Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 21STCV18777, Date: 2024-03-04 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV18777    Hearing Date: March 4, 2024    Dept: 76

            Plaintiff alleges that Defendant has failed to repair the subject vehicle to conform to applicable warranties. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant concealed an engine defect.

            On September 23, 2021, the Court granted Defendant Hyundai Motor America moves to compel arbitration and to stay this action.

            Plaintiff moves for reconsideration of that order compelling arbitration.

TENTATIVE RULING

            Plaintiff Simone D. Day’s motion for reconsideration  of the Court’s November 1, 2021 order compelling arbitration is DENIED.

ANALYSIS

Motion For Reconsideration

Request For Judicial Notice

            Plaintiffs’ request that the Court take judicial notice of various appellate opinions and superior court rulings is DENIED as unnecessary. The Court need only take judicial notice of relevant materials. (Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1057, 1063, overruled in part on other grounds noted in In re Tobacco Cases II (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1257, 1276.) The Court may deny a request for judicial notice of material unnecessary to its decision. (Rivera v. First DataBank, Inc. (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 709, 713.)

Discussion

            Plaintiffs move for reconsideration of the Court’s September 23, 2021 order compelling arbitration. The notice of ruling was served by e-mail on October 1, 2021. This motion was filed and served on June 26, 2023—641 days after the Court’s order compelling arbitration was entered.

            Regarding motions for reconsideration, Civ. Proc. Code, § 1008 provides: 

(a) When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.

(b) A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown. For a failure to comply with this subdivision, any order made on a subsequent application may be revoked or set aside on ex parte motion.

(c) If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.

(d) A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by Section 128.7. In addition, an order made contrary to this section may be revoked by the judge or commissioner who made it, or vacated by a judge of the court in which the action or proceeding is pending.

(e) This section specifies the court’s jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.

(f) For the purposes of this section, an alleged new or different law shall not include a later enacted statute without a retroactive application.

(g) An order denying a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to subdivision (a) is not separately appealable. However, if the order that was the subject of a motion for reconsideration is appealable, the denial of the motion for reconsideration is reviewable as part of an appeal from that order.

(h) This section applies to all applications for interim orders.

     (Civ. Proc. Code § 1008 [bold emphasis and underlining added].)

            Here, because Plaintiffs were not the parties who originally brought the motion to compel arbitration, they cannot avail themselves of the limitless period set forth in Civ. Proc. Code, § 1008(b). Rather, they are parties affected by the Court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, and thus, are subject to the 10-day period. This motion is thus untimely.

            Plaintiffs cannot bring a motion pursuant to Civ. Proc. Code, § 1008(c), because that section expressly applies only where a court on its own motion reconsiders a prior order.

            Further, the Court in its discretion declines to reconsider the motion compelling arbitration on its own motion, despite subsequent published opinions which conflict with Felisilda. The Court also notes that the California Supreme Court granted review in Ford Motor Warranty Cases (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1324 on July 19, 2023. Moreover, despite other authority which conflicts with Felisilda, Plaintiff’s argument is that this Court committed an error of law. This is an issue for the appellate court, not a motion for reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration cannot correct judicial error. (Crotty v. Trader (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 765, 770-71.)

            The Court notes that both parties appear to have disobeyed this Court’s order compelling arbitration. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that they have attempted to proceed with arbitration.  

     The parties have not addressed whether the Court should set a completion date for the arbitration.  In the Court’s experience, it is not uncommon for cases ordered to arbitration to become mired in delays, which is antithetical to the concept of arbitration being an expeditious process for resolving disputes.  Such delays require the Court to monitor cases for an extended time, and may even result in one of the parties resorting to motion practice to kickstart the arbitration.  These situations place a burden on the parties and require unnecessary utilization of judicial resources.

       Code of Civil Procedure section 1283.8 governs the time within which an arbitrator’s award must be issued.  Under section 1283.8, when the parties’ agreement does not dictate a time limit, the Court may, on a party’s request, set a reasonable date for the completion of arbitration.  This authority allows the Court to facilitate the nature of arbitration as a speedy process for resolution of the parties’ disputes.  (Bosworth v. Whitmore (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 536, 546-47.)  The parties may agree to extend an arbitration completion time either before or after the time has expired.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1283.8.)  

        In Bosworth, the Court of Appeal noted that a party may petition the court to set a completion date once the arbitration proceedings have begun, but it is a better practice to set an arbitration completion date at the time a case is first ordered to arbitration.  (Bosworth, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at 550.)  When the Court issued the order compelling arbitration on September 23, 2021, the Court scheduled a post-arbitration status conference one year later.  

 At the post-arbitration status conference on September 22, 2022, counsel for Plaintiff indicated that the handling attorney on this case had left the firm and no arbitration had been scheduled.  The Court continued the post-arbitration status conference to June 19, 2023 and informed the parties that the Court would consider setting a definitive completion date if the parties had not completed arbitration by the next court date.

         The delay in this case raises a question:  how long is too long for a case to sit idle?  Standard 2.2 of the Standards of Judicial Administration provides that the goal of each trial court should be to manage unlimited civil cases from filing so that 100% of cases are disposed of within 24 months, or within three years for cases involving “exceptional circumstances.”  A single-plaintiff Song-Beverly case is not an unusual or novel case, and nothing in the record shows that anything about this case, filed nearly three years ago, is so out of the ordinary as to justify this degree of delay. 

            The motion for reconsideration is DENIED.