Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case Number: 21STCV08032, Date: 2023-12-05 Tentative Ruling

Pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1), the Court does not desire oral argument on the motion addressed herein. Counsel must contact the staff in Department 76 to inform the Court whether they wish to submit on the tentative, or to argue the matter. As required by Rule 3.1308(a), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 of their intent to appear and argue.

Notice to Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically at 213-830-0776.

Per Rule of Court 3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, the Court may adopt the tentative ruling as the final ruling.

Plaintiffs allege wage and hour violations and that they were paid less than their male counterparts and retaliated against for complaining about this inequality.

Plaintiff Brooke Stone brings a motion to quash subpoena for records from third party Soapbox Films, LLC. Plaintiff Jackie Stone moves to quash subpoena for records from third party Lucasfilm Ltd., LLC.

Plaintiff Brooke Stone’s motion to quash the subpoena for her employment records from third party Soapbox Films, LLC, is GRANTED in its entirety. No sanctions were requested.

Plaintiff Jackie Stone’s motion to quash the subpoena for her employment records from third party Lucasfilm, Ltd., LLC is GRANTED in its entirety. No sanctions were requested.

Plaintiff Brooke Stone brings a motion to quash subpoena for Plaintiff’s employment records from third party Soapbox Films, LLC, her current employer, or to narrow the scope of the subpoena.

(a) If a subpoena requires the attendance of a witness or the production of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things before a court, or at the trial of an issue therein, or at the taking of a deposition, the court, upon motion reasonably made by any person described in subdivision (b), or upon the court’s own motion after giving counsel notice and an opportunity to be heard, may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective orders. In addition, the court may make any other order as may be appropriate to protect the person from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of the right of privacy of the person.

However, case law has imposed the “good cause” requirement for subpoena document requests propounded upon non-parties, that is, the propounding party must articulate specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to justify production. (Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 219, 223-25.)

In the course of the litigation, Thiem served a subpoena under section 2020 on Calcor's custodian of records demanding Calcor, a nonparty and Thiem's competitor, to, in effect, produce all materials in its possession relating to gun mounts, going back nearly 10 years. The subpoena fails to identify any specific document but merely describes broad categories of documents and other materials.

(Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 219 [bold emphasis added].)

Although the scope of civil discovery is broad, it is not limitless. . . . [Former] Section 2031, subdivision (l), which applies to document production requests served on a party, requires a [*224] party seeking to compel such production to "set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the inspection demand . . . ." (Italics in original.) Section 2020, the statute at issue, contains no such specific requirement. However, since both sections are part of a single statutory scheme, and since it is unlikely the Legislature intended to place greater burdens on a nonparty than on a party to the litigation, we read a similar requirement into the latter section.

(Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 223-24 [bold emphasis added].)

Even were we to ignore that the statements purporting to justify an order compelling Calcor to produce its documents and other materials are unverified, they still fail. There is an absence of specific facts relating to each category of materials sought to be produced; the justifications offered for the production are mere generalities. The very vice of the subpoena's promiscuity is well illustrated by Thiem's inability to provide focused, fact-specific justifications for its demands. The noted generality of the subpoena's definitions, instructions and categories which merely add up to a demand Calcor produce everything in its possession having anything to do with gun mounts, precludes Thiem from demonstrating any particular item or category in fact constitutes or contains matter which "is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." (§ 2017, subd. (a).) The purported justification for imposing this great burden on Calcor necessarily suffers from the same generality as the subpoena itself.

Although appellate courts have frequently stated "fishing expeditions" are permissible in discovery, there is a limit. As noted in Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal. App. 4th 1539 [39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 896], "These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery ( Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal. 3d 785, 790), and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases." (Id. at p. 1546.) However, early in the development of our discovery law our Supreme Court recognized the limits on such "fishing expeditions." In [*225] Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court (1961) 56 Cal. 2d 355 [15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266], the seminal case in California civil discovery, the court gave examples of improper "fishing" WHICH CLEARLY APPLY HERE: "The method of 'fishing' may be, in a particular case, entirely improper (i.e., insufficient identification of the requested information to acquaint the other party with the nature of information desired, attempt to place the burden and cost of supplying information equally available to both solely upon the adversary, placing more burden upon the adversary than the value of the information warrants, etc.). Such improper methods of 'fishing' may be (and should be) controlled by the trial court under the powers granted to it by the statute." ( Id. at pp. 384-385.) The concerns for avoiding undue burdens on the "adversary" in the litigation expressed in Greyhound apply with even more weight to a nonparty.

(Calcor Space Facility v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224-25 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

In this regard, the court will examine whether Plaintiff has demonstrated good cause for the categories of documents requested.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not performing substantially similar work to her male counterparts, and that she was not as skilled, qualified or experienced as they were. Defendatn argues that is seeks to determine what information Plaintiff gave to Soapbox regarding the duties she performed at DNEG, as well as her skills, responsibilities, qualifications and experience. Defendant seeks to discover whether Plaintiff has the skills and qualifications to be an Executive Producer as she contends, her duties at Soapbox and whether she has performed them competently.

Defendant argues that such information is relevant to the inquiry under Labor Code, § 1197.5(a)(1)(A) – (D) which prohibits unequal wages to the opposite sex for substantially similar work when viewed as a composite of skill, effort and responsibility.

The constitutional right of privacy protects documents and communications in one’s employment files. (Board of Trustees v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528, overruled in part on other grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5^th 531, 557.) Moreover, although there may be an implicit partial waiver of the right of privacy in bringing suit, “the scope of such waiver must be narrowly, rather than expansively construed, so that plaintiffs will not be unduly deterred from instituting lawsuits by fear of exposure of private activities. (Citations omitted].) An implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1014 [italics in original, bold emphasis added].)

The California Supreme Court has held that a compelling interest or compelling need is not always required in order to discover private information—the Court must consider the factors articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4^th 1 to determine the seriousness of the privacy invasion and the strength of the countervailing interest required to overcome that invasion. (Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531.)

In ruling upon a privacy objection in the contact of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.) If the Court reaches the fourth step, the Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.) Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” or “compelling need[1]” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id. at 556-57.)

As noted above, Plaintiff has a legal protected privacy interest in her employment records, and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy as to subsequent employment. The threatened intrusion is serious, as it seeks the entirety of Plaintiff’s employment file from a third party employer.

The Court finds that Defendant has not articulated sufficient good cause for production of the requested documents, relative to a legitimate and important countervailing interest disclosure serves. In short, what Plaintiff represented on her resume to a prospective employer, her duties at her current employer and her performance in connection therewith, have little to no probative value as to her past situation with Defendant employer. What happened with Plaintiff’s future employment does not change the past circumstances which form the basis of Plaintiff’s Complaint.

As such, Plaintiff Brooke Stone’s motion to quash the subpoena for her employment records from third party Soapbox Films, LLC, is GRANTED in its entirety.

Plaintiff Jackie Stone brings a motion to quash subpoena for Plaintiff’s employment records from third party Lucasfilm, Ltd., LLC, her current employer, or to narrow the scope of the subpoena.

For the reasons discussed above re: Brook Stone’s motion to quash subpoena, Plaintiff Jackie Stone’s motion to quash the subpoena for her employment records from third party Lucasfilm, Ltd., LLC is GRANTED in its entirety.

[1] In this regard, Plaintiff’s repeated argument that Defendants must show a compelling need for the discovery is based on authority which has been overruled.