Judge: Christian R. Gullon, Case: 25PSCV00648, Date: 2025-04-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 25PSCV00648    Hearing Date: April 2, 2025    Dept: O

Tentative Ruling

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF MOTION vs. AND MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE: PRELIMINARY FCI LENDER SERVICES INC.; INJUNCTION is TBD as no POS filed/alternatively, DENIED.

Background

This case arises from a foreclosure. Plaintiff JOSE ALFREDO RUIZ alleges the following against Defendant FCI LENDER SERVICES INC.; WILMINGTON SAVINGS FUND SOCIETY, FSB, AS OWNER TRUSTEE OF THE RESIDENTIAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITIES TRUST VIII-C; CALIFORNIA TD SPECIALISTS; MEIYU CHEN: Plaintiff’s sister, Raquel Ruiz, was the rightful owner of the subject property; however, Ruiz fell behind on payments. In July 2024, Defendant California TD Specialist recorded a Notice of Default ("NOD") on behalf of Defendants Wilmington Savings Fund Society and FCI Lender Services. On October 17, 2024, Defendant California TD Specialist recorded a Notice of Trustee's Sale ("NTS") on behalf of Defendants Wilmington Savings Fund Society and FCI Lender Services; The trustee's sale was scheduled for November 12, 2024. On November 12, 2024, Raquel Ruiz filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition at 10:48 a.m, but the sale happened four minutes earlier and the property was purchased by Chen. According to Plaintiff, “[g]iven that the subject property was sold at foreclosure at 10:44 a.m. on November 12, 2024, just four minutes before the filing of the Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, the trustee's sale conducted on that date is invalid and should be deemed void and of no legal effect.” (Verified Complaint ¶20.) After Ruiz passed away, “Plaintiff discovered that Mrs. Raquel Ruiz had executed documents indicating that, prior to her death, she had transferred the title to the property from herself to Plaintiff, Jose Alfredo Ruiz.” Therefore, Plaintiff claims legal ownership of the subject property based on a valid transfer of title. Plaintiff hereby seeks an order to cancel the trustee's sale, invalidate the trustee's deed upon sale, and quiet title as against Defendants.

On February 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit asserting the following causes of action (COAs):

1.     Quiet Title

2.     Wrongful Foreclosure

3.     Cancellation of Trustee Deed Upon Sale

4.     Declaratory Relief

On March 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate this case and the UD action, 25WCUD00084.[1] That same day, on March 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion. That same day, Plaintiff also filed a notice of related case and a notice of lis pendens.

Legal Standard

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending final resolution upon a trial. (See Scaringe v. J.C.C. Enterprises, Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1536.) The status quo has been defined to mean the last actual peaceable, uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy. (14859 Moorpark Homeowner’s Assn. v. VRT Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1396. 1402.) The burden of proof is on the plaintiff as moving party. (O’Connell v. Superior Court (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1452, 1481.) A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must show the absence of an adequate damages remedy at law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(4); Thayer Plymouth Center, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 300, 307.)

The trial court considers two factors in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) the likelihood the plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its case at trial, and (2) the interim harm the plaintiff is likely to sustain if the injunction is denied as compared to the harm the defendant is likely to suffer if the court grants a preliminary injunction. (Code Civ. Proc. § 526(a); Husain v. McDonald’s Corp. (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 860, 866-67.) The balancing of harm between the parties “involves consideration of such things as the inadequacy of other remedies, the degree of irreparable harm, and the necessity of preserving the status quo.” (Husain, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at 867.) Thus, a preliminary injunction may not issue without some showing of potential entitlement to such relief. (Doe v. Wilson (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 296, 304.) The decision to grant a preliminary injunction generally lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. (Thornton v. Carlson (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1255.)

A preliminary injunction ordinarily cannot take effect unless and until the plaintiff provides an undertaking for damages which the enjoined defendant may sustain by reason of the injunction if the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction. (See Code Civ. Proc. § 529(a); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1150(f); City of South San Francisco v. Cypress Lawn Cemetery Assn. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 916, 920.)

Discussion

“Plaintiff seeks to invalidate the trustee's sale, cancel the trustee's deed upon sale, and quiet title to the property in his name, as he is the rightful owner based on the transfer of title from his deceased sister.” (Motion p. 3:1-3.)

Here, the motion is denied as Plaintiff has set forth no analysis or authority to support his contention. Though Plaintiff is representing himself, pro per litigants are held to the same standards as attorneys. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543.) And part of an attorney’s duty to the court is to provide briefs supported by authority and a cogent analysis or otherwise the arguments are deemed forfeited. (See City of Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287; Brown v. Garcia (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1198, 1207.)

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the motion is TBD/denied.