Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 21STCV14986, Date: 2023-09-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV14986    Hearing Date: September 21, 2023    Dept: 76

Plaintiffs allege that there were various defects with the 2016 Kia Optima they leased, including a defective 2.4L Theta II engine.

            The Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc.

            Plaintiffs move to tax Defendant’s memorandum of costs.

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiffs Angel Meza and Teresa Meza’s  motion to tax costs is DENIED in its entirety. 

ANALYSIS:

Discussion

Plaintiffs move to tax Defendant’s memorandum of costs.

Plaintiffs argue that Defendant may not recover costs under Civ. Proc. Code, § 998 because it was not made in good faith, and thus was not valid.  Plaintiffs also argue that the Song-Beverly Act, Civil Code, § 1794(d) only gives a prevailing buyer the right to recover attorney’s fees and expenses, but not prevailing defendants.  

            Neither of these arguments is meritorious. The Court entered judgment in favor of Defendant Kia Motors America, Inc. Therefore, Defendant is the prevailing party under Civ. Proc. Code, § 1032(a)(4)(a defendant as against those plaintiffs who do not recover any relief against that defendant). A prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute. (Civ. Proc. Code, § 1032(b)).  Nothing in the Song-Beverly Act places a limitation on the general costs statutes, and nothing in CCP § 998 modifies the categories of costs otherwise available to a prevailing party.

            Plaintiffs do not cite any statute which expressly precludes Defendant from recovering the costs set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 1033.5 as the prevailing party.  Defendant is not seeking to recover attorney’s fees, nor “expenses” which go beyond those in § 1033.5, as the courts have construed that term for purposes of Civ. Code, § 1794(d). “Examining the language of the statute (citation omitted), it is clear the Legislature intended the word "expenses" to cover items not included in the detailed statutory definition of "costs.’” (Jensen v. BMW of N. Am., Inc. (1995) 35 Cal. App. 4th 112, 137.)

            Nor is Defendant seeking to recover costs or expert witness fees, as provided for in Civ. Proc. Code, § 998(c)(1), which applies when plaintiff does not accept an offer and plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable judgment or award. That is, § 998(c)(1) applies even if plaintiff did obtain an award, but it was less than the § 998 offer.

            Here, Plaintiffs recovered nothing, so Defendant is the “prevailing party” under Civ. Proc. Code, § 1032(a)(4). The memorandum of costs seeks to recover filing and motion fees in the amount of $2,715.83 and deposition costs in the amount of $2,777.25. These costs are allowable pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code, § 1033.5(a)(1) and (3).

            Plaintiffs simply argue that Defendant has not substantiated these costs with documentation. The Court finds that Defendant has sufficiently explained these costs in the Memorandum of Costs Worksheet and attachments thereto. Plaintiffs’ argument is not persuasive.

            As such, the motion to tax costs is DENIED in its entirety.