Judge Christopher K. Lui, Case Number: 22STCP02726, Date: 2024-01-17 Tentative Ruling

Petitioners Mohsen Amjadi and Saeid Amjadi move to compel Respondent Farmers Insurance to arbitrate pursuant to the Uninsured Motorist coverage of the automobile insurance policy issued by Farmers to Petitions.

Petitioners bring a motion for protective order re: phone records, and request sanctions.

Petitioners Mohsen Amjadi and Saeid Amjadi’s motion for a protective order and request for sanctions is DENIED.

Petitioners bring a motion for protective order re: phone records, and request sanctions. Petitioners argues that Farmers should only be entitled to the relevant data sought through the proper legal channels during the arbitration discovery process, such as calls and text message to the specific number provided by the driver of the other vehicle which collided into Petitioners.

The parties must apply to this Court for resolution of discovery disputes, and any questions of coverage, before the arbitrable issues arise.

Any proper court to which application is first made by either the insured or the insurer under Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure for any discovery or other relief or remedy, shall thereafter be the only court to which either of the parties shall make any applications under Title 4 (commencing with Section 2016.010) of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to the same accident, subject, however, to the right of the court to grant a change of venue after a hearing upon notice, upon any of the grounds upon which change of venue might be granted in an action filed in the superior court.

Under Insurance Code § 11580.2(f)(2), the Superior Court has exclusive jurisdiction in discovery disputes in uninsured motorist arbitrations:

We conclude the court had the power to rule on the discovery dispute. And because we conclude the Legislature could not have intended the arbitrator and the court to possess concurrent power, the uninsured motorist law grants the superior court the exclusive jurisdiction to hear discovery matters arising under uninsured motorist arbitrations. Invested with the exclusive power to rule, and because the uninsured motorist statute makes available “all rights, remedies, obligations, liabilities and procedures set forth in [the Civil Discovery Act]” (§ 11580.2, subd. (f)), the court necessarily had the power to dismiss the case as a terminating sanction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2023, subds. (a)(7) & (b)(4)(C).)

Here, moving parties cite Civ. Proc. Code, § 2017.020(a) as the statutory authority for this protective order. That section provides:

(a) The court shall limit the scope of discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other affected person. This motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

Here, counsel for moving party did not submit a sufficient meet and confer declaration regarding this protective order motion, as required by § 2017.020(a). Counsel Mitra Chegini vaguely indicates that a meet and confer effort was made attempted in May 2022. (Chegini Decl., ¶ 7.) However, the Declaration is dated April 14, 2023.

Moreover, moving party has not demonstrated good cause for a protective order which would prohibit the production of any phone records. Indeed, moving party makes a generalized reference to the right of privacy, without engaging in the Hill balancing test:

In ruling upon a privacy objection in the contact of discovery, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest. (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at 552.) The party asserting a privacy right must also establish an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances. (Id.) Further, the party asserting a privacy right must establish a threatened intrusion that is serious. (Id.) The Court need not proceed to the fourth step of balancing competing interests if all three of the above are not satisfied. (Id. at 555.) If the Court reaches the fourth step, the Court must balance these competing considerations: The party seeking information may raise whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves. (Id. at 552.) The party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. (Id.) Courts may not require the party seeking discovery to demonstrate a “compelling state interest” or “compelling need[1]” simply because discovery of any facially private information is sought. (Id. at 556-57.)

Marshalls argues Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th 1 did not overrule the compelling interest/compelling need test, but only concluded such an interest need not be shown in every case. This is correct so far as it goes. A threatened invasion of privacy can, to be sure, be extremely grave, and to the extent it is, to conclude in a given case that only a compelling countervailing interest and an absence of alternatives will suffice to justify the intrusion may be right. (See, e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics v. Lungren (1997) 16 Cal.4th 307, 340–342 [66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 940 P.2d 797].) But the flaw in the Court of Appeal's legal analysis, and in the cases it relied upon, is the de facto starting assumption that such an egregious invasion is involved in every request for discovery of private information. Courts must instead place the burden on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies, as Hill requires. What suffices to justify an invasion will, as Marshalls recognizes, vary according to the context. Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest. (Hill, at p. 34.) To the extent prior cases require a party seeking discovery of private information to always establish a compelling interest or compelling need, without regard to the other considerations articulated in Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, they are disapproved.

[1] In this regard, Plaintiff’s repeated argument that Defendants must show a compelling need for the discovery is based on authority which has been overruled.