Judge: Christopher K. Lui, Case: 21STCV28812, Date: 2024-07-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV28812 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 76
Plaintiff Jamil Houston’s motion
to compel further responses to special interrogatories, set two, from Defendant
Resonant Technologies Group, LLC is GRANTED as to special interrogatories Nos.
21 – 35.
Further
responses are due within 30 days.
Plaintiff’s
request for sanctions against Defendant Resonant Technologies Group, LLC and
its counsel of record, Buchalter, jointly and severally is GRANTED in the
reduced amount of $3,368 for 6 total hours at $600/hour plus $80 in costs.
Sanctions are to be paid to Plaintiff’s counsel within 30 days.
ANALYSIS
Motion To Compel Further Responses Special
Interrogatories, Set Two
Plaintiff Jamil Houston moves to
compel further responses to special interrogatories, set one from Defendant
Resonant Technologies Group, LLC, and requests sanctions.
(a) On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party
may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party
deems that any of the following apply:
(1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete.
(2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section
2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is
inadequate.
(3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.
(b)
(1) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and
confer declaration under Section 2016.040.
(2) In lieu of a separate statement required under the California
Rules of Court, the court may allow the moving party to submit a concise
outline of the discovery request and each response in dispute.
(c) Unless notice of this motion is given within 45 days of the
service of the verified response, or any supplemental verified response, or on
or before any specific later date to which the propounding party and the
responding party have agreed in writing, the propounding party waives any right
to compel a further response to the interrogatories.
(d) The court shall impose a monetary sanction under Chapter 7
(commencing with Section 2023.010) against any party, person, or attorney who
unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a further response to
interrogatories, unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted
with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition
of the sanction unjust.
(e) If a party then fails to obey an order compelling further response
to interrogatories, the court may make those orders that are just, including
the imposition of an issue sanction, an evidence sanction, or a terminating
sanction under Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010). In lieu of, or in
addition to, that sanction, the court may impose a monetary sanction under
Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 2023.010).
(Code
Civ. Proc § 2030.300 [bold emphasis added].)
Defendant
Resonant Technologies Group, LLC served responses on June 1, 2023. (Declaration
of Alishan Jadhavji, ¶ 5; Exh. B.) The parties agreed to an extension of December
8, 2023 to file the motion. (Id., ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff’s
counsel engaged in meet and confer efforts prior to filing the motion. (Id.)
The Court
will address the special interrogatories set forth in the separate statement:
¿ Special Interrogatory Nos. 21 – 35: GRANTED.
Defendant
indicated it would not respond to the interrogatory.
Defendant’s
objections are OVERRULED as without merit.
Further, any objections not
asserted in the response have been waived. Objections which the responding
party did not raise in initial responses are deemed to have been waived. (Scottsdale Ins. Co.
v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 263, 272-76 [holding that the attorney-client
privilege was waived by failing to present the objection in the initial
response to requests for production of documents].) Defendants’ sole recourse is to seek a relief
from waiver pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 2031.300(a)(1) & (2). (Id. at 274-75 [noting that the “sole remedy
for relief from waiver in the context of discovery is contained within the
provisions of the Act and [a party] cannot rely upon the provisions of [Code of
Civil Procedure] section 473.”])
Notably,
Defendant is simply engaging in an ipse dixit as to its potential liability, which
is not relevant. Plaintiff is entitled to discovery on evidence regarding a
potential alter ego liability theory, or other theory to hold Defendant liable
as a joint employer.
As a general matter, the statutory scheme imposes no obligation on a
party propounding interrogatories to establish good cause or prove up the
merits of any underlying claims. (See Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2017.010,
2030.010–2030.310.) . . .
. . . [*551] . . .
. . . “California law permits
the use of discovery to get information necessary to plead a cause of action” (citation omitted); it also permits
the use of discovery to determine whether an individual dispute is only a drop
in the pond and a broader representative action is warranted. “Doubts as to
whether particular matters will aid in a party's preparation for trial should
generally be resolved in favor of permitting discovery; this is especially true
when the precise issues of the litigation or the governing legal standards are
not clearly established.” (Citations omitted.) In pursuing such discovery, the strength or
weakness of the plaintiff's individual claim is immaterial: “[I]t is well
established that relevancy of the subject matter does not depend upon a legally
sufficient pleading, nor is it restricted to the issues formally raised in the
pleadings.” (Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., at p. 10.)
(Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3
Cal.5th 531, 550-51.)
Moreover,
Plaintiff is entitled to discover information which go to defining the scope of
a representative action:
Marshalls also
contends the trial court had discretion, based on the “extremely meager
showing that plaintiffs' counsel has made in this case,” to condition
interrogatory responses on prior submission to a deposition and substantive
proof of the complaint's allegations. But California law has
long made clear that to require a party to supply proof of any claims or
defenses as a condition of discovery in support of those claims or defenses is
to place the cart before the horse. The Legislature was aware that
establishing a broad right to discovery might permit parties lacking any valid
cause of action to engage in “fishing expedition[s],” to a defendant's
inevitable annoyance. (Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, supra,
56 Cal.2d at p. 385.) It granted such a right anyway, comfortable in the
conclusion that “[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation.” (Id. at p. 386.)
