Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 25PSCV00590, Date: 2025-05-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 25PSCV00590 Hearing Date: May 28, 2025 Dept: O
Tentative Ruling
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF AND
ANTI- SLAPP SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
A PORTION OF PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT, PURSUANT TO CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 425.16 is GRANTED. A proposed order
has been filed. (A motion for attorney fees will later be filed.)
Background
This is a defamation case. Plaintiff Juan
Pablo
Ochoa alleges that Defendants Raymond
Zakari DBA Liddle & Liddle A Professional Corporation defamed him and
placed him in false light on their fraudulent written 3 day notice.
On
February 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit.
On
March 14, 2025, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint (FAC).
On
April 18, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motion.
Legal Standard
“A SLAPP suit is a meritless
lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant's exercise of First Amendment
rights.’” (Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. Kabateck (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th
416, 426.) To protective the valid exercise of free speech, the Legislature
enacted the anti-SLAPP statute. (Ibid.) “The statute authorizes a
special motion to strike a cause of action arising from the defendant's
exercise of his or her constitutional right of petition or free speech, unless
the plaintiff establishes a probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Ibid.)
“The
procedure made available to defendants by the anti-SLAPP statute has a
distinctive two-part structure. [Citations.] A court may strike a cause of
action only if the cause of action (1) ARISES FROM an act in furtherance
of the right of petition or free speech ‘in connection with a public issue,’
and (2) the plaintiff has not established ‘a probability’ of prevailing on the
claim. [Citation]. [Citation].” (Yang v. Tenent (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
939, 945-46, emphasis added and capitalization added.)
The
first step involves a defendant’s burden. The defendant “satisfies the first
step of the analysis by demonstrating that the ‘conduct by which plaintiff
claims to have been injured falls within one of the four categories described
in subdivision (e) of section 425.16]’ [citation], and that the plaintiff's
claims in fact arise from that conduct [citation].” [Citation].” (Id. at
p. 946.)
Upon
a successful showing of the first step, the burden shifts to the plaintiff. (Ibid.)
The plaintiff’s burden is “to demonstrate the merit of the claim by
establishing a probability of success . . . The court's inquiry at this second
step is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim
and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment.” [Citation]. (Ibid.) In making the determination in the second step,
trial court considers “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.” (Equilon
Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
Discussion[1]
The entire subject of Plaintiff's FAC is directed at Defendant's
pursuit of its client's right to serve and file an Unlawful Detainer action.
California law provides that the service of the Notice is part
and parcel of the protected activity of pursuing an Unlawful Detainer
action. As provided in the motion, “[a]n unlawful detainer
action and service of notices legally required to file an unlawful detainer
action are protected activity within the meaning of section 425.16.” (Motion p.
8, quoting Newport Harbor Offices & Marina, LLC v. Morris
Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 28, 45 (Newport
Harbor.) (The court in Newport Harbor also discussed how the "Litigation
Privilege" of Civil Code, section 47(b) provides an additional
near-absolute immunity from liability arising from communication made in
connection with a judicial proceeding.)
Thus, Defendants have satisfied their burden that
their conduct—in filing UD lawsuit—is protected and the entirety of
Plaintiff’s FAC in fact arise from that conduct.
The burden now shifts to Plaintiff to
demonstrate a likelihood of prevailing on the merits. However, no opposition
has been filed.
Therefore, the motion is granted.
[1] According
to Defendants, the FAC erroneously names Mr. Zakari as a "dba"
for Liddle &Liddle. The
Notice to Quit against which Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint is solely
directed was signed by LIDDLE & LIDDLE, APC, with Raymond Zakari, Esq.
signing in his capacity as attorney in that firm. Indeed, it appears that
Liddle & Liddle’s client/the landlord was/is Maria De Lourdes
Luna Bautista, not Raymond Zakari himself.