Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 20STCV47977, Date: 2023-03-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV47977 Hearing Date: March 23, 2023 Dept: 76
Pursuant to California Rule of Court
3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed
herein. As required by Rule 3.1308(a)(2), any party seeking oral argument
must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to
appear and argue. Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to
smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776. If notice of
intention to appear is not given and the parties do not appear, the Court will
adopt the tentative ruling as the final ruling.
Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to sex and disability harassment and discrimination, forcing Plaintiff to take a medical leave, and was further harassed upon her return.
Defendant Rogelio Navarete filed a Cross-Complaint alleging that Plaintiff’s allegations have caused him emotional distress
The Court granted Cross-Defendant Sandra Goumghar’s anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Cross-Complaint filed by Defendant Rogelio Navarete. Goumghar now seeks to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to CCP § 425.16.
TENTATIVE RULING
Cross-Defendant Sandra Goumghar’s motion for attorney’s fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $7,800.
ANALYSIS
Motion For Attorneys’ Fees (CCP § 425.16(c)(1)).
Discussion
The Court granted Cross-Defendant Sandra Goumghar’s anti-SLAPP special motion to strike as to the Cross-Complaint filed by Defendant Rogelio Navarete. Goumghar now seeks to recover attorney’s fees pursuant to CCP § 425.16 in the amount of $8,775.00 with a 1.5 multiplier for a total fee award of $13,162.50.
A defendant prevailing on a special motion to strike is only entitled to recover fees and costs in connection with the motion, not the entire action. (City of Industry v. City of Fillmore (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 218 [bold emphasis and underlining added].) In determining the fee award pursuant to section 425.16, the court may utilize the lodestar method addressed in Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25. (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92-93 [bold emphasis added].) Fees incurred in litigating motions for attorney’s fees are properly awarded pursuant to CCP § 425.16 (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1141), as are attorney’s fees incurred on appeal by a prevailing defendant (Wanland v. Law Offices of Mastagni, Holstedt & Chiurazzi (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 15, 1-22.)
A defendant prevailing on a special
motion to strike is entitled to recover its attorney fees and costs. (§ 425.16,
subd. (c)(1); Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [104 Cal. Rptr. 2d
377, 17 P.3d 735].) The defendant can
recover only its fees and costs in connection with the motion, not
the entire action. (Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 75, 92
[101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 303]; Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165
Cal.App.4th 1315, 1320 [81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 866].)
(City of Industry v. City of Fillmore
(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 191, 218 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)
In awarding fees the trial court is not
constrained by the amount sought by the successful moving parties (Robertson v.
Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 361 [42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464]), but is obligated
to award “reasonable attorney fees under section 425.16 [that] adequately
compensate[] them for the expense of responding to a baseless lawsuit.” (Id. at
p. 362; accord, Dove Audio, Inc. v. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman (1996) 47
Cal.App.4th 777, 785 [54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 830].) The fees awarded should include services for all proceedings, including
discovery initiated by the opposing party pursuant to section 425.16,
subdivision (g), directly related to the special motion to strike.
( [*93] Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego Unified
Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1248 [132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 57] [affirming
award of attorney fees including fees incurred in opposing discovery request
and motion for reconsideration]; American Humane Assn. v. Los Angeles Times
Communications (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1104 [112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 488]
[documentation for attorney fee motion should include ?the total cost of the
special motion to strike and any related discovery permitted by the court”];
see Wilkerson v. Sullivan (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 443, 446 [121 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275] [“statute is broadly construed so as to effectuate the legislative purpose
of reimbursing the prevailing defendant for expenses incurred in extricating
herself from a baseless lawsuit”].)
In determining the fee award pursuant to
section 425.16, the court may utilize the lodestar method addressed in Serrano
v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25 [141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303] and in
appropriate cases may include a fee enhancement for the purpose of compensating
the attorney for contingent risk, exceptional skill or other factors. (Ketchum
v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 1136, 1138.)
(Jackson v. Yarbray (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 75, 92-93 [bold emphasis added].)
The determination of reasonable amount of attorney fees is within the sound discretion of trial courts. (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095; Akins v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. (2000) 79 Cal. App. 4th 1127, 1134.) “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally ‘begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate….’” “[T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee award….” (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.) In setting the hourly rate for an attorney fees award, courts are entitled to consider the rate of “‘fees customarily charged by that attorney and others in the community for similar work.’" (Bihun v. AT&T Information Systems, Inc. (1993) 13 Cal. App. 4th 976, 997 [affirming rate of $450 per hour], overruled on other grounds by Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus. (1993) 6 Cal. 4th 644, 664.) The burden is on the party seeking attorney fees to prove reasonableness of the fees. (Center for Biological Diversity v. County of San Bernardino (2010) 188 Cal. App. 4th 603, 615.)
The Court has broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee award which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal. App. 4th 1379, 1393-94.) The Court need not explain its calculation of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Industries Inc. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-75.)
The Court finds the hourly rate of $650 to be reasonable. (Declaration of Randal Oakley, ¶ 11.) However, counsel who bill at such a rate should not have to conduct extensive research on established anti-SLAPP law.
The Court has considered the summary of work set forth in the Declaration of Randal Oakley at ¶¶ 4 – 8. The Court finds that the reasonable number of hours spent by counsel is 12 hours. As such, the lodestar amount is $7,800. The Court does not find that application of a lodestar multiplier is justified and declines to apply one.
As such, the motion for attorney’s
fees is GRANTED in the reduced amount of $7,800.