Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 19STCV34066, Date: 2023-09-13 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 19STCV34066 Hearing Date: September 13, 2023 Dept: 76
Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. Counsel must contact the staff in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the tentative, or to argue the matter. As required by Rule 3.1308(a), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and argue.
Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.
Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention
to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final
ruling.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant (the live-in girlfriend of Plaintiff’s late father, Eugene) fraudulently transferred title to two real properties from Plaintiff’s name to Defendant’s name, pursuant to a Power of Attorney Plaintiff had given to her father to refinance a loan.Defendant Ludmilla Haikin filed a Cross-Complaint alleging that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant knowingly consented to the transfer of the subject property to Defendant/Cross-Complainant in her individual name, and Cross-Complainant added Cross-Defendant back on title. Cross-Complainant alleges that she took a loan out on the property for which she was the only responsible borrower. Later, Cross-Defendant allegedly agreed that the property only be in Cross-Complainant’s name. However, after Eugene passed away Cross-Defendant claimed for the first time that the property was hers.
Defendant Ludmilla Haikin filed a Cross-Complaint alleging that Plaintiff/Cross-Defendant knowingly consented to the transfer of the subject property to Defendant/Cross-Complainant in her individual name, and Cross-Complainant added Cross-Defendant back on title. Cross-Complainant alleges that she took a loan out on the property for which she was the only responsible borrower. Later, Cross-Defendant allegedly agreed that the property only be in Cross-Complainant’s name. However, after Eugene passed away Cross-Defendant claimed for the first time that the property was hers.
The Court granted Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ludmila Haikin, an individual, individually and as Trustee of the Haikin Family Trust’s motion for summary judgment as to the Second Amended Complaint.
The Court subsequently granted Plaintiff’s motion for new trial in part. Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ludmila Haikin brings a motion to bifurcate and sever this action and to try equitable claims and special defenses first without a jury, and to bifurcate the Cross-Complaint.
TENTATIVE RULING
Defendant Ludmila Haikin, an individual, individually and as Trustee of the Haikin Family Trust motion to bifurcate and sever is DENIED in its entirety.
ANALYSIS
Motion To Bifurcate and Sever This Action
Defendant/Cross-Complainant Ludmila Haikin brings a motion to bifurcate and sever this action and to try equitable claims and special defenses first without a jury, and to bifurcate the Cross-Complaint.
Moving party argues: This motion is made on the grounds that good cause exists to sever or bifurcate the Equitable Claims, the Special Defenses and the Cross-Complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §§1048, 591 and 592. The 3AC sets forth alleged title claims to Haikin's home (the "Subject Property") and pleads an alleged cause of action for quiet title as a second cause of action, as well as a declaratory relief cause of action as the third cause of action, and a cancellation of written instrument as the first cause of action all of which will likely be dispositive of this entire action (the "Equitable Claims") and should be tried first in a Court Trial. Quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of written instrument are equitable causes of action that do not require a jury. If Haikin prevails on the Equitable Claims, this entire action will be resolved in her favor and there will likely be no reason to proceed to a jury trial on any issues. Haikin estimates that the Equitable Claims could be resolved as a 3-5 day Court Trial.
The only other cause of action in the Complaint is a damage claim for Slander of Title (the "Slander of Title Claim") that will only apply if Plaintiff Anat Krichmar prevails on her alleged Equitable Claims for title to half of the Subject Property. The permissive Cross-Complaint also involves contingent damage claims against Plaintiff that also only apply if Plaintiff prevails on her Equitable Claims and/or the Special Defenses of statute of limitations and laches.
The argument raised here is that the Slander of Title Claim and the Cross-Complaint should be severed from the main Complaint and tried separately, after the conclusion of the Court Trial on Plaintiff s equitable claims, to further the interests of justice, convenience, and economy, and to avoid the confusion of issues and prejudice to the Parties.
Civ. Proc. Code, § 598 provides:
The court may, when the convenience of witnesses, the ends of justice, or the
economy and efficiency of handling the litigation would be promoted thereby, on
motion of a party, after notice and hearing, make an order, no later than the close of pretrial conference
in cases in which such pretrial conference is to be held, or, in other cases,
no later than 30 days before the trial date, that the trial of any issue or any
part thereof shall precede the trial of any other issue or any part thereof in
the case, except for special defenses which may be tried first pursuant to
Sections 597 and 597.5. The court, on its own motion, may make such an order at
any time. . . .
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 598.)
Civ. Proc. Code, § 1048 provides:
(a) When actions involving
a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a
joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it
may order all the actions consolidated and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
(b) The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or
when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a
separate trial of any cause of action, including a cause of action asserted in
a cross-complaint, or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of
action or issues, preserving the right of trial by jury required by the Constitution
or a statute of this state or of the United States.
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 1048.)
The trial court had ample authority to
make this discretionary decision. Aside from the language in Code of Civil Procedure
section 598, which concerns pretrial motions, Evidence Code section 320
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, the court in its
discretion shall regulate the order of proof." Similarly, Code of Civil
Procedure section 1048, subdivision (b) states that a trial court, "in
furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will
be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any cause
of action . . . or of any separate issue or of any number of causes of action
or issues . . . ." Under these provisions, trial courts have broad
discretion to determine the order of proof in the interests of judicial economy. (
Buran Equipment Co. v. H & C Investment Co. (1983) 142 Cal. App. 3d 338,
343-344 [190 Cal. Rptr. 878].)
(Grappo v. Coventry Fin. Corp. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 496, 503.)
A jury must hear the statute of limitations question. “[T]he running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily a question of fact upon which a plaintiff has the right to a jury.” (Amtower v. Photon Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1593.)
The running of the statute of limitations is inextricably tied to the chronology of this case, and the merits of the case depend upon the chronology of events. Similarly, the issues presented in the Cross-Complaint rely upon the same set of facts as the Complaint.
Moving party has not demonstrated that the requested bifurcation and severance will further convenience or avoid prejudice, serve the ends of justice, be conducive to expedition, efficiency and economy. (Civ. Proc. Code, §§ 598, 1048.) Rather, it seems that presenting all evidence at once to a single jury, especially for the statute of limitations issue, at the same time that the Court hears the evidence for purposes of the equitable claims is the most efficient.
As such, the
motion to bifurcate and sever is DENIED in its entirety.