24PSCV03750, Date: 2025-05-07 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 24PSCV03750 Hearing Date: May 7, 2025 Dept: O
Tentative
Ruling
PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT is DENIED due to both
unjustifiable delay and prejudice to Defendant; the court requests Defendant
file a proposed order.
Background
This is a lemon law case.
On November 1, 2024, Plaintiff Sade
Griffith filed this action for SBA violations against Defendant General Motors,
LLC.
On December 5, 2024, Defendnant filed its
answer.
On February 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed the
instant motion.
On April 24, 2025, Defendant filed an
opposition.
To date, as of Monday, 5/5/25, no reply
has been received, which is due 5 court days before the hearing.
Legal
Standard
The
court may, in furtherance of justice and on any proper terms, allow a party to
amend any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd. (a)(1); Branick v. Downey Savings & Loan Association (2006) 39 Cal.4th
235, 242.) The court may also, in its discretion and after notice to the
adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any
pleading or proceeding in other particulars. (Code Civ. Proc., § 473, subd.
(a); Branick, supra, 39 Cal.4th at
242.) The court may deny the plaintiff’s leave to amend if there is prejudice to
the opposing party, such as delay in trial, loss of critical evidence, or added
costs of preparation. (Id.) Leave to
amend is also properly denied where the proposed amendment is not actionable
under substantive law. (Opp. p. 5, citing to Tyco Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 148.)
Under
California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324, a motion to amend a pleading before
trial must (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading,
which must be serially numbered to differentiate it from previous pleadings or
amendments; (2) state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to
be deleted, if any, and where, by page, paragraph and line number, the deleted
allegations are located; and (3) state what allegations are proposed to be
added to the previous pleading, if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line
number, the additional allegations are located. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1324(a).) A separate supporting declaration specifying (1) the effect of the
amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to
the amended allegations were discovered; AND
(4) the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier must
accompany the motion. (Id., rule 3.1324(b).
Discussion
The
motion is brief. Plaintiff argues that in light of the recent legal
development, Plaintiff believes there are valid grounds to amend the complaint.
As a result, Plaintiff intends to replace the claim under the Song-Beverly
Consumer Warranty Act with a cause of action under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act. The declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel is equally devoid of a meaningful
reason to satisfy the requirements above. As noted in opposition, the motion is
likely made as a result of Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th
189. In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court held that “a motor vehicle
purchased with an unexpired manufacturer’s new car warranty does not qualify as
a ‘motor vehicle sold with a manufacturer’s new car warranty’ under
[Song-Beverly]’s definition of ‘new motor vehicle’ unless the new car warranty
was issued with the sale.” (17 Cal.5th at 196 (citing Cal. Civ. Code §
1793.22(e)(2))). As a result of Rodriguez, Plaintiff’s Song Beverly
claims—which relate to the purchase of a used vehicle in a transaction in which
GM did not extend a new car warranty—are no longer viable.
However,
as noted in opposition, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend to replace the Song-Beverly
claims with an entirely
new claim that he could have asserted from the outset but chose not to. In
fact, as noted in opposition, at the time this lawsuit was filed, the Court of
Appeal had already held that Song-Beverly does not apply to vehicles that are
purchased used with only the balance of the original new car warranty
remaining. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209,
225). And, at the time this lawsuit was
filed, the California Supreme Court had already granted review of the Court of
Appeal’s decision in Rodriguez. (See Rodriguez v. FCA US, 512 P.3d 654,
295 Cal.Rptr.3d 351 (Cal. 2022)). Despite being on notice of these decisions, however, Plaintiff chose
to pursue only Song-Beverly claims against GM. Where, as here, the
Plaintiff was aware of the facts relevant to the proposed amendment and waited
without justification to assert them, leave to amend is appropriately denied.
(See e.g., Opp. p. 4, citing Record v. Reason (1993) 73 Cal. App. 4th
472, 486 (leave to amend was properly denied where the plaintiffs “had
knowledge of the circumstances on which they based the amended complaint …
almost three years before they sought leave to amend”); see also Roemer v.
Retail Credit Co. (1975) 44 Cal. App. 3d 926, 940 (affirming denial of
leave to amend and noting that a “long delay in offering the amendment after
knowledge of the [relevant] facts could very reasonably be construed by the
court to constitute a lack of due diligence”)).
Aside from the
element of unjustifiable delay, allowing Plaintiff to add this cause of action
at this stage would “open[ ] up an entirely new field of inquiry without any
satisfactory explanation as to why this major change in point of attack had not
been made” at an earlier stage, when Plaintiff first became aware of the facts
and allegations supporting this additional cause of action. (Opp. p. 6, citing
Estate of Murphy v. Gulf Ins. Co. (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 304, 311).
No reply has been filed to address Defendant’s argument
and authority.
Conclusion
Based on the
foregoing, considering the unjustifiable delay and the unfair prejudice,
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is denied.