Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 20STCV31763, Date: 2023-08-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV31763    Hearing Date: August 9, 2023    Dept: 76

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein.  Counsel must contact the staff in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the tentative, or to argue the matter.  As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(2), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and argue.

Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final ruling.

            Plaintiff alleges that he was injured on the job, was not provided reasonable accommodation for his disabilities, and was terminated for filing Workers’ Compensation cases. Plaintiff also alleges wage and hour violations.

Plaintiff brings a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents (set one), propounded upon Defendant Sunland Mobile, Inc.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Iquique Vargas, Jr.’s motion to compel further responses, and request for sanctions, is DENIED in its entirety.

ANALYSIS

Motion To Compel Further Responses To Requests For Production of Documents

Plaintiff brings a motion to compel further responses to requests for production of documents (set one), propounded upon Defendant Sunland Mobile, Inc.

(a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.

(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with each of the following:

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(3) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.

(c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on or before any specific later date to which the demanding party and the responding party have agreed in writing, the demanding party waives any right to compel a further response to the demand.

.  . .

(i) Except as provided in subdivision (j), if a party fails to obey an order compelling further response, the court may make those orders that are just, including the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of, or in addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).

.  .  .

     (Civ. Proc. Code § 2031.310.)

            On March 2, 2022, Sunland provided its supplemental responses to requests for production. (Mohrsaz Decl., ¶ 8; Exh. D.) The motion was filed and served on December 6, 2022. Plaintiff only provides evidence that the parties agreed that the motion to compel deadline would be extended to December 31, 2022. (Mohrsaz Decl., ¶ 51; Exh. F.)

            The Mohrsaz Declaration reflects that Plaintiff’s counsel engaged in sufficient meet and confer efforts.

However, in the separate statement, Plaintiff has not made a fact-specific showing of good cause for each category of documents requested, as required by Civ. Proc. Code, § 2031.310(b)(1).) 

“Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless.” (Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223 [61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 567].) Discovery devices must “be used as tools to facilitate litigation rather than as weapons to wage litigation.” (Id. at p. 221.) A party seeking to compel discovery must therefore “set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought.” (§ 2031.310, subd. (b)(1); see Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.)  To establish good cause, a discovery proponent must identify a disputed fact that is of consequence in the action and explain how the discovery sought will tend in reason to prove or disprove that fact or lead to other evidence that will tend to prove or disprove the fact.

(Digital Music News LLC v. Superior Court (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 216, 224 (bold emphasis and underlining added), overruled on other grounds in Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, n. 8.)

Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. . . .  [Former] Section 2031, subdivision (l), which applies to document production requests served on a party, requires a  [*224]  party seeking to compel such production to "set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand . . . ." (Italics in original.) . . .

In law and motion practice, factual evidence is supplied to the court by way of declarations. Thiem provided argument but no evidence at all to permit the court to conclude the material sought was "admissible in evidence or appear[ed] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."  The only justification for the request is contained in Thiem's "Statement Pursuant to Rule 335(a)" and in a document entitled "Combined Opposition to Calcor Space Facility, Inc.'s  Motion for Protective Order and Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Compel Calcor Space Facility, Inc.  to Comply with Deposition Subpoena for Production of Business Documents." Neither document is verified, and thus they do not constitute evidence.

Even were we to ignore that the statements purporting to justify an order compelling Calcor to produce its documents and other materials are unverified, they still fail. There is an absence of specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to be produced; the justifications offered for the production are mere generalities. The very vice of the subpoena's promiscuity is well illustrated by Thiem's inability to provide focused, fact-specific justifications for its demands. The noted generality of the subpoena's definitions, instructions and categories which merely add up to a demand Calcor produce everything in its possession having anything to do with gun mounts, precludes Thiem from demonstrating any particular item or category in fact constitutes or contains matter which "is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (§ 2017, subd. (a).) The purported justification for imposing this great burden on Calcor necessarily suffers from the same generality as the subpoena itself.

Although appellate courts have frequently stated "fishing expeditions" are permissible in discovery, there is a limit. As noted in Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1539 [39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896], "These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery ( Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790), and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases." (Id. at p. 1546.) However, early in the development of our discovery law our Supreme Court recognized the limits on such "fishing expeditions." In  [*225] Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355 [15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266], the seminal case in California civil discovery, the court gave examples of improper "fishing" WHICH CLEARLY APPLY HERE: "The method of 'fishing' may be, in a particular case, entirely improper (i.e., insufficient identification of the requested information to acquaint the other party with the nature of information desired, attempt to place the burden and cost of supplying information equally available to both solely upon the adversary, placing more burden upon the adversary than the value of the information warrants, etc.). Such improper methods of 'fishing' may be (and should be) controlled by the trial court under the powers granted to it by the statute." ( Id. at pp. 384-385.) . . .

(Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-25 [bold emphasis and underlining added].) 

            Accordingly, the motion to compel further responses, and request for sanctions, is DENIED in its entirety.