Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 25PSCV00376, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25PSCV00376    Hearing Date: May 12, 2025    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE PRAYER FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES FROM PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT is DENIED. 

Background

This case arises from an automobile versus automobile collision that occurred on February 23, 2024. On February 4, 2025, Plaintiffs YUAN WANG and EVANGELINE CHEN filed a complaint against Defendants DAVID YOSHI and DOES 1-20, alleging causes of action for: (1) motor vehicle; (2) general negligence; and (3) intentional tort. The complaint is set forth on a Judicial Council of California PLD-PI-001 form.

Defendant was personally served with the summons and complaint on February 6, 2025. (2/10/25 Proof of Service of Summons.) 

On March 19, 2025, Defendant filed and served the instant motion to strike.   

On March 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed and served an opposition to the motion to strike.   

As of May 7, 2025, no reply brief has been filed. Any reply brief was required to have been filed and served at least five court days prior to the hearing. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).)

Legal Standard

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b)(1).) A court may “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).) A court may “[s]trike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (b).)

In order to state a prima facie claim for punitive damages, a complaint must set forth the elements as stated in the general punitive damage statute, Civil Code section 3294. (College Hospital, Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 721.) These statutory elements include allegations that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice.¿(Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).)¿¿¿

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.” (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) California Civil Code, Section 3294 authorizes punitive damages upon a showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. Malice is defined as either “conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff,” or “despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “Despicable conduct is conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Mock v. Michigan Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal. App. 4th 306, 331.) California Civil Code, Section 3294(c)(2) defines oppression as “despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” Fraud under California Civil Code, Section 3294(c)(3) “means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” Specific facts must be pled in support of punitive damages. (Hillard v. A.H. Robins Co. (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 374, 391-392.)  

Discussion

Defendant moves to strike Plaintiffs’ third cause of action for intentional tort from the complaint and moves to strike Plaintiffs’ prayer for punitive damages from the complaint. In support of its motion, Defendant contends that: (1) the third cause of action for intentional tort does not allege facts showing that Defendant acted intentionally or with a willful disregard of Plaintiffs’ rights; and (2) the complaint contains only conclusory allegations without sufficient facts to support oppression, fraud, or malice.

In opposition, Plaintiffs aver that the motion to strike is untimely and should be denied.

A summons directed to a defendant “shall contain . . . [a] direction that the defendant file with the court a written pleading in response to the complaint within 30 days after summons is served on him or her.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 412.20, subd. (a)(3).)

Here, the court finds that the motion is untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of service of the summons and complaint. Defendant was served with the summons and complaint on February 6, 2025; however, the instant motion to strike was not filed until March 19, 2025. Thus, the instant motion was filed more than 30 days after service of the summons and the complaint. There is no indication from the court file or Defendant’s moving papers that any extensions of time were granted for Defendant to file a responsive pleading. Defendant therefore has not complied with CCP § 412.20(a)(3).

Moreover, Defendant did not file a reply brief. “Contentions are waived when a party fails to support them with reasoned argument and citations to authority.” (Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215.) Thus, the failure of Defendant to provide any rebuttal argument to Plaintiffs’ contention raised in the opposition is deemed a concession to such argument.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion to strike is denied.