Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 21STCV18290, Date: 2024-10-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV18290 Hearing Date: October 15, 2024 Dept: 76
The following
tentative ruling is issued pursuant to Rule of Court 3.1308 at 2:24 p.m. on October 14, 2024.
Notice of intent
to appear is REQUIRED pursuant to California Rule of Court 3.1308(a)(1). The Court does not desire oral argument on
the motion addressed herein.
As required by
Rule 3.1308(a)(1), any party seeking oral argument must notify ALL OTHER
PARTIES and the staff of Department 76 by 4:00 p.m. on October 14, 2024.
Notice to
Department 76 may be sent by email to smcdept76@lacourt.org or telephonically
at 213-830-0776.
Per Rule of Court
3.1308, if notice of intention to appear is not given, oral argument will not
be permitted.
Following a jury trial, the jury reached a verdict of no liability and judgment was entered in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff moves for a new trial.
TENTATIVE RULING
Plaintiff Eli Bachar’s motion for a new trial is DENIED.
ANALYSIS
Motion For New Trial
Defendant’s Evidentiary Objections
Declaration of Natan Davoodi
No. 1: OVERRULED. Not hearsay; permissible legal argument by
counsel.
No. 2: OVERRULED. Not hearsay; permissible legal argument by
counsel; goes to weight.
No. 3: OVERRULED. Not hearsay; permissible legal argument by
counsel.
No. 4: SUSTAINED, Hearsay; impermissible evidence regarding
jurors’ thought processes.
No. 5: SUSTAINED, Hearsay; impermissible evidence regarding
jurors’ thought processes.
No. 6: SUSTAINED, Hearsay; impermissible evidence regarding
jurors’ thought processes.
Discussion
Following a
jury trial, the jury reached a verdict of no liability and judgment was entered
in favor of Defendant. Plaintiff moves for a new trial.
The motion for new trial was filed
before the entry of judgment, so timeliness is not an issue. (Wenzoski v.
Cent. Banking Sys. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 539, 541 n.2.)
Plaintiff cites the following bases
for requesting a new trial as set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 657:
The verdict
may be vacated and any other decision may be modified or vacated, in whole or
in part, and a new or further trial granted on all or part of the issues, on
the application of the party aggrieved, for any of the following causes,
materially affecting the substantial rights of such party:
1. Irregularity
in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the
court or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a
fair trial.
. . .
6. Insufficiency
of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or the verdict or
other decision is against law.
7. Error
in law, occurring at the trial and excepted to by the party making the
application.
When a new
trial is granted, on all or part of the issues, the court shall specify the
ground or grounds upon which it is granted and the court’s reason or reasons
for granting the new trial upon each ground stated.
A new trial
shall not be granted upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to
justify the verdict or other decision, nor upon the ground of excessive or
inadequate damages, unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced
from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the
court or jury clearly should have reached a different verdict or decision.
The order
passing upon and determining the motion must be made and entered as provided in
Section 660 and if the motion is granted must state the ground or grounds
relied upon by the court, and may contain the specification of reasons. If an
order granting such motion does not contain such specification of reasons, the
court must, within 10 days after filing such order, prepare, sign and file such
specification of reasons in writing with the clerk. The court shall not direct
the attorney for a party to prepare either or both said order and said
specification of reasons.
(Civ. Proc. Code, § 657.)
PLAINTIFF ARGUES:
A new
trial is warranted in this case because the final verdict form submitted to the
jury wrongly combined the causes of action for which Plaintiff was seeking
relief in a manner that misled the jury in contradiction to directly applicable
law, wrongly allowed the jury to adjudicate all causes of action at issue
without addressing all relevant elements for each claim, and was thus rendered
defective for purposes of trial. On the basis of the defective verdict form,
the jury ultimately found in favor of Defendant FIE and against Plaintiff,
ultimately resulting in prejudice to the severe detriment of Plaintiff.
In preparation of trial,
as far back as April 26, 2024, Plaintiff had submitted the first of his
proposed special verdict forms for the claims at issue, while Plaintiff’s
second proposed verdict form followed. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 6; a true and
correct copy of Plaintiff’s proposed special verdict forms are attached as
Exhibit A to the Davoodi Decl.) Because the elements necessary for Plaintiff to
prove in order to prevail on each cause of action at issue differ from one
another, Plaintiff’s proposed verdict form listed questions pertinent to each
particular element necessary for Plaintiff to prove to prevail on each separate
causes of action. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 7.) However, Defendant FIE’s
proposed verdict form combined the Breach of Contract Claim, the Breach of Good
Faith Claim, Tortious Breach of Good Faith Claim, even though each of these
claims required Plaintiff to prove different elements to prevail. (See Davoodi
Decl., at ¶ 8.)
The Court
moved forward with the proposed jury form submitted by Defendant FIE and stated
(both prior to submitting the final verdict form to the jury and after the
final verdict was returned the signed verdict form) that any issue with the
verdict forms could be dealt with in a post-trial motion. A true and correct
copy of the final verdict form submitted to the jury is attached hereto as
Exhibit B. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 9.)
In rendering their verdict, the jury answered the first
three questions posed on the final verdict form as follows:
1. Did ELI BACHAR, an individual, suffer a loss,
all or part of which was covered under the insurance policy issued to him by
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE?
Answer: Yes
2. Was
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE notified of the loss as required by the policy?
Answer: Yes
3. Did FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE fail to pay
policy benefits owed to ELI BACHAR?
Answer: No
(See
Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 10.)
The
instructions following question three on the final verdict form instructed the
jury the following: “If your answer to question 3 is no, stop here, answer no
further questions, and have the presiding juror sign and date this form.” (See
Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 11; see also Ex. B thereto.)
