Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 18STCV07282, Date: 2024-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18STCV07282    Hearing Date: October 17, 2024    Dept: 76

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has breached the payment obligation of a promissory note.

Defendant filed a Cross-Complaint alleging that Plaintiff owes Defendant 50% of all amounts collected on a Deed of Trust given in favor of both Defendant and Plaintiff.

Following a court trial, judgment was entered on July 10, 2024 in favor of Plaintiff in the principal amount of $313,000.00. 

Plaintiff seeks an award of prejudgment interest.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Josef Mamaliger’s motion for prejudgment interest is DENIED as untimely. 

Motion For Prejudgment Interest

Following a court trial, judgment was entered on July 10, 2024 in favor of Plaintiff in the principal amount of $313,000.00. Plaintiff seeks an award of prejudgment interest.

            On June 11, 2024, the Court issued a Tentative Decision and Proposed Statement of Decision whereby the Court made various findings. Among those findings, the Court found that the terms of the Promissory Note create a usurious transaction which imposes interest upon interest. (Statement of Decision, Page 13.) Accordingly, the Court found that the $25,200 in annual interest could not be recovered by Plaintiff. (Id.)

In Steiny, the court concluded that the award of interest after entry of the judgment was proper where the complaint requested prejudgment interest and the parties stipulated that request for interest would be adjudicated in a postjudgment hearing. (Steiny, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 294.) In Rogers, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th 824, the court stated that, at the latest, a request for prejudgment interest could be pursued as part of a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 657, subdivision 5, on the ground of “‘inadequate damages.’” (Rogers, supra, at p. 830.) The court stated such a motion would be timely if made within the “time limits for a motion for new trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 659).” (Ibid.)

In the present case, there is no dispute that Watson's request for prejudgment interest was made less than 15 days after the judgment was filed. As such, the request was made within the statutory time limit for motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. (Code Civ. Proc., § 659, subd. (a)(2).) Consequently, we conclude Watson's request for prejudgment interest was timely.

(Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279, 298.)

            Here, notice of entry of judgment was served by the clerk on July 10, 2024 by mail. The instant motion was served and filed on July 29, 2024. Civ. Proc. Code, § 1013, which extends by 5 calendar days the time for exercising a right or doing an act where service is by mail, does not apply to the 15 day period in which a service of notice of intention to move for a new trial must be served and filed. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 659(b).

            The fact that Plaintiff decided to file a notice of entry of judgment does not extend Plaintiff’s time to bring a motion for new trial (and thus this motion), because the 15-day period begins to run at the earlier date of the mailing of notice of entry of judgment by the clerk of the court. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 659(a)(2).)

            As such, because this motion was served and filed 19 days after the clerk mailed the notice of entry of judgment, this motion is untimely and is thus DENIED.