That the eventual proper scope of a putative representative action
is as yet uncertain is no obstacle to discovery; a party may proceed with
interrogatories and other discovery methods precisely in order to ascertain
that scope. (Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 1, 9–12 [145 Cal. Rptr.
316].) In Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., the plaintiff in an
insurance dispute issued interrogatories seeking information about other
insureds nationwide. The defendant objected on the ground no national
class action had been alleged and the answers at best would inform the
plaintiff as to whether to amend to allege such a class action. The Court
of Appeal explained, “[t]his is the precise reason why the discovery should be
permitted.” (Id. at p. 12.) “California law permits the use of
discovery to get information necessary to plead a cause of action” (id.
at p. 11); it also permits the use of discovery to determine whether an
individual dispute is only a drop in the pond and a broader representative action
is warranted. “Doubts as to whether particular matters will aid in a
party's preparation for trial should generally be resolved in favor of
permitting discovery; this is especially true when the precise issues of the
litigation or the governing legal standards are not clearly established.” (Ibid.;
see Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1982)
31 Cal.3d 785, 791, fn. 8 [183 Cal. Rptr. 810, 647 P.2d 86].) In
pursuing such discovery, the strength or weakness of the plaintiff's individual
claim is immaterial: “[I]t is well established that relevancy of the subject
matter does not depend upon a legally sufficient pleading, nor is it restricted
to the issues formally raised in the pleadings.” (Union Mut. Life Ins.
Co., at p. 10.)
[*552]
It follows that a party allegedly subject to an illegal employment
policy need not already have direct, personal knowledge of how prevalent
that policy is to seek contact information for other employees that may
allow the plaintiff to determine the proper extent of any representative
action. Instead, the contact information is reasonably understood as a
legitimate “starting point for further investigations” through which a
plaintiff may “‘educate [himself or herself] concerning [the parties’] claims
and defenses.’” (Puerto v. Superior Court, supra, 158
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1250,De 1249.)
In sum: Marshalls
made no showing of the burden disclosure would impose, and the statutory scheme
imposes no good cause requirement for seeking information by interrogatory.
Accordingly, on the record here, claims of undue burden do not support the
trial court's refusal to permit Williams discovery of statewide employee
contact information until he supplies Marshalls with discovery and establishes
both some merit to his personal claim and reason to be certain others had
similar claims.
(Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.
5th 531, 550-52 [bold emphasis added].)
“Discovery may be obtained of the identity and location of persons having
knowledge of any discoverable matter. . . .”
(Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.)
Indeed, our discovery system is founded on the
understanding that parties use discovery to obtain names and contact
information for possible witnesses as the starting point for further
investigations: “The Civil Discovery Act also provides that a party may obtain
information by the use of various methods, including oral and written
depositions. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2020.010, subd. (a).) The party's ability to
subpoena witnesses presumes that he has the witnesses' contact information.”
(Dixon, at p. 443.)
(Puerto v. Superior Court
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249.)
Moreover,
the fact that identical responses have been provided to co-Plaintiff Land does
not render the special interrogatories moot as to Plaintiff Houston. Even
duplicative discovery propounded by the same party may be permitted.
It follows that the selection of the
method of discovery to be utilized is to be made by the party seeking
discovery. It cannot be dictated by the opposing party. (Citations omitted.)
Moreover, the choice is subject to a trial court's control only to the extent
consistent with express statutory limitations. ( Greyhound Corp. v. Superior
Court, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 383.) n4 A party is permitted to use multiple
methods of obtaining discovery and the fact that information was disclosed
under one method is not, standing alone, a proper basis for refusing to provide
discovery under another method. ( Coy v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210,
218-219 [23 Cal.Rptr. 393, 373 P.2d 457].)
(Irvington-Moore,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 733, 739.)
Moreover:
A party is generally entitled to discovery upon a showing, not that he
knows what he will find, but that it is reasonable to expect the proposed
discovery to yield pertinent and otherwise admissible evidence. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 2017.010; former Code Civ. Proc., § 2017, subd. (a), enacted 1986,
repealed Stats. 2004, ch. 182.)
(City of King City v. Community Bank of
Central California (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 913, 931.)
If the
responses are truly duplicative, then Defendant can simply cut and paste the
responses and verify them.
Further
responses are due within 30 days.
Plaintiff’s
request for sanctions against Defendant Resonant Technologies Group, LLC and
its counsel of record, Buchalter, jointly and severally is GRANTED in the
reduced amount of $3,368 for 6 total hours at $600/hour plus $80 in costs.
(Decl. of Aishan A. Jadhavji, ¶ 12.) Sanctions are to be paid to Plaintiff’s
counsel within 30 days.