Based on
these instructions, the jury stopped after answering no to question three,
answered no further questions, and had the presiding juror sign and date the
final verdict form. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 12.) Accordingly, judgement was
found in favor of Defendant FIE and against Plaintiff on all other Causes of
Actions. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 13.)
In review
of the final verdict form, it is clear that the final verdict form submitted to
the jury did not allow for the possibility of the jury to properly adjudicate
the Breach of Good Faith Claim or the Tortious Breach of Good Faith Claim, as
the final verdict form instructed the jury to stop their factual determination
entirely after answering “No” to whether Defendant FIE failed to pay policy
benefits, despite the fact that the jury could have found in favor of Plaintiff
with
regard to the Breach of Good Faith
Claim and the Tortious Breach of Good Faith Claim regardless of whether or not
Defendant FIE failed to pay policy benefits. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 14.)
Indeed,
this was confirmed when counsel for Plaintiff polled the jury after the verdict
came down. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 15.) When counsel (plural) for Plaintiff
asked the jurors that voluntarily remained behind to be polled whether their
determination of question three would have been different had the question read
“did Farmers Insurance Exchange fail to deliver what was promised under the
policy,” jurors responded that yes, it would have. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶
16.) Counsel for Plaintiff then asked whether their determination of question
three would have been different had the question read “did Farmers Insurance
Exchange fail to properly investigate Plaintiff’s claim,” and the polled jurors
again responded that yes, it would have. (See Davoodi Decl., at ¶ 17.) On this
basis, Plaintiff now moves for a new trial.
DEFENDANT ARGUES:
There
are two arguments which Defendant presents in the Opposition which the Court
finds persuasive: (1) Plaintiff waived the ability to challenge the verdict
form; and (2) Plaintiff’s conversations with jurors after the trial are
inadmissible and ineffective to warrant a new trial.
First, by
failing to correct the verdict form before the jury was discharged after
polling, Defendant forfeited the challenge to the verdict. Moreover,
Plaintiff’s counsel’s conversation with jurors after jury was discharged goes
to the jurors’ internal though processes which are inadmissible to impeach a
verdict.
We conclude that the same rules apply
when a new trial is granted based on an erroneous or misleading special verdict
question. Such a question has the same potential to misguide the jury and
result in a miscarriage of justice as an erroneous or misleading jury
instruction. The trial court must consider the special verdict form and
jury instructions as a whole, and the particular circumstances of the case, and
decide whether the question was erroneous or misleading and, if so, whether the
defect “materially affect[ed] the substantial rights of” the party moving for a
new trial (Code Civ. Proc., § 657).
b. The Court Granted a New Trial Based on Inadmissible Evidence
Evidence of jurors' internal thought
processes is inadmissible to impeach a verdict. (Evid. Code, § 1150,
subd. (a); 7 People v.
Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal.2d 342, 349–350 [**499] [78 Cal.
Rptr. 196, 455 P.2d 132] (Hutchinson).) Only evidence as to
objectively ascertainable statements, conduct, conditions, or events is
admissible to impeach a verdict. (Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a); In
re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294 [84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 403, 975 P.2d
600].) Juror declarations are admissible to the extent that they
describe overt [*1125] acts constituting jury misconduct, but they
are inadmissible to the extent that they describe the effect of any event on a
juror's subjective reasoning process. (In re Stankewitz (1985)
40 Cal.3d 391, 398 [220 Cal. Rptr. 382, 708 P.2d 1260].) Accordingly,
juror declarations are inadmissible to the extent that they purport to describe
the jurors' understanding of the instructions or how they arrived at their
verdict. (People v. Dillon (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1384, fn.
9 [95 Cal. Rptr. 3d 449]; Mesecher v. County of San Diego (1992)
9 Cal.App.4th 1677, 1684 [12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279] (Mesecher).)
The trial court here, to a large
degree, based its determination that the jury was misled by the special verdict
question and that its failure to provide proper guidance in response to the
jury's question was prejudicial on statements in two juror declarations.
. . .
The trial court cited and quoted part
of this quoted language in its order granting a new trial, as stated, ante.
The portions cited by the trial court [*1126] describe some of
the jurors' purported understanding of the words “potential risks” as used in
the special verdict form. Those portions of the declarations reflect the
jurors' subjective reasoning processes and therefore are inadmissible.
(Evid. Code, § 1150, subd. (a).)
(Bell v. Bayerische Motoren
Werke Aktiengesellschaft (2010) 181 Cal. App. 4th 1108, 1124-26 [bold
emphasis added].)
Any challenge to the verdict based
on the polling must be asserted before the jury is discharged if the purported
defect is apparent and could be corrected, or else the challenge is forfeited.
(Keener, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 262–268.) “Failure to object
to a verdict before the discharge of a jury and to request clarification or
further deliberation precludes a party from later questioning the validity of
that verdict if the alleged defect was apparent at the time the verdict was
rendered and could have been corrected.” (Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures,
Inc. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 512, 521 [143 Cal. Rptr. 247, 573 P.2d
465].) Further polling of the jury and sending the jury out for further
deliberations are means by which some defects can be corrected. (Keener,
supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 270; Henrioulle, supra, 20 Cal.3d at p.
522.) We conclude that the purported defect in the verdict was apparent
at the time of polling and could have been corrected either by polling the jury
a second time or by sending the jury out for further deliberations. Plaintiffs
forfeited their challenge to the verdict by failing to assert it before the
jury was discharged.
(Bell v. Bayerische Motoren
Werke Aktiengesellschaft (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1129-30 [bold
emphasis added].)
As such,
Plaintiff is deemed to have waived the right to challenge the verdict form and
the Court cannot consider the conversations which Plaintiff’s counsel had with
juror after the jury was discharged.